PEACEMAKERS- 
BLESSED  AND  OTHERWISE 

Observations,  Reflections  and  Irritations 
at  an  International  Conference 


BY 
IDA  M.  TARBELL 


FATHER  ABRAHAM 
IN  LINCOLN'S  CHAIR 
HE  KNEW  LINCOLN 
THE  WAYS  OF  WOMAN 
THE  RISING  OF  THE  TIDE 
NEW  IDEALS  IN  BUSINESS 
LIFE  OF  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN 
HE  KNEW  LINCOLN,  AND  OTHER  BILLY  BROWN 
STORIES. 


PEACEMAKERS- 
BLESSED  AND  OTHERWISE 

Observations,    Reflections    and    Irritations    at    an 
International  Conference 


BY 

IDA  M.  TARBELL 


gorfc 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
1922 

All  rights  reserved 


•  *  • '     "*..;,' 

PRINTED  IN  THE  UNITED   STATES   OF  AMERICA 


COPYRIGHT,  1922, 
BY  THE   MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

Set  up  and  printed.     Published  April,    1822. 


Press  of 

J.  J.  Little  &  Ives  Company 
New  York,  U.  S.  A. 


FOREWORD 

This  book  does  not  pretend  to  be  a  history 
or  even  an  adequate  review  of  the  work  of 
the  Conference  on  the  Limitation  of  Arma- 
ment, nor  does  it  pretend  to  be  the  writer's 
full  appraisement  of  that  work.  It  is  what 
its  sub-title  suggests,  a  collection  of  ob- 
servations, rejections  and  irritations. 
These  were  set  down  each  week  of  the  first 
two  months  of  the  Conference  and  were  pub- 
lished practically  as  they  stand  here  by  the 
McClure  Syndicate. 

I.  M.  T. 


471 


a 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTBB 

I.    PRE-CONFERENCK  REFLECTIONS  .      .  1 

II.    ARMISTICE  DAY 29 

III.    NOVEMBER  12,  1921 41 

IV.    THE  FRENCH  AT  THE  CONFERENCE   .  60 

V.    THE  PARIS  SHRINE  OF  OUR  LADY  OF 

HATES 83 

VI.    WHY  DID  HE  Do   IT?    ....  99 

VII.    DRAMATIC  DIPLOMACY       .      .      .      .  114 

VIII.    THE  MOODS  OF  AN   INTERNATIONAL 

CONFERENCE 137 

IX.    PUT  YOURSELF  IN  THEIR  PLACES     .  160 

X.    CHINA  AT  THE  CONFERENCE  .      .      .  186 

XI.    THE  MEASURE  OF  THE  WASHINGTON 

CONFERENCE  .                               .  206 


PEACEMAKERS- 
BLESSED  AND  OTHERWISE 

Observations,  Reflections  cmd  Irritations 
at  an  International  Conference 


PEACEMAKERS  BLESSED 
AND  OTHERWISE 

CHAPTEE  I 

PRE-CONFERENCE    REFLECTIONS 

WHEN  one  attempts  to  set  down,  with 
any  degree  of  candor,  his  impressions  of  a 
great  gathering  like  the  Conference  on  the 
Limitation  of  Armament,  he  will  find  him- 
self swayed  from  amusement  to  irritation, 
from  hope  to  despair,  from  an  interest  in 
the  great  end  to  an  interest- in  the  game  as 
it  is  being  played.  My  hopes  and  interests 
and  irritations  over  the  Washington  Con- 
ference began  weeks  before  it  was  called. 
What  could  it  do?  All  around  me  men  and 
women  were  saying,  "It  will  end  war/7  and 
1 


PEACEMAKERS 


possibly — so  deep  was  the  demand  in  them 
that  war  be  ended — believing  what  they 
said.  It  has  always  been  one  of  the  singu- 
lar delusions  of  people  with  high  hopes 
that  if  nations  disarmed  there  could  be  no 
wars.  Take  the  gun  away  from  the  child 
and  he  will  never  hurt  himself.  If  it  were 
so  easy! 

Their  confidence  alarmed  the  authors  of 
the  Conference.  They  did  not  mean  dis- 
armament, but  limitation  of  armament. 
Moreover  it  was  not  even  a  Conference  for 
but  one  on  limitation.  This  was  equivalent 
to  saying  that  there  were  other  matters  in- 
volved in  cutting  down  arms — the  causes 
that  had  brought  them  into  being  in  the 
first  place,  the  belief  that  only  in  them  was 
security,  and  that  if  you  were  to  do  away 
with  them  you  must  find  a  substitute,  and 
a  way  to  make  this  substitute  continually 
effective.  That  is,  there  were  several  prob- 
lems for  the  Conference  to  solve  if  they 
were  to  put  a  limit  to  armaments,  and  they 
2 


PKE-CONFEBElSrCE  BEFLECTIONS 

were  not  easy  problems.  But  those  who 
kept  their  eyes  on  disarmament,  pure  and 
simple,  refused  to  face  them. 

Along  with  the  many  who  believed  the 
coming  Conference  could  say  the  magic 
word  were  not  a  few — the  sophisticated, 
who  from  the  start  said :  "Well,  of  course, 
you  don't  expect  anything  to  come  out  of 
it."  Or,  "Are  you  not  rather  naive  to  sup- 
pose that  they  will  do  anything?"  And 
generally  the  comment  was  followed  by 
"Of  course  nothing  came  from  Paris." 

This  superior  attitude — sometimes  van- 
ity, sometimes  disillusionment,  sometimes 
resentment  at  trying  any  new  form  of  in- 
ternational dealing — was  quite  useless  to 
combat.  You  had  an  endless  task  of  course 
if  you  attacked  them  on  the  point  of  nothing 
coming  out  of  Paris  when  you  believed  pro- 
foundly that  a  great  deal  of  good,  as  well  as 
much  evil,  had  come  out  of  Paris,  and  that 
the  good  is  bound  to  increase  and  the  evil  to 
diminish  as  time  goes  on. 
3 


PEACEMAKEKS 

Very  singular,  the  way  that  people  dis- 
miss the  treaty  of  Versailles,  drop  it  out 
of  count  as  a  thing  so  bungling  and  evil 
that  it  is  bound  to  eventuate  only  in  wars, 
bound  to  be  soon  upset.  The  poor  human 
beings  that  made  the  treaty  of  Versailles 
lacked  omniscience,  to  be  sure,  and  they  cer- 
tainly strained  their  "fourteen  points,"  but 
it  will  be  noted  that  not  a  few  of  the  ar- 
rangements that  they  made  are  working 
fairly  well. 

Moreover,  what  the  Superior  forget  is 
that  that  treaty  had  an  instrument  put  into 
it  intended  for  its  own  correction.  The 
Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  is  a  part 
of  the  treaty  of  Versailles  and  it  says  very 
specifically  that  if  at  any  time  in  the  fu- 
ture any  treaty — if  that  means  anything  it 
must  include  the  treaty  of  Versailles — be- 
comes "inapplicable,"  works  disturbance 
between  the  nations  instead  of  peace,  the 
League  may  consider  it. 

The  belief  in  political  magic  on  one  side 
4 


PRE-CONFERENCE  REFLECTIONS 

and  doubt  of  all  new  political  ventures  on 
the  other,  made  the  preliminary  days  of  the 
Washington  Conference  hard  for  the  simple- 
minded  observer,  prepared  to  hope  for  the 
best  and  to  take  no  satisfaction  in  the 
worst,  not  to  ask  more  than  the  conferring 
powers  thought  they  could  safely  under- 
take, to  believe  that  the  negotiators  would 
be  as  honest  as  we  can  expect  men  to  be, 
and  that  within  the  serious  limits  that  are 
always  on  negotiators,  would  do  their  best. 
One  had  to  ask  himself,  however,  what 
substantial  reasons,  if  any,  he  had  that  the 
Conference  would  be  able  to  do  the  things 
that  it  had  set  down  as  its  business.  This 
business  was  very  concisely  laid  down  in  an 
agenda,  divided  into  two  parts  and  running 
as  follows: 

Limitation  of  Armaments: 

(1)  Limitation  of  naval  armaments  under  which 
shall  be  discussed  the  following: 

(A)  Basis  of  limitation 

(B)  Extent 
(0)  Fulfillment 

(D)  Rules  for  control  of  new  agencies  of  war- 
fare 

5 


PEACEMAKEES 

(E)  Limitation  of  land  armaments. 
Far  Eastern  Questions : 

(1)  Questions  relating  to  China 

First.    Principles  to  be  applied 
Second.    Application 
Subjects : 

(A)  Territorial  integrity 

(B)  Administrative  integrity 

(C)  Open  door 

(B)  Concessions,  monopolies,  preferen- 
tial privileges 

(E)  Development  of  railways,  includ- 

ing    plans     relative     to     the 
Chinese  Eastern  Railway 

(F)  Preferential  railway  rates 

(G)  Status  of  existing  commitments. 
Siberia: 

Sub-headings  the  same  as  those  under  China. 
Mandated  Islands : 

Sub-headings  the  same  as  those  under  China  with 
railway  sections  eliminated. 

What  reasons  were  there  for  thinking 
that  the  nations — England,  France,  Italy, 
China,  Japan,  Belgium,  Holland,  Portugal 
— could,  with  the  United  States,  handle 
these  problems  of  the  Pacific  in  such  a  way 
that  they  would  be  able  to  cut  their  arma- 
ments, and,  cutting  them,  find  a  satisfactory 
substitute.  There  were  several  reasons. 

A  first,  and  an  important  one,  was  that 
the  difficulties  to  be  adjusted  were,  as  de- 


PKE-CONFEKENCE  EEFLECTIONS 

fined,  confined  to  one  side  only  of  the  earth's 
surface  which,  if  huge,  is  nevertheless  fairly 
simple,  being  mostly  water.  It  was  the 
problems  of  the  Pacific  Ocean  that  they  pre- 
pared to  handle.  These  problems  are  com- 
paratively definite — the  kind  of  thing  that 
you  can  get  down  on  paper  with  something 
like  precision.  They  had  one  great  advan- 
tage, and  that  is  that  in  the  main  they  did 
not  involve  a  past  running  into  the  dim  dis- 
tance. England  has  held  Hongkong  for 
only  about  eighty  years.  We,  the  United 
States,  have  had  port  privileges  in  China 
only  since  1844.  France  first  got  a  strong- 
hold in  Cochin  China  in  1862,  and  her  pro- 
tectorate over  Annam  is  less  than  forty 
years  old.  It  was  only  twenty -five  years  ago 
that  the  war  between  Japan  and  China  over 
Korea  began;  the  complications  in  eastern 
Kussia  are  still  younger.  So  are  those  in 
Shantung,  Yap,  the  Philippine  Islands. 
That  is,  the  chief  bones  of  contention  in  the 
Conference  were  freshly  picked.  In  most 
7 


PEACEMAKEES 

of  the  cases  there  were  men  still  living  who 
helped  in  the  picking. 

It  was  the  same  when  it  came  to  conces- 
sions. The  question  of  the  ownership  and 
administration  of  railroads  and  mines — 
they  belong  to  our  age.  We  can  put  our 
fingers  on  their  beginnings,  trace  with  some 
certainty  what  has  happened,  find  the  in- 
triguers, the  bribe  givers  and  takers,  the 
law  breaker,  if  such  there  have  been.  In 
the  case  of  most  of  the  concessions  we  can 
get  our  hands  upon  the  very  men  involved 
in  securing  them  and  in  carrying  on  their 
development. 

How  different  from  the  problems  of  Eu- 
rope, running  as  they  do  through  century 
after  century,  involving  as  they  do  succes- 
sions of  invasions,  of  settlements,  of  con- 
quests, of  incessant  infiltration  of  different 
races,  and  the  consequent  mingling  of 
social,  political,  industrial  and  religious 
notions.  The  quarrels  of  Europe  are  as 
old  as  its  civilization,  their  bases  are  lost 
8 


PRE-COOTERENCE  REFLECTIONS 

in  the  past.  Without  minimizing  at  all  the 
difficulty  of  the  questions  on  the  agenda  of 
the  Conference,  they  did  have  the  advan- 
tage of  being  of  recent  date. 

There  was1  encouragement  in  the  rela- 
tions of  the  conferees.  These  were  not 
enemy  nations,  fresh  from  wars,  meeting  to 
make  treaties.  They  were  nations  that  for 
five  years  had  been  allies,  and  from  the  life- 
and-death  necessity  of  cooperation  had 
gained  a  certain  solidarity.  True,  their 
machinery  of  cooperation  was  pretty  well 
shot  up.  The  frictions  of  peace  are  harder 
on  international  machinery  than  the  shells 
of  war.  The  former  racks  it  to  pieces;  the 
latter  solidifies  it.  Nevertheless,  the  na- 
tions that  were  coming  to  the  Conference 
were  on  terms  of  fairly  friendly  acquaint- 
ance, an  acquaintance  which  had  stood  a 
tremendous  test. 

These  nations  had  all  committed  them- 
selves solemnly  to  certain  definite  ideals, 
laid  down  by  the  United  States  of  America. 
9 


PEACEMAKERS 

True,  their  ideals  were  badly  battered,  and 
as  a  government  we  were  in  the  anomalous 
position  of  temporarily  abandoning  them 
after  having  committed  our  friends  to  them. 
However,  they  still  stood  on  their  feet, 
these  ideals. 

It  could  be  counted  as  an  advantage  that 
the  associations  of  the  years  of  the  War 
had  made  the  men  who  would  represent  the 
different  nations  at  the  Conference  fairly 
well  acquainted  with  one  another.  What- 
ever disappointments  there  might  be  in  the 
delegations  we  could  depend  upon  it  that 
the  men  chosen  would  be  tried  men.  They 
were  pretty  sure  to  be  men  of  trustworthy 
character,  with  records  of  respectable 
achievement,  men  like  Eoot  and  Hughes 
and  Underwood  in  our  own  delegation. 
They  would  not  come  unknown  to  each 
other  or  unknown  to  the  nations  involved. 
It  would  be  a  simple  matter  for  us,  the 
public,  to  become  acquainted  with  their 
records.  If  by  any  unhappy  chance  there 
10 


PBB-COOTBBBNCB  KEFLECTIONS 

should  be  among  them  a  political  intriguer, 
that,  too,  would  be  known. 

These  were  all  good  reasons  for  expect- 
ing that  the  Conference  might  do  something 
of  what  it  started  out  for.  How  much  of  it 
it  would  do  and  how  permanent  that  which 
it  did  would  be  would  depend  in  no  small 
degree  upon  the  attitude  of  mind  of  this 
country,  whether  the  backing  that  we  gave 
the  Conference  was  one  of  emotionalism  or 
intelligence.  We  were  starting  out  with  a 
will  to  succeed ;  we  were  going  to  spend  our 
first  day  praying  for  success.  It  would  be 
well  if  we  injected  into  those  prayers  a 
supplication  for  self-control,  clearness  of 
judgment,  and  willingness  to  use  our  minds 
as  well  as  our  hearts  in  the  struggles  that 
were  sure  to  come. 

Alarms  went  along  with  these  hopes. 
There  were  certain  very  definite  things  that 
might  get  in  the  way  of  the  success  of  the 
Conference — things  that  often  frustrate  the 
best  intentions  of  men,  still  they  were  mat- 
11 


PEACEMAKEKS 

ters  over  which  the  public  and  the  press 
would  have  at  least  a  certain  control,  if 
they  took  a  high  and  intelligent  view  of 
their  own  responsibility. 

First,  there  were  the  scapegoats.  There 
are  bound  to  be  periods  in  all  human  under- 
takings when  the  way  is  obscure,  when  fail- 
ure threatens,  when  it  is  obvious  that  cer- 
tain things  on  which  we  have  set  our  hearts 
are  unobtainable.  Irritation  and  dis- 
couragement always  characterize  these 
periods.  It  is  here  that  we  fall  back  on  a 
scapegoat.  An  international  conference 
usually  picks  one  or  more  before  it  gets 
through — a  nation  which  everybody  com- 
bines to  call  obstinate,  unreasonable, 
greedy,  a  spoke  in  the  wheel.  Then  comes 
a  hue  and  cry,  a  union  of  forces — not  to 
persuade  but  to  overwhelm  the  recalci- 
trant, to  displace  it,  drive  it  out  of  court. 
The  spirit  of  adjustment,  and  of  accommo- 
dation which  is  of  the  very  essence  of  suc- 
cess in  an  undertaking  like  the  Conference 
12 


FEE-CONFERENCE  REFLECTIONS 

on  the  Limitation  of  Armaments  is  always 
imperiled  and  frequently  ruined  by  fixing 
on  a  scapegoat.  Would  this  happen  at 
Washington? 

Of  course  the  nation  on  which  irritation 
and  suspicion  were  concentrated  might  be 
in  the  wrong.  It  might  be  deep  in  evil  in- 
trigue. It  might  be  shockingly  greedy.  But 
it  was  a  member  of  the  Conference  and  the 
problem  must  be  worked  out  with  it.  You 
work  nothing  out  with  scapegoats.  Abra- 
ham Lincoln  once  laid  down  a  principle  of 
statesmanship  which  applies.  "Honest 
statesmanship" he  said,  "is  the  employment 
of  individual  meanness  for  the  public 
good." 

It  takes  brains,  humor,  self-control  to  put 
any  such  rule  as  this  in  force.  If  unhap- 
pily the  Conference  did  not  furnish  a  suffi- 
cient amount  of  these  ingredients,  would 
the  press  and  public  make  good  the  deficit? 
They  are  always  in  a  strategic  position 
where  they  can  insist  that  everybody  must 
13 


PEACEMAKERS 

be  considered  innocent  until  he  is  proved 
guilty,  that  nothing  be  built  on  suspicion, 
everything  on  facts.  Something  very  im- 
portant for  them  to  remember  if  they  in- 
sisted was  that  these  facts  had  a  history, 
that  they  were  not  isolated  but  related  to  a 
series  of  preceding  events.  For  instance, 
there  was  the  high  hand  that  Japan  had 
played  with  China.  We  must  admit  it. 
But  in  doing  so  we  must  not  forget  that 
it  was  only  about  sixty  years  ago  that  the 
very  nations  with  whom  Japan  was  now 
to  meet  in  council  in  Washington  had  gath- 
ered with  their  fleets  in  one  of  her  ports 
and  used  their  guns  to  teach  her  the  beau- 
ties of  Christian  civilization.  She  had  de- 
cided to  learn  their  lessons.  She  has  won- 
derful imitative  powers.  She  had  followed 
them  into  China,  and  if  she  had  played  a 
higher  hand  there  than  any  of  them — and 
there  might  be  a  question  as  to  that — it 
should  be  remembered  that  she  had  only 
sixty  years  in  which  to  learn  the  degree  of 


PRE-CONFERENCE  REFLECTIONS 

greed  that  can  safely  be  practiced  in  our 
modern  civilization.  We  must  consider 
that  possibly  she  had  not  had  sufficient 
time  to  learn  to  temper  exploitation  with 
civilized  discretion. 

No  scapegoats.  No  hues  and  cries.  And 
certainly  no  partisanship.  Was  it  possible 
for  the  United  States  to  hold  a  truly  na- 
tional parley,  one  in  which  party  ambitions 
and  antipathies  did  not  influence  the  nego- 
tiations? We  had  had  within  three  years  a 
terrible  lesson  of  the  lengths  to  which  men's 
partisanship  will  go  in  wrecking  even  the 
peace  of  the  world.  Would  we  repeat  that 
crime?  It  was  an  ugly  question,  and  be  as 
optimistic  as  I  would  I  hated  to  face  it. 

There  was  another  danger  on  the  face  of 
things — crudeness  of  opinion.  We  love  to 
be  thought  wise.  There  are  thousands  of 
us  who  in  the  pre-Conference  days  were 
getting  out  our  maps  to  find  out  where  Yap 
lay  or  the  points  between  which  the  Eastern 
Chinese  railroad  ran,  who  would  be  tempted 
15 


PEACEMAKERS 

sooner  or  later  to  become  violent  partisans 
of,  we  will  say:  Yap  for  America — Shan- 
tung for  China — Vladivostok  for  the  Far 
Eastern  Republic.  There  was  danger  in 
obstinate  views  based  on  little  knowledge 
or  much  knowledge  of  a  single  factor. 

And  there  were  the  sacrifices.  Were  we 
going  to  accept  beforehand  that  if  we  were 
to  have  the  limitation  of  armament  which 
we  desired — we,  the  United  States  might 
have  to  sacrifice  some  definite  thing — a 
piece  of  soil,  a  concession,  a  naval  base  in 
the  Pacific — and  that  nothing  more  fatal 
to  the  success  of  the  Conference  could  be 
than  for  us  to  set  our  teeth  and  say :  "We 
must  have  this" — quite  as  fatal  as  setting 
our  teeth  and  saying :  "This  or  that  nation 
must  do  this." 

But  my  chief  irritation  in  these  pre-Con- 
ference  days  lay  with  the  agenda.  It  was 
illogical  to  place  limitation  of  armament  at 
the  head  of  the  program.  That  was  an 
effect — not  a  cause.  It  looked  like  an  at- 
16 


PBE-CONFEKENCE  REFLECTIONS 

tempt  to  make  reduction  of  taxes  more  im- 
portant than  settlement  of  difficulties. 
Was  the  Conference  to  be  merely  a  kind  of 
glorified  international  committee  on  tax  re- 
duction? Not  that  I  meant  to  underesti- 
mate the  relief  that  would  bring. 

Suppose  the  Conference  should  say :  We 
will  reduce  at  once — by  the  simplest,  most 
direct  method — cut  down  fifty  per  cent,  of 
our  appropriations — for  five  years  and  be- 
fore the  term  is  ended  meet  again  and  make 
a  new  contract. 

What  a  restoration  of  the  world's  hope 
would  follow!  How  quickly  the  mind 
sprang  to  what  such  a  decision  would  bring 
to  wretched,  jobless  peoples — the  useful 
work,  the  schools,  the  money  for  more 
bread,  better  shelter,  leisure  for  play.  How 
much  of  the  resentment  at  the  huge  sums 
now  going  into  warships,  cannon,  naval 
bases,  war  colleges,  would  evaporate. 

The  mere  announcement  would  soothe 
and  revive.  Labor  bitterly  resents  the 
17 


PEACEMAKEKS 

thought  that  it  may  be  again  asked  to 
spend  its  energies  in  the  creation  of  that 
which  destroys  men  instead  of  that  which 
makes  for  their  health  and  happiness. 

"Get  them  to  plowing  again,  to  pop- 
ping corn  by  their  own  firesides,  and  you 
can't  get  them  to  shoulder  a  musket  again 
for  fifty  years,"  Lincoln  said  of  the  sol- 
diers that  the  approaching  end  of  the  Civil 
War  would  release.  As  a  matter  of  fact — 
suppression  of  the  Indians  aside — it  was 
only  thirty-three  years  when  they  were  at 
it  again,  but  there  was  no  great  heart  in 
the  enterprise;  they  still  preferred  their 
"plows  and  popcorn,"  and  the  experience 
of  the  Great  War  had  only  intensified  that 
feeling. 

Cut  down  armament  now  merely  for  sake 
of  reducing  taxation  and  you  would  give 
the  world's  love  of  peace  a  chance  to  grow 
— and  that  was  something.  But  it  was 
something  which  must  be  qualified. 

The  history  of  man's  conduct  shows  that 
18 


PKE-CONFEBENCE  KEFLECTIONS 

however  much  he  desires  his  peaceful  life, 
the  moment  what  he  conceives  to  be  his 
country's  interest — which  he  looks  at  as  his 
interest — is  threatened,  he  will  throw  his 
tools  of  peace  into  the  corner  and  seize  those 
of  war.  It  does  not  matter  whether  he  is 
prepared  or  not.  Men  always  have  and, 
unless  we  can  find  something  beside  force 
to  appeal  to  in  a  pinch,  always  will  do  just 
as  they  did  at  Lexington,  as  the  peasants 
of  Belgium  did  at  the  rumor  of  the  advance 
of  the  Germans — seize  any  antiquated  kick- 
ing musket  or  blunderbuss  they  can  lay 
their  hands  on  and  attack. 

There  was  another  significant  possibility 
to  limitation,  on  which  the  lovers  of  peace 
rightfully  counted — certainly  believers  in 
war  do  not  overlook  it — and  that  was  the 
chance  that  the  enforced  breathing  spell 
would  give  for  improving  and  developing 
peace  machinery.  It  would  give  a  fresh 
chance  to  preach  the  new  methods,  arouse 
faith  in  them,  stir  governments  to  greater 
interest  in  them  and  less  in  arms. 
Ift 


PEACEMAKERS 

It  was  a  possibility — but  to  offset  it  ex- 
perience shows  that  with  the  passing  of  the 
threat  of  war,  interest  in  pacific  schemes  is 
generally  left  to  a  few  tireless  and  little 
considered  groups  of  non-official  people. 
Active  interest  inside  governments  dies  out. 
The  great  peace  suggestions  and  ventures  of 
the  world  have  been  born  of  wars  fought 
rather  than  of  wars  that  might  be  fought. 
The  breathing  spell  long  continued  might 
end  in  a  general  rusting  and  neglect  of  the 
very  methods  for  preventing  wars  which 
peace  lovers  are  now  pushing. 

What  it  all  amounted  to  was  that  the 
most  drastic  limitation  was  no  sure  guar- 
antee against  future  war.  Take  away  a 
man's  gun  and  it  is  no  guarantee  that  he 
will  not  strike  if  aroused.  You  must  get 
at  the  man — enlarge  his  respect  for  order, 
his  contempt  for  violence,  change  his  notion 
of  procedure  in  disputes,  establish  his 
control.  It  takes  more  than  "gun  toting" 
to  make  a  dangerous  citizen,  more  than  re- 
lieving him  of  his  gun  to  make  a  safe  one. 
20 


PRE-CONFERENCE  REFLECTIONS 

If  the  Conference  only  cut  down  the  num- 
ber of  guns  the  nations  were  carrying,  it 
would  have  done  little  to  insure  perma- 
nent peace.  The  President's  conference  on 
unemployment  which  held  its  sessions  just 
before  the  Conference  on  the  Limitation  of 
Armament  spent  considerable  time  in  con- 
sidering what  the  industry  of  the  country 
might  do  to  prevent  industrial  crises. 
Among  the  principles  it  laid  down  was  one 
quite  as  applicable  to  international  as  to 
business  affairs. 

"The  time  to  act  is  before  a  crisis  has  be- 
come inevitable." 

That  was  the  real  reason  for  the  exist- 
ence of  the  coming  Conference — to  act  be- 
fore the  jealousies  and  misunderstandings 
around  the  Pacific  had  gone  so  far  that 
there  was  no  solution  but  war.  Let  us  sup- 
pose that  in  1913  say,  England,  France, 
Germany,  Austria  and  Kussia  had  held  a 
conference  over  an  agenda  parallel  to  the 
one  now  laid  down  for  the  Washington  Con- 
21 


PEACEMAKERS 

ference — one  that  not  only  considered  limit- 
ing their  armies  and  navies  but  boldly  and 
openly  attacked  the  fears,  the  jealousies, 
the  needs,  and  the  ambitions  of  them  all — 
might  it  not  have  been  possible  that  they 
would  have  found  a  way  other  than  war? 
Are  governments  incapable  in  the  last  anal- 
ysis of  settling  difficulties  save  by  force  and 
exhaustion,  or  are  they  made  impotent  by 
the  idea  that  no  machinery  and  methods  for 
handling  international  affairs  are  possible 
save  the  ones  which  have  so  often  landed 
their  peoples  in  the  ditch? 

In  his  farewell  words  to  this  country  at 
the  end  of  his  recent  visit,  the  late  Viscount 
Bryce  remarked  that  anybody  could 
frighten  himself  with  a  possibility  but  the 
course  of  prudence  was  to  watch  it  and  esti- 
mate the  likelihood  that  it  would  ever  en- 
ter into  the  sphere  of  probability. 

It  is  just  here  that  governments  have  fal- 
len down  worst.  They  might  watch  the 
war  possibilities,  but  they  have  refused  or 
22 


PKE-CONFEBENCE  REFLECTIONS 

not  been  able  to  evaluate  them.  They 
seemed  to  have  felt  usually  that  closing 
their  eyes  to  them  or  at  least  refusing  to 
admit  them  was  the  only  proper  diplomatic 
attitude. 

As  a  rule,  it  has  been  the  non-responsible 
outsider  that  has  exploited  war  possibili- 
ties. Sometimes  this  has  been  done  from 
the  highest  motives,  with  knowledge  and 
restraint.  More  often  it  has  been  done  on 
half-knowledge  and  with  reckless  indiffer- 
ence to  results.  There  are  always  a  number 
of  people  around  with  access  to  the  public 
ear  who  love  to  handle  explosives — never 
quite  happy  unless  their  imaginations  are 
busy  with  wars  and  revolutions.  There  are 
others  possessed  by  the  pride  of  prophecy — 
their  vanity  is  demonstrating  the  inevitable 
strife  in  the  situation.  They  are  the 
makers  of  war  scares — the  breeders  and 
feeders  of  war  passions.  Sometimes  war 
possibilities  are  the  materials  for  skillful 
national  propaganda — the  agent  of  one  na- 
23 


PEACEMAKERS 

tion  working  on  a  second  to  convince  it  of 
the  hostile  intent  of  a  third. 

It  is  the  governments  concerned  that 
should  be  handling  this  sort  of  stuff  and 
handling  it  in  such  a  way  that  they  would 
cut  under  the  malicious  and  the  wanton, 
get  at  the  real  truth  and  get  at  it  in  time 
and  get  it  out  to  the  world. 

One  of  the  chief  reasons  for  some  sort  of 
active  association  of  nations  is  that  there 
should  be  a  permanent  central  agency  al- 
ways working  over  war  possibilities,  esti- 
mating them,  heading  them  off. 

Present  diplomacy  does  not  do  it.  Could 
the  coming  Conference  find  a  way  for  just 
this  service  in  the  Pacific  situation? 

How  could  the  public  be  sure  the  Confer- 
ence was  really  seeking  these  ends?  Only 
by  openness  and  frankness.  Could  one 
really  expect  that?  No  one  of  sense  and 
even  a  very  little  knowledge  of  how  men 
achieve  results,  whether  in  statecraft  or  in 
business,  would  think  for  a  moment  that  the 
24 


PRE-CONFERENCE  REFLECTIONS 

Conference  must  sit  daily  in  open  session 
with  a  public  listening  to  all  that  it  said. 
There  was  only  one  practical  way  of  han- 
dling the  agenda.  The  Conference  must 
form  itself  into  groups,  each  charged  with  a 
subject  on  which  it  was  to  arrive  at  some 
kind  of  understanding.  The  report  must 
be  presented  at  the  Conference.  But  when 
this  was  done  there  should  be  free,  open 
discussion. 

To  handle  the  plenary  sessions  of  the 
present  Conference  as  they  were  handled  in 
Paris  in  1919  would  be  a  tragic  mistake. 
These  plenary  conferences  were  splendidly 
set  scenes.  No  one  who  looked  on  the  gath- 
ering at  which  the  Covenant  of  the  League 
of  Nations  was  presented  would  ever  forget 
it.  Nor  would  he  forget  how  the  gloved- 
and-iron  hand  of  Clemenceau  never  for  a 
moment  released  its  grip;  how  effectively, 
for  example,  the  incipient  revolt  against 
the  mandate  system  aimed  at  making  na- 
tions the  protectors  and  not  the  exploiters 
of  the  German  territories  to  be  disposed  of 
25 


PEACEMAKEES 

was  soft-pedaled.  Nor  would  lie  ever  for- 
get certain  sinister  faces  in  the  great  pic- 
ture that  chilled  at  their  birth  the  high 
hopes  whieh  the  Conference  championed. 

Free  discussion,  running,  if  you  please, 
over  days  at  this  juncture,  might  have  in- 
sured an  easier,  straighter  road  for  the 
treaty  of  Versailles  and  particularly  for  the 
League  of  Nations. 

Frankness  would  be  the  greatest  ally  of 
all  who  looked  on  the  great  mission  of  the 
coming  Conference  as  preventing  the  Pacific 
crisis  from  ever  ending  in  war.  Frankness 
would  break  the  war  bubbles  that  the  irre- 
sponsible were  blowing  so  gayly.  It  would 
be  the  surest  preventive  of  the  fanatical 
and  partisan  drives  which  are  almost  cer- 
tain to  develop  if  there  was  unnecessary 
secrecy.  Naturally,  those  on  the  outside 
would  look  on  a  failure  to  take  the  public  in 
as  proof  that  sinister  forces  were  at  work 
in  the  Conference,  that  dark  things  were 
brewing  which  must  be  kept  out  of  sight. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  one  look  inside  would 


FEE-CONFERENCE  REFLECTIONS 

probably  show  a  group  of  worn  and  anx- 
ious gentlemen  honestly  doing  their  best 
to  find  something  on  which  they  could 
agree  with  a  reasonable  hope  that  the  coun- 
tries that  had  sent  them  to  Washington 
would  accept  their  decisions.  After  one 
good  look  the  public  might  change  suspi- 
cion to  sympathy. 

There  was  always  the  argument  from 
the  conventionally  minded  that  "it  isn't 
done,"  that  diplomacy  must  be  secret.  John 
Hay  didn't  think  so.  He  told  his  friend 
Henry  Adams  in  the  course  of  his  efforts 
to  establish  the  "open  door"  in  China  that 
he  got  on  by  being  "honest  and  naif !" 

The  point  in  this  policy  at  which  most 
people,  in  and  out  of  the  present  Confer- 
ence, would  stick  is  that  word  "naif." 
They  would  prefer  to  be  thought  dishonest 
rather  than  simple-minded.  However,  if 
everybody  who  had  a  part  in  the  gathering 
could  be  as  simple-minded  as  he  was  in 
fact,  would  pretend  to  know  no  more  than 
27 


PEACEMAKEES 

he  did  in  truth  and  would  be  as  honest  as 
it  was  in  his  nature  to  be,  there  would  be 
a  good  chance  of  keeping  Mr.  Hay's  door  in 
China  open.  And  if  that  could  be  done 
along  with  the  other  things  it  implied,  the 
Conference  would  have  actually  contributed 
to  the  chances  of  more  permanent  peace  in 
the  world  and  could  cut  down  its  arma- 
ments, because  it  had  less  need  of  them,  not 
merely  because  it  wanted  temporarily  to  re- 
duce taxation. 


CHAPTER  II 

ARMISTICE  DAY 

IT  was  the  Unknown  Soldier  Boy  that 
put  an  end  to  the  doubt,  the  faultfinding, 
the  cynicism  that  was  in  the  air  of  Wash- 
ington as  the  day  for  the  opening  of  the 
Conference  approached.  It  all  became 
vanity,  pettiness,  beside  that  bier  with  its 
attending  thousands  of  mourning  people. 

They  carried  the  body  to  the  capitol 
where  for  a  day  it  lay  in  state.  Busy  with 
my  attempts  to  learn  something  of  what  it 
was  all  about,  it  was  not  until  late  in  the 
afternoon  that  I  thought  of  the  ceremony 
on  the  hill,  and  made  my  way  there  for  my 
daily  walk.  It  had  been  a  soft,  sunny  day, 
the  air  full  of  gray  haze.  Everything 
around  the  great  plaza — the  Capitol,  the 
29 


PEACEMAKERS 

library,  the  trees,  the  marble  Senate  and 
House  buildings  right  and  left — was  tender 
in  its  outline.  There  were  no  crowds,  but 
as  I  looked  I  saw  massed  four  abreast  from 
the  entrance  door  to  the  rotunda,  down 
along  terraces  of  steps,  across  the  plaza  as 
far  as  I  could  see,  a  slowly  moving  black 
mass,  kept  in  perfect  line  by  soldiers  stand- 
ing at  intervals.  I  made  my  way  across. 
Where  was  its  end?  I  went  to  find  it. 

I  walked  the  width  of  the  great  plaza 
and  turned  down  the  Avenue.  As  far  as  I 
could  see  the  people  were  massed — one 
block,  two  blocks,  three  blocks,  four — and 
from  every  direction  you  could  see  men  and 
women  hurrying  to  fall  in  line.  I  had  had 
no  idea  of  joining  that  line,  of  passing 
through  that  rotunda.  My  only  notion  was 
to  take  a  glimpse  of  the  crowd.  But  to  have 
gone  on,  to  have  been  no  part  of  something 
which  came  upon  me  as  tremendous  in  its 
feeling  and  meaning,  would  have  been  a 

withdrawal  from  my  kind  of  which  I  think 
30 


AEMISTICE  BAY 

I  should  always  have  been  ashamed.    And 
so  I  fell  in. 

The  mass  moved  slowly,  but  very  steadily. 
The  one  strongest  impression  was  of  its 
quietness.  Nobody  talked.  Nobody  seemed 
to  want  to  talk.  If  a  question  was  asked, 
the  reply  was  low.  We  moved  on  block 
after  block — turned  the  corner — now  we 
faced  the  Capitol — amazingly  beautiful, 
proud  and  strong  in  the  dim  light.  I  never 
had  so  deep  a  feeling  that  it  was  something 
that  belonged  to  me,  guarded  me,  meant 
something  to  me,  than  as  I  moved  slowly 
with  that  great  mass  toward  the  bier.  The 
sentinels  stood  rigid,  as  solemn  and  as 
quiet  as  the  people.  The  only  murmur  that 
one  heard  was  now  and  then  a  low  singing, 
"Nearer  My  God  to  Thee."  How  it  began, 
who  suggested  it,  I  do  not  know;  but 
through  all  that  slow  walk,  the  only  thing 
that  I  heard  was  women's  voices,  now  be- 
hind me,  now  before  me,  humming  that  air. 
It  took  a  full  three-quarters  of  an  hour  to 
31 


PEACEMAKEES 

reach  the  door  and  pass  into  the  rotunda. 
It  took  strong  self-control  not  to  kneel  by 
the  bier.  They  told  me  that  there  were 
women,  bereft  mothers,  to  whom  the  appeal 
was  too  much — mothers  of  missing  boys. 
This  might  have  been  hers.  Could  she 
pass?  The  guards  lifted  them  very  gently, 
and  in  quiet  the  great  crowd  moved  for- 
ward. I  fancy  there  were  thousands  that 
passed  that  place  that  day  that  will  have 
always  before  their  eyes  that  great  dim  cir- 
cle with  bank  upon  bank  of  flowers,  from  all 
over  the  earth — flowers  from  kings  and 
queens  and  governments,  from  great 
leaders  of  armies,  from  those  who  labor, 
from  the  mothers  of  men,  and  hundreds 
upon  hundreds  from  those  who  went  out 
with  the  dead  but  came  back.  The  only 
sound  that  came  to  us  as  we  passed  was 
the  clear  voice  of  a  boy,  one  of  a  group,  once 
soldiers.  They  came  with  a  wreath.  They 
carried  a  flag.  The  leader  was  saying  his 
farewell  to  their  buddy. 
32 


AEMISTICE  DAY 

A  hundred  thousand  or  more  men  and 
women  made  this  pilgrimage.  A  hundred 
thousand  and  many  more  packed  the 
streets  of  Washington  the  next  day  when 
the  bier  was  carried  from  the  Capitol  to 
the  grave  at  Arlington. 

The  attending  ceremony  was  one  of  the 
most  perfect  things  of  the  kind  ever 
planned.  It  had  the  supreme  merit  of  re- 
straint. Every  form  of  the  country's  serv- 
ice had  a  place — not  too  many — a  few — 
but  they  were  always  of  the  choicest — from 
the  President  of  the  United  States  down  to 
the  last  marine,  the  best  we  had  were 
chosen  to  follow  the  unknown  boy. 

There  was  an  immense  sincerity  to  it  all. 
They  felt  it — the  vast,  inexpressible  sorrow 
of  the  war.  And  no  one  felt  it  more  than 
the  President  of  the  United  States.  What 
he  said  at  Arlington,  what  he  was  to  say 
the  next  day  at  the  opening  of  the  Confer- 
ence, showed  that  with  all  his  heart  and 
all  his  mind  the  man  hated  the  thing  that 
33 


PEACEMAKEKS 

had  brought  this  sorrow  to  the  country, 
and  that  he  meant  to  do  his  part  to  put  an 
end  to  it. 

The  ceremony  was  for  the  dead  sacrifice, 
but  the  feature  of  it  which  went  deepest  to 
the  heart  and  brought  from  the  massed 
crowds  their  one  instinctive  burst  of  sym- 
pathy and  greeting  was  the  passing,  almost 
at  the  end  of  the  procession,  of  the  War's 
living  sacrifice — Woodrow  Wilson. 

The  people  had  stood  in  silence,  rever- 
ently baring  their  heads  as  the  bier  of  the 
soldier  passed,  followed  by  all  the  official 
greatness  of  the  moment — the  President  of 
the  United  States,  his  cabinet,  the  Supreme 
Court,  the  House,  the  Senate,  Pershing, 
Foch.  And  then,  quite  unexpectedly,  a  car- 
riage came  into  view — two  figures  in  it — 
a  white-faced  man,  a  brave  woman.  Un- 
conscious of  what  they  were  doing,  the 
crowd  broke  into  a  muffled  murmur — "Wil- 
son!'7 The  cry  flowed  down  the  long  ave- 
nue— a  surprised,  spontaneous  recognition. 

34: 


AEMISTICE  DAY 

It  was  as  if  they  said:  "You — you  of  all 
living  men  belong  here.  It  was  you  who 
called  the  boy  we  are  honoring — you  who 
put  into  his  eye  that  wonderful  light — the 
light  that  a  great  French  surgeon  declared 
made  him  different  as  a  soldier  from  the 
boys  of  any  other  nation." 

"I  don't  know  what  it  is,"  he  said, 
"whether  it  is  God,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  or 
President  Wilson,  but  the  American  soldier 
has  a  light  in  his  eye  that  is  not  like  any- 
thing that  I  have  ever  seen  in  men."  Wood- 
row  Wilson,  under  God,  had  put  it  there. 
His  place  was  with  the  soldier.  The  crowd 
knew  it,  and  told  him  so  by  their  uncon- 
scious outburst. 

His  carriage  left  the  procession  at  the 
White  House.  Later  the  crowd  followed  it. 
All  the  afternoon  of  Armistice  Day  men 
and  women  gathered  before  his  home.  All 
told  there  were  thousands  of  them.  They 
waited,  hoping  for  his  greeting.  And  when 
he  gave  it,  briefly,  they  cheered  and  cheered. 
35 


PEACEMAKERS 

But  they  did  not  go  away.    It  was  dark  be- 
fore that  crowd  had  dispersed. 

But  this  expression  of  love  and  loyalty 
and  interest  in  Woodrow  Wilson  is  no  new 
thing  in  Washington.  For  months  now,  on 
Sundays  and  holidays,  men,  women  and 
children  have  been  walking  to  his  home, 
standing  in  groups  before  it,  speaking  to- 
gether in  hushed  tones  as  if  something 
solemn  and  ennobling  stirred  in  them. 
Curiosity?  No.  Men  chatter  and  jibe  and 
jostle  in  curiosity.  These  people  are  silent 
— gentle — orderly.  You  will  see  them  be- 
fore the  theater,  too,  when  it  is  known  that 
he  is  within,  quietly  waiting  for  him  to  come 
out — one  hundred,  two  hundred,  five  hun- 
dred— even  a  thousand  sometimes,  it  is  said. 
They  cheer  him  as  he  passes — and  there 
are  chokes  in  their  voices — and  always 
tenderness.  Let  it  be  known  that  he  is  in 
his  seat  in  a  theater,  and  the  house  will 
rise  in  homage.  Let  his  face  be  thrown  on 
a  screen,  and  it  will  receive  a  greeting  that 
36 


AKMISTICE  DAY 

the  face  of  no  other  living  American  will 
receive.     It  requires  explanation. 

The  people  at  least  recognized  him  as  be- 
longing to  the  Conference.  And,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  the  Conference  never  was  able 
to  escape  him.  Again  and  again,  he  ap- 
peared at  the  table.  The  noblest  words  that 
were  said  were  but  echoes  of  what  he  had 
been  saying  through  the  long  struggle.  The 
President's  great  slogan — Less  of  arma- 
ments and  none  of  war — was  but  another 
way  of  putting  the  thing  for  which  he  had 
given  all  but  his  last  breath.  The  best  they 
were  to  do — their  limitation  of  armaments, 
their  substitute  to  make  it  possible,  were 
but  following  in  the  path  that  he  had  cut. 
The  difficulties  and  hindrances  which  they 
were  to  meet  and  which  were  to  hamper 
both  program  and  final  settlements  were 
but  the  difficulties  and  hindrances  which  he 
had  met  and  which  hampered  his  work  at 
Paris.  From  the  start  to  the  finish  of  the 
Conference  on  the  Limitation  of  Armament, 
37 


PEACEMAKERS 

the  onlooker  recognized  both  the  spirit  and 
the  hand  of  Woodrow  Wilson  as  the  crowd 
recognized  him  on  Armistice  Day. 

There  was  another  figure  in  the  memorial 
procession  which  deeply  touched  the  crowd 
and  which  stayed  on,  uninvited.  She  came 
with  the  dead  soldier  boy.  She  stood  by 
him  night  and  day  as  he  lay  in  state,  fol- 
lowed him  to  the  grave  in  which  they  laid 
him  away  at  Arlington,  a  symbol  of  the 
nation's  grief  over  all  its  missing  sons.  She 
did  not  go  with  the  crowds.  She  took  her 
place  at  the  door  of  the  Conference,  and 
there,  day  by  day,  her  solemn  voice  was 
heard. 

"I  am  the  mother  of  men.  Never  before 
have  I  lifted  my  voice  in  your  councils.  I 
have  been  silent  because  I  trusted  you.  But 
to-day  I  speak  because  I  doubt  you.  I  have 
the  right  to  speak,  for  without  me  mankind 
would  end.  I  bear  you  with  pain,  such  as 
you  cannot  know.  I  rear  you  with  sacrifice, 
such  as  you  cannot  understand.  I  am  the 
38 


AEMISTICB  DAY 

world's  perpetual  soldier,  facing  death  that 
life  may  be.  I  do  not  recoil  from  my  great 
task.  God  laid  it  on  me.  I  have  accepted 
it  always.  I  give  my  youth  that  the  world 
may  have  sons,  and  I  glory  in  my  harvest. 

"But  I  bear  sons  for  fruitful  lives  of  labor 
and  peace  and  happiness.  And  what  have 
you  done  with  my  work?  To-day  I  mourn 
the  loss  of  more  than  ten  million  dead, 
more  than  twenty  million  wounded,  more 
than  six  million  imprisoned  and  missing. 
This  is  the  fruit  of  what  you  call  your  Great 
War. 

"It  is  I  who  must  face  death  to  replace 
these  dead  and  maimed  boys.  I  shall  do  it. 
But  no  longer  shall  I  give  them  to  you  un- 
questioning as  I  have  in  the  past,  for  I 
have  come  to  doubt  you.  You  have  told 
me  that  you  used  my  sons  for  your  honor 
and  my  protection,  but  I  have  begun  to  read 
your  books,  to  listen  to  your  deliberations, 
to  study  your  maneuvers;  I  have  learned 
that  it  is  not  always  your  honor  and  my 
39 


PEACEMAKEES 

protection  that  drives  you  to  war.  Again 
and  again  it  is  your  own  love  of  glory,  of 
power,  of  wealth;  your  hate  and  contempt 
for  those  that  are  not  of  your  race,  your 
color,  your  point  of  view.  You  cannot 
longer  have  my  sons  for  such  ends.  I  ask 
you  to  remold  your  souls,  to  make  effective 
that  brotherhood  of  man  of  which  you  talk, 
to  learn  to  work  together,  white  and  black 
and  brown  and  yellow,  as  becomes  the  sons 
of  the  same  mother. 

"I  shall  never  leave  your  councils  again. 
My  daughters  shall  sit  beside  you  voicing 
my  command — you  shall  have  done  with 
war." 


40 


CHAPTER  III 

NOVEMBER  12,   1921 

WE  shall  have  to  leave  November  12, 
1921,  the  opening  day  of  the  Conference  on 
the  Limitation  of  Armament,  to  History  for 
a  final  appraisement.  Arthur  Balfour  told 
Mr.  Hughes  after  he  had  had  time  to  gather 
himself  together  from  the  shock  of  the 
American  program  that  in  his  judgment  a 
new  anniversary  had  been  added  to  the  Re- 
construction Movement.  "If  the  llth  of 
November,"  said  Mr.  Balfour,  "in  the  minds 
of  the  allied  and  associated  powers,  in  the 
minds  perhaps  not  less  of  all  the  neutrals 
— if  that  is  a  date  imprinted  on  grateful 
hearts,  I  think  November  12  will  also  prove 
to  be  an  anniversary  welcomed  and  thought 
of  in  a  grateful  spirit  by  those  who  in  the 
41 


PEACEMAKEES 

future  shall  look  back  upon  the  arduous 
struggle  now  being  made  by  the  civilized 
nations  of  the  world,  not  merely  to  restore 
pre-war  conditions,  but  to  see  that  war  con- 
ditions shall  never  again  exist." 

Whatever  place  it  may  turn  out  that  No- 
vember 12  shall  hold  on  the  calendar  of 
great  national  days,  this  thing  is  sure;  it 
will  always  be  remembered  for  the  shock  it 
gave  Old  School  Diplomacy.  That  insti- 
tution really  received  a  heavier  bombard- 
ment than  War,  the  real  objective  of  the 
Conference.  The  shelling  reached  its  very 
vitals,  while  it  only  touched  the  surface  of 
War's  armor. 

Diplomacy  has  always  had  her  vested  in- 
terests. They  have  seemed  permanent,  im- 
pregnable. What  made  November  12,  1921, 
portentous  was  its  invasion  of  these  vested 
interests.  Take  that  first  and  most  impor- 
tant one — Secrecy.  When  Secretary 
Hughes  followed  the  opening  speech  of  wel- 
come and  of  idealism  made  by  President 
42 


NOVEMBER  12,  1921 

Harding,  not  with  another  speech  of  more 
welcome  and  more  idealism,  as  diplomacy 
prescribes  for  such  occasions,  but  with  the 
boldest  and  most  detailed  program  of  what 
the  United  States  had  in  mind  for  the  meet- 
ing, Diplomacy's  most  sacred  interest  was 
for  the  moment  overthrown.  To  be  sure, 
what  Secretary  Hughes  did  was  made  pos- 
sible by  John  Hay's  long  struggle  to  edu- 
cate his  own  countrymen  to  the  idea  of  open 
diplomacy ;  by  what  President  Wilson  tried 
to  do  at  the  Paris  conference.  Mr.  Wilson 
won  the  people  of  the  world  to  his  prin- 
ciple, but  his  colleagues  contrived  to  block 
him  in  the  second  stage  of  the  Paris  game. 
Mr.  Hughes,  building  on  that  experience, 
did  not  wait  for  consultation  with  his  col- 
leagues. On  his  own,  in  a  fashion  so  unex- 
pected that  it  was  almost  brutal,  he  threw 
not  only  the  program  of  the  United  States 
on  the  table,  but  that  which  the  United 
States  expected  of  two — two  only,  please 
notice — of  the  eight  nations  she  had  in- 
vited in,  Great  Britain  and  Japan. 
43 


PEACEMAKERS 

His  proposals  came  one  after  another  ex- 
actly like  shells  from  a  Big  Bertha! — "It 
is  now  proposed  that  for  a  period  of  ten 
years  there  should  be  no  further  construc- 
tion of  capital  ships."  One  after  another 
the  program  of  destruction  followed. 

The  United  States : — to  scrap  all  capital  ships  now 
under  construction  along  with  fifteen  old  battle- 
ships, in  all  a  tonnage  of  845,740  tons; 

Great  Britain: — to  stop  her  four  new  Hoods  and 
scrap  nineteen  capital  ships,  a  tonnage  of  583,375 
tons; 

Japan: — abandon  her  program  of  ships  not  laid 
down,  and  scrap  enough  of  existing  ones,  new  and 
old,  to  make  a  tonnage  of  448,928  tons. 

I  once  saw  a  huge  bull  felled  by  a  sledge 
hammer  in  the  hands  of  a  powerful  Czecho- 
Slovac  farm  hand.  When  Mr.  Hughes  be- 
gan hurling  one  after  another  his  revolu- 
tionary propositions  the  scene  kept  flash- 
ing before  my  eyes,  the  heavy  thud  of  the 
blow  on  the  beast's  head  falling  on  my 
ears.  I  felt  almost  as  if  I  were  being  hit 
myself,  and  I  confess  to  no  little  feeling  of 
regret  that  Mr.  Hughes  should  be  putting 
his  proposals  so  bluntly.  "It  is  proposed 
that  Great  Britain  shall,"  etc.  "It  is  pro- 
44 


NOVEMBER  12,  1921 

posed  that  Japan  shall,"  etc.  Would  it  have 
been  less  effective  as  a  proposal  and  would 
it  not  have  been  really  more  acceptable  as 
a  form  if  he  had  said — "We  shall  propose  to 
Great  Britain  to  consider  so  and  so."  But, 
after  all,  when  you  are  firing  Big  Berthas 
it  is  not  the  amenities  that  you  consider. 

Mr.  Balfour  and  Sir  Auckland  Geddes, 
sitting  where  I  could  look  them  full  in  the 
face,  had  just  the  faintest  expression  of 
"seeing  things."  I  would  not  have  been 
surprised  if  they  had  raised  their  hands  in 
that  instinctive  gesture  one  makes  when  he 
does  "see  things"  that  are  not  there.  The 
Japanese  took  it  without  a  flicker  of  an 
eyelash — neither  the  delegates  at  the  table 
nor  the  rows  of  attache's  and  secretaries 
moved,  glanced  at  one  another,  changed  ex- 
pression. So  far  as  their  faces  were  con- 
cerned Mr.  Hughes  might  have  been  con- 
tinuing the  Harding  welcome — instead  of 
calling  publicly  on  them  for  a  sacrifice  un- 
precedented and  undreamed  of. 
45 


PEACEMAKEES 

The  program  was  so  big — its  presentation 
was  so  impressive  (Mr.  Hughes  looked  seven 
feet  tall  that  day  and  his  voice  was  the  voice 
of  the  man  who  years  ago  arraigned  the  In- 
surance Companies)  that  one  regretted  that 
there  were  omissions  so  obvious  as  to  force 
attention.  There  was  a  singular  one  in  the 
otherwise  admirable  historical  introduction 
Mr.  Hughes  made  to  his  program.  He  re- 
viewed there  the  efforts  of  the  first  and 
second  Hague  Conferences  to  bring  about 
disarmament — explained  the  failure — and 
jumped  from  1907  to  1921  as  if  in  1919,  at 
the  Paris  Peace  Conference,  man's  most 
valiant  effort  to  bring  about  disarmament 
had  not  been  made.  He  failed  to  notice 
the  fact  that  to  this  effort  scores  of  peo- 
ples had  subscribed,  including  all  of  the  na- 
tions represented  at  the  council  table;  that 
these  nations  had  been  working  for  two 
years  in  the  League  of  Nations,  under  cir- 
cumstances of  indescribable  world  confu- 
sion and  disorganization,  to  gather  the  in- 
46 


NOVEMBER  12,  1921 

formation  and  prepare  a  practical  plan  not 
only  to  limit  the  world's  arms  but  to  regu- 
late for  good  and  all  private  traffic  in  arma- 
ments. Before  Mr.  Hughes  sat  M.  Viviani 
of  France  who  had  been  serving  on  the 
Commission  charged  with  this  business. 
Before  him,  too,  was  man  after  man  fresh 
from  the  discussions  of  the  second  annual 
Assembly  of  the  League.  Disarmament  and 
many  other  matters  pertaining  to  world 
peace  had  been  before  them.  They  came 
confident  that  they  had  done  something  of 
value  at  Geneva  however  small  it  might  be 
compared  with  the  immense  work  still  to 
be  done.  Arthur  Balfour  of  England, 
Viviani  of  France,  Wellington  Koo  of 
China,  Senator  Schanzer  of  Italy,  Sastri  of 
India,  Van  Karnebeck  of  Holland — were 
among  those  that  heard  Mr.  Hughes  jump 
their  honest  efforts,  beginning  in  1919,  to 
bring*  the  armaments  of  the  world  to  a 
police  basis.  It  must  have  bewildered  them 
a  little — but  they  are  gentlemen  who  are 
4T 


PEACEMAKERS 

forced  by  their  profession  to  take  hints 
quickly — they  understood  that  as  far  as  the 
American  Conference  on  Limitation  of 
Armament  was  concerned,  the  League  of 
Nations  was  not  to  exist.  From  that  day, 
if  you  wanted  information  on  the  League 
from  any  one  of  them  you  had  to  catch  him 
in  private,  and  he  usually  made  sure  no- 
body was  listening  before  he  enlightened 
you  as  to  his  opinions,  which  invariably 
were  "not  for  publication." 

One  could  not  but  wonder  if  Mr.  Bal- 
four  had  this  omission  in  mind  when  at  a 
later  session  he  said  in  speaking  of  Mr. 
Hughes'  review  of  past  disarmament  ef- 
forts that  "some  fragments"  had  been  laid 
before  the  Conference.  What  Mr.  Hughes 
really  did  in  ignoring  the  work  for  disarma- 
ment carried  on  at  Paris  and  Geneva  in  the 
last  three  years  was  to  call  attention  to  it. 

After  all,  was  it  not  petty  to  be  irritated 
when  something  so  bold  and  real  had  been 
initiated?  Was  it  not  yielding  to  the  de- 
48 


NOVEMBER  12,  1921 

sire  to  "rub  in"  the  omission  as  bad — or 
worse — than  the  omission?  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  the  thing  going  on  at  the  moment  was 
so  staggering  that  one  had  no  time  for  more 
than  a  momentary  irritation.  Mr.  Hughes 
swept  his  house  on  November  12 — swept  it 
off  its  feet.  If  secret  diplomacy  was  given 
by  him  such  a  blow  as  it  never  had  received 
before,  diplomatic  etiquette  was  torn  to 
pieces  by  the  Senate  and  the  House  of  the 
United  States,  each  of  which  had  a  section 
of  the  gallery  to  itself.  Possibly  their  ac- 
tion was  due  to  a  little  jealousy.  They  are 
accustomed  to  holding  the  center  of  the  de- 
liberative stage  in  Washington,  and  they 
always  have,  possibly  always  will  resent  a 
little  the  coming  of  an  outside  deliberative 
body  which  for  the  time  being  the  public 
regards  as  more  interesting  than  them- 
selves. They  made  it  plain  from  the  start 
that  they  were  not  awed.  The  House  of 
Representatives  particularly  was  a  joy  to 
see  if  it  did  make  a  shocking  exhibition  of 
49 


PEACEMAKEES 

itself.  It  looked  as  if  it  were  at  a  ball 
game  and  conducted  itself  in  the  same  way. 
It  hung  over  the  gallery,  lolled  in  its  seats, 
and  when  the  President  struck  his  great 
note,  the  words  which  ought  to  become  a 
slogan  of  the  country — "Less  of  Armament 
and  None  of  War" — it  rose  to  its  feet  and 
cheered  as  if  there  had  been  a  home  run. 

Having  once  broke  out  in  unrestrained 
cheers,  they  gave  again  and  again  what  Wil- 
liam Allen  White  called  "the  yelp  of  de- 
mocracy." Even  after  the  program  was 
over  and  the  remaining  formalities  cus- 
tomary on  such  occasions  were  about  at  an 
end,  they  took  things  into  their  own  hands 
and  finished  their  attack  on  diplomatic  eti- 
quette by  calling  for  Briand  as  they  might 
have  called  for  Babe  Kuth.  "It  isn't  done, 
you  know,"  I  heard  one  young  Britisher 
say  after  it  was  over.  But  it  had  been  done, 
and  the  chances  are  that  there  will  be  more 
of  it  in  the  future. 

If  this  day  does  work  out  to  be  porten- 
60 


NOVEMBEK  12,  1921 

tous  in  history,  as  it  possibly  may,  the  time 
will  come  when  every  country  will  hang 
great  historical  pictures  of  the  scene  in  its 
public  galleries..  We  should  have  one,  what- 
ever its  fate.  And  I  hope  the  artist  that 
does  it  will  not  fail  to  give  full  value  to  the 
Congress  that  cracked  the  proprieties.  Let 
him  take  his  picture  from  the  further  left 
side  of  the  auditorium.  In  this  way  he  can 
bring  in  the  House  of  Representatives.  He 
can  afford  to  leave  out  the  diplomatic  gal- 
lery, as  he  would  have  to  do  from  this  posi- 
tion. The  diplomatic  gallery  counted  less 
than  any  other  group  in  the  gathering. 

Secrecy  and  etiquette  were  not. the  only 
vested  interests  attacked  on  November  12, 
1921.  There  was  a  third  that  receiver!  a 
blow — lighter  to  be  sure,  but  a  blow  all  the 
same  and  a  significant  one.  The  exclusive 
vested  right  of  man  to  the  field  of  diplomacy 
was  challenged.  Not  by  giving  a  woman  a 
seat  at  the  table,  but  by  introducing  her  on 
the  floor,  in  an  official  capacity,  a  new 
51 


PEACEMAKERS 

official  capacity,  rather  problematical  as  yet 
as  to  its  outcome — a  capacity  which  if  it 
ranks  lower  than  that  of  delegate  is  still 
counted  higher  than  that  of  expert,  since 
it  brings  the  privilege  of  the  floor. 

Behind  the  American  delegation  facing 
the  hall  and  inside  the  sacred  space  devoted 
to  the  principals  of  the  Congress,  sat  a 
group  of  some  twenty-one  persons,  the  rep- 
resentatives of  a  new  experiment  in  diplo- 
macy— a  slice  of  the  public  brought  in  to  act 
as  a  link  between  the  American  delegates 
and  the  public.  Four  of  these  delegates 
were  women — well-chosen  women.  They 
are  the  diplomatic  pioneers  of  the  United 
States. 

Who  were  those  people,  why  were  they 
there?  I  heard  more  than  one  puzzled  for- 
eign attach^  ask.  When  you  explained  that 
this  was  an  advisory  body,  openly  recog- 
nized by  the  government,  they  continued, 
"But  why  are  women  included?"  They 
understood  the  women  in  the  diplomatic 
52 


NOVEMBER  12,  1921 

gallery,  the  women  in  the  boxes.  It  was  a 
great  ceremony.  It  was  quite  within  estab- 
lished diplomatic  procedure  that  the  ladies 
of  the  official  world  should  smile  upon  such 
an  occasion. 

They  understood  the  few  women  scat- 
tered among  the  scores  of  men  in  the  press 
galleries — but  women  on  the  floor  as  part 
of  the  Conference?  What  did  that  mean? 
It  meant,  dear  sirs,  simply  this,  that  man's 
exclusive,  vested  interest  in  diplomacy  had 
been  invaded — its  masculinity  attacked  like 
Its  secrecy  and  propriety.  What  would 
come  of  the  invasion  no  one  could  tell. 

It  is  doubtful  if  ever  a  program  has  re- 
ceived heartier  acclaim  from  this  country 
than  that  of  Mr.  Hughes.  It  stirred  by  its 
boldness,  its  breadth.  "Scrap!"  Whoever 
had  said  that  word  seriously  in  all  the  long 
discussion  of  disarmament.  Ten  years! — 
the  longest  the  most  sanguine  had  suggested 
was  five.  It  caught  the  imagination — had 
the  ring  of  possibility  in  it.  It  might  be 
53 


PEACEMAKEKS 

putting  the  cart  before  the  horse,  as  I  had 
been  complaining,  but  it  made  it  practically 
certain  that  the  horse  would  be  acquired 
even  if  you  had  to  pay  a  good  round  sum 
for  him,  so  desirable  had  the  cart  been 
made. 

And  then  the  way  the  nations  addressed 
picked  it  up!  Three  days  later  their  for- 
mal acceptances  were  made.  For  England, 
Arthur  Balfour  accepted  in  principle,  de- 
claring as  he  did  so : 

"It  is  easy  to  estimate  in  dollars  or  in 
pounds,  shillings  and  pence  the  saving  to 
the  taxpayer  of  each  of  the  nations  con- 
cerned which  the  adoption  of  this  scheme 
will  give.  It  is  easy  to  show  that  the  relief 
is  great.  It  is  easy  to  show  that  indirectly 
it  will,  as  I  hope  and  believe,  greatly  stimu- 
late industry,  national  and  international, 
and  do  much  to  diminish  the  difficulties 
under  which  every  civilized  government  is 
at  this  time  laboring.  All  that  can  be 
weighed,  measured,  counted;  all  that  is  a 
64 


NOVEMBEK  12,  1921 

matter  of  figures.  But  there  is  something 
in  this  scheme  which  is  above  and  beyond 
numerical  calculation.  There  is  some- 
thing which  goes  to  the  root,  which  is 
concerned  with  the  highest  international 
morality. 

"This  scheme,  after  all — what  does  it  do? 
P.  rn-'kes  idealism  a  practical  proposition. 
It  takes  hold  of  the  dream  which  reformers, 
poets,  publicists,  even  potentates,  as  we 
heard  the  other  day,  have  from  time  to  time 
put  before  mankind  as  the  goal  to  which 
human  endeavor  should  aspire." 

"Japan/'  declared  Admiral  Baron  Kato, 
"deeply  appreciates  the  sincerity  of  purpose 
evident  in  the  plan  of  the  American  Gov- 
ernment for  the  limitation  of  armaments. 
She  is  satisfied  that  the  proposed  plan  will 
materially  relieve  the  nations  of  wasteful 
expenditures  and  cannot  fail  to  make  for 
the  peace  of  the  world. 

"She  cannot  remain  unmoved  by  the  high 
aims  which  have  actuated  the  American 
55 


PEACEMAKEES 

project.  Gladly  accepting,  therefore,  the 
proposal  in  principle,  Japan  is  ready  to 
proceed  with  determination  to  a  sweeping 
reduction  in  her  naval  armament." 

Italy,  through  Senator  Schanzer,  greeted 
the  proposal  as  "The  first  effective  step 
toward  giving  the  world  a  release  of  such 
nature  as  to  enable  it  to  start  the  work  of 
its  economic  reconstruction." 

France — her  Premier,  Briand,  spoke  for 
her — slid  over  the  naval  program.  France, 
he  said,  had  already  entered  on  the  right 
way — the  way  Mr.  Hughes  had  indicated; 
her  real  interest  was  elsewhere.  "I  rather 
turn/7  said  M.  Briand,  "to  another  side 
of  the  problem  to  which  Mr.  Balfour  has 
alluded,  and  I  thank  him  for  this.  Is  it 
only  a  question  here  of  economy?  Is  it 
only  a  question  of  estimates  and  budgets? 
If  it  were  so,  if  that  were  the  only  pur- 
pose you  have  in  view,  it  will  be  really 
unworthy  of  the  great  nation  that  has  called 
us  here. 

56 


NOVEMBER  12,  1921 

"So  the  main  question,  the  crucial  ques- 
tion, which  is  to  be  discussed  here,  is  to 
know  if  the  peoples  of  the  world  will  be  at 
last  able  to  come  to  an  understanding  in 
order  to  avoid  the  atrocities  of  war.  And 
then,  gentlemen,  when  it  comes  on  the 
agenda,  as  it  will  inevitably  come,  to  the 
question  of  land  armament,  a  question  par- 
ticularly delicate  for  France,  as  you  are  all 
aware,  we  have  no  intention  to  eschew  this. 
We  shall  answer  your  appeal,  fully  con- 
scious that  this  is  a  question  of  grave  and 
serious  nature  for  us." 

What  more  was  there  to  do?  England, 
Japan  and  the  United  States  had  accepted 
"in  principle"  a  program  for  the  limitation 
of  navies,  much  more  drastic  than  the  ma- 
jority of  people  had  dreamed  possible.  To 
be  sure  the  details  were  still  to  be  worked 
out,  but  that  seemed  easy.  Had  not  the 
Conference  finished  its  work?  There  were 
people  that  said  so.  No.  Mr.  Hughes  had 
simply  awakened  the  country  to  what  was 
57 


PEACEMAKERS 

possible  if  the  reasons  for  armament  could 
be  removed. 

So  far  as  we,  the  United  States,  were  con- 
cerned, these  reasons  were  fourfold: 

(1)  Our  Pacific  possessions.     Until  we  felt  rea- 
sonably sure  that  they  were  safe  from  possible  attack 
by  Japan,  we  must  keep  our  navy  and  strengthen  our 
fortifications. 

(2)  The  England-Japan  pact.     We  suspected  it. 
It  might  be  a  threat.    So  long  as  it  existed  could  we 
wisely  limit  our  navy  ? 

(3)  Our  Open  Door  policy  in  China.    We  meant 
to  stand  by  that.    It  had  been  invaded  by  Japan  in 
the  Great  War;  could  we  reaffirm  it  now  and  secure 
assurances  we  trusted  that  there  would  be  no  further 
encroachments?    If  not,  could  we  limit  our  arma- 
ment? 

(4)  Our  policy  of  the  integrity  of  nations — China 
and  Russia.    We  had  announced  a  "moral  trustee- 
ship" over  both.    No  more  carving  up.    Let  them 
work  it  out  for  themselves.    How  were  we  going  to 
back  up  that  policy? 

That  is,  we  had  possessions  and  policies 
for  which  we  were  responsible.  Could  we 
protect  them  without  armament?  That  de- 
pended, in  our  judgment,  upon  England 
and  Japan.  Would  they  be  willing  to  make 
agreements  and  concessions  which  would 
convince  us  that  they  were  willing  to  respect 
68 


WVEMBEK  12,  1921 

our  possessions  and  accept  our  policies  in 
the  Pacific? 

If  so,  what  assurances  could  we  give  them 
in  return  that  would  convince  them  that  we 
meant  to  respect  their  possessions  and  poli- 
cies? How  could  we  prove  to  them  that 
they  need  not  fear  us? 

It  was  within  the  first  month  of  the  Con- 
ference that  the  answers  to  these  questions 
were  worked  out  "in  principle"  again. 


59 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  FRENCH  AT  THE  CONFERENCE 

THE  morale  of  an  international  conference 
is  easily  shaken  in  the  public's  mind. 
Seeming  delay  will  do  it.  Those  who  look 
on  feel  that  whatever  is  to  be  done  must  be 
done  quickly,  that  things  must  go  in  leaps. 
They  mistrust  days  of  plain  hard  work — 
work  which  yields  no  headlines.  It  must 
be,  they  repeat,  because  the  negotiators 
have  fallen  on  evil  times,  are  intriguing, 
bargaining. 

Two  days  after  Mr.  Hughes  had  laid  out 
his  plan  for  ship  reduction,  and  it  had  been 
accepted  in  principle  and  turned  over  to 
the  naval  committee,  I  heard  an  eager,  sus- 
picious young  journalist  ask  Lord  Lee  who, 
at  the  end  of  eight  hours  of  committee 
60 


THE  FRENCH  AT  THE  CONFERENCE 

work — grilling  business  always — was  con- 
ducting a  press  conference,  if  they  were 
really  "doing  anything."  His  tone  showed 
that  he  doubted  it,  that  in  his  judgment 
they  must  be  loafing,  deceiving  the  public; 
that  if  they  were  not,  why,  by  this  time  the 
program  ought  to  be  ready  for  his  news- 
paper. Lord  Lee  was  very  tired,  but  he 
had  not  lost  his  sense  of  humor.  He  made 
a  patient  answer.  But  one  understood  that 
there  had  already  begun  in  Washington 
that  which  one  saw  and  heard  so  much  two 
years  and  a  half  before  in  Paris — a  feeling 
that  taking  time  to  work  out  problems  was 
a  suspicious  performance. 

The  calm  of  steady  effort  on  the  part  of 
the  Conference  was  brief.  Mr.  Hughes  in 
closing  the  second  plenary  session  where 
his  naval  program  had  been  so  generously 
accepted  "in  principle,"  had  said  "I  express 
the  wish  of  the  Conference  that  at  an  op- 
portune time  M.  Briand  will  enjoy  the 
opportunity  of  presenting  to  the  Conference 
61 


PEACEMAKERS 

most  fully  the  views  of  France  with  regard 
to  the  subject  of  land  armaments  which  we 
must  discuss."  Mr.  Hughes  kept  that 
promise,  fixing  November  21,  nine  days 
after  the  opening,  as  the  "opportune  time." 

The  Conference  went  into  M.  Briand's 
open  session  serene,  confident,  self-compla- 
cent. It  came  out  excited,  scared,  ruffled 
to  the  very  bottom  of  its  soul.  In  an  hour 
one-third  of  Mr.  Hughes'  agenda  had  been 
swept  away.  Could  this  have  been  avoided? 
I  am  inclined  to  think  that  it  would  have 
been  if  there  had  been  a  larger  sympathy, 
a  better  understanding  of  the  French  and 
their  present  psychology.  If  we  are  to  carry 
on  the  world  cooperatively,  as  seems  in- 
evitable, we  must  have  a  much  fuller  knowl- 
edge of  one  another's  ways  and  prejudices 
and  ambitions  than  was  shown  at  the  out- 
set of  the  Washington  Conference. 

Back  of  the  commotion  that  M.  Briand 
stirred  up  on  November  21  lay  the  idiosyn- 
crasies and  experiences  of  France.  To  un- 
62 


THE  FRENCH  AT  THE  CONFERENCE 

derstand  at  all  the  crisis,  for  so  it  was 
called,  one  must  understand  something  of 
France — that  she  is  a  land  which  through 
the  centuries  has  held  herself  apart  as 
something  special,  the  elite  of  the  nations. 
The  people  of  no  country  in  the  civilized 
world  are  so  satisfied  with  themselves  and 
their  aim.  There  are  no  people  that  find 
life  at  home  more  precious,  guard  it  so  care- 
fully, none  who  care  so  little  about  other 
lands,  and  it  might  be  said,  know  so  little 
of  other  lands. 

It  is  only  within  the  last  twenty  years 
that  the  Frenchman  has  come  to  be  any- 
thing of  a  traveler.  To-day,  in  many  parts 
of  France,  the  young  man  or  young  woman 
who  comes  to  America  has  the  same  pres- 
tige on  returning  that  thirty  years  ago  the 
person  in  towns  outside  of  the  Atlantic 
border  had  in  his  town  when  he  returned 
from  a  trip  abroad.  I  was  living  in  Paris 
in  the  early  90's  when  Alphonse  Daudet 
made  a  trip  to  England.  It  was  a  public 
63 


PEACEMAKEES 

event.  Peary  discovered  the  pole  with 
hardly  less  newspaper  talk. 

Now  this  country,  so  wrapt  up  in  itself 
and  the  carrying  out  of  its  notions  of  life 
— among  the  most  precious  notions  in  my 
judgment  that  mankind  have — finds  itself 
for  a  long  period  really  the  center  of  the 
world's  interests.  It  makes  a  superhuman 
effort,  is  valiant  beyond  words,  practically 
the  whole  civilized  world  rallies  to  its  help. 
It  comes  off  victorious,  and  when  it  gathers 
itself  together  and  begins  to  examine  its 
condition  it  finds  the  ghastly  wounds  of  a 
devastated  region ;  the  work  of  centuries  so 
shattered  that  it  will  take  centuries  to  re- 
store the  fertility,  beauty,  interest.  It  finds 
itself  with  an  appalling  debt ;  with  a  popu- 
lation depleted  at  the  point  most  vital  to 
a  nation,  in  its  young  men,  threatening  the 
oncoming  generation.  It  sees  its  enemy 
beaten,  to  be  sure,  but  with  its  land  practi- 
cally unimpaired. 

France  not  only  had  her  condition  in  her 
64 


THE  FKENCH  AT  THE  CONFERENCE 

mind,  she  had  all  her  past: — reminiscences 
of  invasions,  from  Attila  on.  Old  obses- 
sions, old  policies  revived: — the  belief  that 
she  would  never  have  safety  except  in  a 
weak  Central  Europe — a  doctrine  she  had 
repudiated — broke  out. 

She  came  to  the  peace  table  in  Paris 
under  an  accepted  program  which  said: 
Separations,  but  no  indemnities.  And  her 
bitterness  so  overwhelmed  her  that  she  for- 
got the  principle  pledge  and  demanded  in- 
demnities in  full.  She  forgot  her  pledge  to 
annex  nothing  and  called  for  the  Rhine 
Border.  Every  effort  to  reason  with  her, 
to  persuade  her  not  to  ask  the  impossible  of 
her  beaten  enemy,  she  interpreted  as  lack 
of  sympathy,  and  pointed  to  her  devastated 
region,  her  debts,  her  shrunken  population. 
She  accused  of  injustice  those  who  felt  that 
mercy  is  the  great  wisdom.  Justice  became 
her  great  cry.  Intent  on  herself,  her  dread- 
ful woes,  her  determination  to  have  the  last 
pound,  she  magnified  her  perils,  saw  com- 
65 


PEACEMAKEES 

binations  against  her,  and  went  about  in 
Europe  trying  to  arm  other  peoples,  to 
build  up  a  pro-France  party.  Any  effort 
to  persuade  her  that  the  spirit  which  under- 
lay the  Versailles  Treaty  was  pro-humanity 
and  not  pro-French  embittered  and  antag- 
onized her.  She  resented  the  English  ef- 
fort to  bring  some  kind  of  order  into  the 
Continent.  She  resented  the  conclusion  of 
the  world — slow  enough  though  it  was — to 
let  Kussia  work  out  her  own  destiny. 

No  lover  of  France  has  any  right  to  over- 
look or  encourage  this  attitude.  It  is  the 
most  dangerous  course  she  could  take. 
She  is  building  up  anti-French  antago- 
nisms in  beaten  Europe,  and  she  is  alienat- 
ing countries  that  want  to  bring  the  world 
onto  a  new  basis  of  Good  Will  and  who  be- 
lieve it  can  be  done. 

When  M.  Briand  came  to  the  Washington 
peace  table,  he  left  behind  him  a  country  in 
this  abnormal  mood — her  thoughts  cen- 
tered on  herself — her  needs,  her  dangers. 
66 


THE  FKENCH  AT  THE  CONFEKENCE 

M.  Briand  knew  well  enough  that  she  would 
not  see  the  program  that  Mr.  Hughes  had 
thrown  out  as  it  was  intended — a  tremen- 
dously bold  suggestion  for  world  peace — a 
call  to  the  sacrifice  that  each  country  must 
make  if  order  was  to  be  restored,  the  awful 
losses  of  recent  years  repaired.  M.  Briand 
knew  that  what  France  expected  him  to  get 
at  Washington  was  recognition,  sympathy, 
guarantees.  The  last  thing  that  she  wanted 
brought  back  was  a  request  to  join  in  a 
program  of  sacrifice. 

Moreover,  M.  Briand  came  to  the  Confer- 
ence at  considerable  peril  to  himself.  He 
was  Premier,  and  in  this  office  he  had  been 
doing  as  much  as  he  seems  to  haye  thought 
possible  to  hold  down  the  military  trend  of 
the  country.  His  policy  had  been  fought 
for  a  year  by  a  strong  party,  intent  on 
demonstrating  that  France  was  the  most 
powerful  nation  on  the  continent  of  Eu- 
rope, that  it  was  her  right  and  her  ambition 
to  hold  first  place  there.  M,  Briand's 
67 


PEACEMAKERS 

friends  thought  that  he  should  not  come  to 
the  United  States.  But,  as  he  publicly  said, 
he  wanted  to  come  in  order  to  persuade  the 
Conference  that  France  was  not  as  military 
in  spirit  as  much  of  the  world  seemed  to 
believe,  that  she  did  want  peace,  that  her 
refusals  to  disarm  came  from  the  fact  that 
she  was  still  threatened  by  both  Germany 
and  Russia  and  must  either  have  arms  or 
guarantees. 

M.  Briand  knew  the  line  of  argument  that 
the  Hughes  program  would  awaken  in 
France.  This  argument  was  admirably  set 
forth  early  in  the  Conference  by  the  semi- 
official Le  Temps: 

<CL.  Under  a  regime  of  limited  armaments  such 
as  that  of  which  Mr.  Hughes  has  defined  the  basis, 
each  state  has  the  right  to  possess  force  proportioned 
to  the  dangers  to  which,  in  the  opinion  of  all  the 
contracting  powers,  it  may  reasonably  believe  itself 
to  be  exposed. 

"II.  When  powers  agree  among  themselves  to 
limit  their  armaments  they  oblige  themselves  by  that 
very  fact  even  though  tacitly  aiding  that  one  of 
themselves  which  should  find  itself  at  grips  with  a 
danger  which  its  limited  armaments  would  not  allow 
it  to  subdue. 

68 


THE  FKENCH  AT  THE  CONFEKENCE 

"III.  It  is  not  possible  to  have  a  contractual 
limitation  of  armament  without  there  being  at  the 
same  time  among  all  the  contract  ants  a  joint  and 
several  obligation  of  mutual  aid." 

It  is  not  unfair,  I  think,  to  say  that  when 
M.  Briand  came  to  speak  to  the  Washington 
Conference  on  November  21,  he  was  not 
thinking  of  the  peace  of  the  world;  he  was 
thinking  of  the  needs  and  ambitions  of 
France.  Moreover,  his  mood  was  not  the 
most  conciliatory  in  the  world.  His  pride 
and  his  pride  for  his  country  had  been 
deeply  wounded  on  the  opening  day  of  the 
Conference.  He  had  found  himself  on  that 
occasion  set  at  one  side.  To  be  sure,  he 
and  his  colleagues  were  given  a  position  at 
the  right  of  the  American  delegates,  Great 
Britain  being  at  the  left;  but  when  Mr. 
Hughes  presented  his  naval  program, 
France  did  not  figure  in  it,  except  inci- 
dentally. The  whole  discussion  was  cen- 
tered on  Great  Britain,  Japan  and  the 
United  States.  France  and  Italy  were  set 
aside  with  the  casual  remark  that  it  was  not 
69 


PEACEMAKEES 

thought  necessary  to  discuss  their  tonnage 
allowance  at  that  time. 

Did  Mr.  Hughes  lack  tact  and  understand- 
ing when  he  confined  his  opening  speech  to 
three  nations?  I  think  that  the  after 
events  point  that  way.  To  have  invited 
eight  nations  and  to  have  spoken  to  but  two 
at  the  start  was  a  good  deal  like  inviting 
eight  guests  to  a  dining  table  and  talking 
to  but  two  of  them  through  the  meal.  The 
oversight,  if  that's  the  proper  word  for  it, 
was  forgotten,  if  noticed  by  any  one  in  the 
really  tremendous  thing  that  Mr.  Hughes 
did.  The  trouble  is  that  there  is  almost 
always  one  among  a  number  of  neglected 
guests  that  does  feel  and  does  not  for- 
get it. 

The  opening  week  of  the  Conference  kept 
France  in  about  the  same  position  that  she 
had  on  the  opening  day.  She  was  not  yet 
a  principal,  and  another  point — and  one 
that  is  hard  on  the  French — they  saw  here 
what  they  began  to  see  in  Paris  in  1919  and 
70 


THE  FRENCH  AT  THE  CONFERENCE 

so  openly  resented  there — that  English  is 
taking  the  place  of  French  as  the  language 
of  diplomacy.  There  is  no  mistake  about 
this,  and  I  don't  wonder  that  all  French- 
men resent  it.  At  the  opening  day  every 
delegate,  except  M.  Briand,  spoke  in  Eng- 
lish; the  French  translations  which  fol- 
lowed each  speech  were  made  purely  out  of 
compliment  to  the  French  delegation.  M. 
Briand  is  one  of  not  a  few  in  France  who 
will  take  no  pains,  whatever  their  contracts, 
to  learn  a  word  of  English.  For  the  last 
two  years  he  has  been  constantly  in  con- 
ference with  Lloyd  George,  he  has  had  most 
of  that  time  the  remarkable  interpreter,  M. 
Carmlynck,  at  his  side.  I  have  heard 
M.  Carmlynck  say  that  in  all  this  time  M. 
Briand  has  not  learned  a  word  of  English, 
although  Lloyd  George,  who  at  the  start 
understood  no  French  at  all,  is  now  able  to 
follow  closely  the  arguments  in  French,  and 
even  will  at  times  correct  or  question  the 
phrasing  of  the  translation  into  English. 
71 


PEACEMAKEES 

The  French  are  not  a  race  that  conceal 
their  feelings.  An  Englishman,  an  Ameri- 
can, is  apt  to  accuse  anybody  who  does  not 
cover  up  disappointment,  resentment,  of 
being  a  poor  sport.  France's  chief  con- 
tempt for  the  Anglo-Saxon  is  that  he  is  not 
out  and  out  with  everything;  that  he  has 
reticences  and  reserves,  conceals  his  dis- 
likes, his  vices,  his  emotions.  The  French 
showed  at  Washington  from  the  start  that 
they  were  disappointed.  They  did  not  mix 
freely;  they  did  not  use  the  ample  offices 
prepared  for  them  in  the  Annex  to  the  Pan- 
American  Building,  where  the  delegates  sat, 
although  every  other  nation  was  making 
more  or  less  use  of  these  quarters.  They 
insisted  on  conducting  all  their  press  meet- 
ings in  French  alone,  although  every  other 
nation,  when  it  put  up  somebody  who  did 
not  speak  English,  provided  a  translator. 
The  result  was  that  the  French  press  gath- 
erings were  sparsely  attended. 
VAnd  then  came  M.  Briand's  speech, 
72 


THE  FKENCH  AT  THE  COOTEKENCE 

which  caused  the  first  Conference  crisis. 
For  days  after  that  speech  was  made,  I  lis- 
tened to  people  remake  it,  giving  their  idea 
of  how  he  might  have  used  the  same  matter 
and  carried  his  audience  with  him,  giving 
them  the  impression  of  a  courageous  peo- 
ple, as  they  really  are,  intent  not  only  on 
the  restoration  of  their  tormented  and  suf- 
fering land  but  willing  to  do  their  part  to 
restore  the  rest  of  the  world.  Instead,  M. 
Briand  gave  an  impression  of  a  land  in 
panic,  its  mind  centered  on  possible  dangers 
from  a  conquered  enemy.  It  was  France 
Sanglante  that  he  held  in  upraised  arms  be- 
fore the  Conference,  a  bleeding  France  at 
whom  ravening  German  and  Russian  wolves 
were  snapping  and  threatening.  All  his 
powerful  oratory,  his  wealth  of  emotional 
gesture,  upraised  arms,  tossed  black  locks, 
rolling  head,  tortured  features — all  these 
M.  Briand  brought  into  play  in  his  ef- 
forts to  arouse  the  Conference  to  share 
the  fears  of  France.  He  could  not  do  it. 
73 


PEACEMAKEES 

He  was  talking  to  people  as  well  informed 
as  himself  on  the  actual  facts  of  Europe, 
but  people  who  are  not  interpreting  those 
facts  in  the  way  that  the  French  do.  He 
was  talking  to  people  who  view  the  situa- 
tion of  the  present  world  as  one  to  be  cor- 
rected only  by  hard,  steady  sacrifice  and 
work  in  a  spirit  of  good  will  and  mercy. 
Unhappily  he  gave  them  the  impression 
that  France  thought  only  of  herself  and  of 
what  the  world  should  do  for  her  to  pay  her 
for  her  terrible  sacrifices.  In  his  picture 
of  bleeding  France  he  did  not  include  bleed- 
ing Belgium,  Italy,  England,  Canada,  Aus- 
tralia, New  Zealand,  all  of  whom  sat  at 
the  table  and  all  of  whom  had  suffered 
losses  and  are  staggering  under  debts,  if 
not  equal,  at  least  comparable  to  those  of 
France. 

It  was  a  mistake  of  emphasis,  that  bril- 
liant journalist  Simeon  Strunsky  said.    He 
pointed  out  that  the  thing  really  relevant 
in  M.  Briand's  speech  was  practically  con- 
74 


THE  FRENCH  AT  THE  CONFERENCE 

cealed  from  the  public,  that  France  had  dis- 
armament plans  on  hand  which  soon  would 
reduce  her  army  one  half  and  her  term  of 
military  service  from  three  years  to  eigh- 
teen months.  M.  Briand's  tragic  picture  of 
the  danger  of  France  so  obscured  this  state- 
ment, so  vitally  important  to  the  work  of 
the  Conference,  that  not  a  few  people  con- 
tended that  no  such  statement  was  ever 
made.  One  has  only  to  look  at  the  text  of 
the  address  to  see  that  it  was  there,  though 
so  out  of  proportion  to  the  bulk  of  the 
speech  that  it  failed  of  its  effect. 

The  speech  was  disastrous.  "I  was  never 
so  heartsick  in  my  life,"  I  heard  one  of  the 
greatest  and  most  important  men  in  Wash- 
ington say  after  it  was  over.  Mr.  Wells, 
that  ardent  advocate  of  the  brotherhood  of 
man,  knocked  his  doctrine  all  to  smither- 
eens by  accusing  France  of  wanting  arms 
to  turn  against  England.  Lord  Curzon,  as 
militant  as  Mr.  Wells,  made  a  most  un- 
guarded speech  for  a  man  in  his  position. 
75 


PEACEMAKEES 

France,  sore  and  sensitive,  cried  aloud 
that  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
were  trying  to  isolate  her.  Mr.  Hughes 
and  Mr.  Balfour  had,  to  be  sure,  made  con- 
soling speeches  after  M.  Briand's  outburst, 
but  they  were  rather  the  efforts  of  serene 
elderly  friends  trying  to  calm  the  panic  of 
a  frightened  child,  and  their  effect  was 
rather  to  aggravate  France's  determination 
to  assert  herself,  to  prove  herself  the  equal, 
by  arms,  if  necessary,  of  any  nation  in  the 
world,  England  included. 

The  irritation  of  that  day  spread  over  the 
world.  The  Conference  was  "wrecked," 
cried  the  lovers  of  gloom  and  chaos.  Wash- 
ington buzzed  with  gossip  of  wrangling  be- 
tween even  the  heads  of  delegations.  There 
was  a  rumor  spread  of  a  sharp  quarrel  be- 
tween Mr.  Balfour  and  Mr.  Hughes  on  the 
way  the  discussions  in  the  committees  were 
to  be  handled.  It  was  said  that  Mr.  Hughes 
wanted  everything  that  was  voiced  put 
down ;  that  Mr.  Balfour  thought  a  digest  of 
76 


THE  FEENCH  AT  THE  CONFEEENCE 

the  discussions  would  be  sufficient.  This 
rumor  was  followed  by  the  story  of  an  ugly 
scene  in  committee  between  the  French 
Premier,  Briand,  and  the  Italian  Senator 
Schanzer  over  the  morals  of  the  Italian 
army. 

Now,  luckily  the  Conference  was  admir- 
ably arranged  to  scotch  vicious  rumors. 
There  never  has  been  a  great  international 
gathering  in  which  the  press  had  as  real  an 
opportunity  to  learn  what  was  going  on. 
Every  morning  there  was  given  out  at  press 
headquarters  a  list  of  delegates  who  at 
fixed  hours  would  receive  the  press.  This 
morning  bulletin  ran  something  like  this: 

11 :00  A.M.  Lord  Lee 

11:30  Ambassador  Schanzer 

3 :00  P.M.  Lord  Eiddle 

3:30  Secretary  Hughes 

4:00  The  President  of  the  United  States 

(twice  a  week) 

5:30  Admiral  Kato 

6 :00  Mr.  Balfour 

and  so  on.    Every  day  from  six  to  eight  op- 
portunities were   given   to   correspondents 

77 


PEACEMAKEKS 

to  question  principals  of  the  Conference. 
How  much  they  got  depended  upon  how 
much  they  carried — how  able  they  were  to 
ask  questions — how  sound  their  judgment 
was  of  the  answers  they  received — how  hon- 
est their  intent  in  interpreting.  When  ugly 
rumors  such  as  those  which  disturbed  the 
second  week  of  the  Conference's  life  oc- 
curred, this  method  of  treating  the  press 
was  of  real  advantage  to  the  powers  con- 
cerned. It  was  a  joy  to  see  the  way  Secre- 
tary Hughes,  for  instance,  handled  the 
rumors  at  this  moment. 

It  was  always  a  joy  to  see  Mr.  Hughes 
when  he  was  righteously  indignant,  and  he 
certainly  was  so  on  the  afternoon  of  Novem- 
ber 25.  He  lunged  at  once  at  the  report 
of  the  break  between  himself  and  Mr.  Bal- 
four.  The  statement  had  no  basis  but  the 
imagination  of  the  writer.  It  was  unjust 
to  Mr.  Balfour,  who  had  been  cooperative 
from  the  start.  To  put  him  of  all  men  at 
the  Conference  in  a  position  of  opposing  the 
78 


THE  FKENCH  AT  THE  CONFEEENCE 

United  States  was  most  unfair.  There  had 
been  no  clashes  in  committees,  no  quarrels. 
There  had,  of  course,  been  differences  in 
points  of  view,  candid  statements,  free  ex- 
planations, but  any  one  with  common  sense 
knew  that  such  exchange  of  views  must 
take  place.  It  was  a  fine,  generous,  con- 
vincing answer  to  the  ugly  rumors,  and  the 
beauty  of  it  was  that  you  believed  Mr. 
Hughes.  You  knew  that  he  was  not  lying 
to  you.  I  believe  this  to  have  been  the  gen- 
eral conviction  of  the  newspaper  men.  He 
convinced  them  and  they  were  all  for  him. 
This  was  a  real  achievement  for  any  man, 
for  the  press  craft  are  hard  to  convince  and 
quick  to  suspect.  Many  of  them  have  been 
for  years  in  the  thick  of  public  affairs, 
watching  men  go  up  and  down;  seeing 
heroes  made  and  unmade ;  the  incorruptible 
prove  corruptible.  One  wonders  sometimes 
not  that  they  have  so  little  faith,  but  that 
they  have  any.  They  believed  Mr.  Hughes. 
When  he  denied  the  rumors  his  word  was 
79 


PEACEMAKEES 

accepted.  But  the  rumors  were  out,  and 
had  been  cabled  abroad  and  were  already 
doing  their  ugly  work  there — fighting  right 
and  left  like  mad  dogs.  There  was  even  riot 
and  bloodshed  in  Italy  over  the  report  that 
Briand  had  spoken  lightly  of  their  army. 

It  looked  for  the  moment  as  if  an  at- 
mosphere was  gathering  around  the  Wash- 
ington Conference  similar  to  that  in  which 
the  Paris  Conference  had  done  its  work. 
Indeed,  already  the  observer  who  had  been 
in  Paris  in  1919,  had  been  more  than  once 
startled  with  the  way  the  two  conferences 
were  beginning  to  parallel  each  other.  Just 
what  happened  in  Paris  had  already  hap- 
pened here — a  wonderful  first  stage  in  which 
a  noble  program  had  been  given  out — a  pro- 
gram to  which  all  the  world  had  responded 
with  joy  and  hope.  Then  came  a  second 
stage  in  which  the  delegates  attempted  to 
make  their  noble  ideas  realities.  It  was  in 
this  transition  period  that  the  first  convul- 
sions of  public  and  press  began.  They  saw 
80 


THE  FRENCH  AT  THE  CONFERENCE 

that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Conference 
had  no  magic  to  practice,  that  it  was  noth- 
ing but  the  same  old  hard  effort  to  work  out 
by  conferring,  by  bargaining,  by  compro- 
mise, the  best  that  they  could  get.  And  they 
saw,  too,  that  most  of  this  work  was  going 
on  behind  closed  doors.  The  moment  that 
the  Washington  Conference  attempted  to 
get  down  to  cases  there  was  the  same  burst 
of  remonstrance,  suspicion,  accusation  that 
we  saw  in  Paris.  "Secret  diplomacy." 
Then  came  rumors  of  quarrels.  If  it  was 
secret,  must  it  not  have  been  because  there 
were  things  that  they  did  not  want  known 
outside — breaks  in  their  good  will?  The 
rumors  of  quarrels  were  spread  with  relish, 
and  often  malice.  Dislike  of  this  or  that 
nation  flared  up,  mistrust  of  this  or  that 
man.  Washington  air  was  saturated  with 
impatience,  suspicion,  intrigue.  Was  the 
Conference  to  gather  about  it  the  same 
storm  of  wicked  passions  that  had  been  so 
strong  in  Paris,  doing  their  best  to  wreck 
81 


PEACEMAKERS 

the  work,  and  frustrating  some  of  the  no- 
blest attempts.  That  dreadful  "outside"  of 
the  Paris  Conference,  created  by  the  unrea- 
son, hate,  vanity  and  ambitions  of  men, 
seemed  about  to  be  duplicated.  I  had  never 
set  down  my  impressions  of  the  Paris  at- 
mosphere at  the  time  of  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence ;  I  would  do  it  now,  that  I  might  have 
it  to  compare  with  what  seemed  to  me  was 
about  to  develop  in  Washington. 


82 


CHAPTER  V 

THE    PARIS    SHRINE   OF   OUR   LADY    OF    HATES 

MEN  and  women  who  have  been  spectators 
of  great  human  tussles  are  generally  pos- 
sessed by  a  desire  to  tell  what  they  saw, 
thought  and  felt  during  its  progress,  and 
until  they  have  relieved  themselves  of  this 
obsession  they  are  uneasy,  as  from  a  duty 
undone.  Until  one  carries  for  a  time  such 
an  obsession  as  this  he  cannot  realize  the 
patness  of  the  vulgar  expression  getting  a 
thing  "off  one's  chest."  It  lies  there,  liter- 
ally a  load.  He  may  have  a  notion — and  his 
delay  is  probably  due  to  that — that  he  will 
only  be  adding  another  folio  to  a  more  or 
less  pestiferous  collection;  that,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  he  will  not,  and  cannot,  com- 
municate anything  that  others  have  not  al- 
83 


PEACEMAKERS 

ready  communicated.    All  he  can  do  is  to 
say,  "So  I  saw  it ;  so  it  seemed  to  me." 

For  three  years  I  had  carried  around  a 
few  impressions  of  the  Paris  Conference  of 
1919.  I  had  meant  to  keep  them  to  myself 
— they  were  so  ungracious.  Summed  up 
they  amounted  to  a  melancholy  conclusion 
that  in  times  of  stress,  public  and  press, 
unrestrained,  make  a  bedlam  in  which 
steady  constructive  effort,  if  not  frustrated 
utterly,  is  sure  to  be  hindered  and  distorted. 
Taken  as  a  whole  the  milieu  in  which  the 
Paris  Conference  operated,  furnished  the 
most  perfect  example  the  world  has  ever 
seen  of  the  arrogance  of  the  one  who  calls 
himself  liberal,  of  the  irresponsibility  of 
him  who  calls  himself  radical,  of  the  unut- 
terable stupidity  of  him  who  calls  himself 
conservative,  of  the  universal  habit  of  sav- 
ing your  face  by  crying  down  what  others 
are  attempting  to  do,  and  of  the  limita- 
tions which  the  laws  of  human  nature  and 
human  society  put  upon  the  collective  ef- 
forts of  human  beings. 
84 


SHRINE  OF  OUR  LADY  OF  HATES 

From  the  day  that  the  Conference  opened 
you  had  the  impression  of  each  man — I  am 
talking  here  only  of  the  man  on  the  out- 
side— being  for  himself  in  what  was  plainly 
and  admittedly  the  world's  most  gigantic 
effort  to  sink  this  each  man  in  the  whole. 
It  was  the  insistence  of  the  individual  and 
his  way  of  thinking,  so  long  held  in  check 
by  the  terrific  necessities  of  the  war,  that 
caused  the  first  doubts  of  the  undertaking 
to  one  who  struggled  to  keep  a  disinter- 
ested outlook.  Take  the  idealists  who  had 
accepted  the  great  formula  for  world  peace 
laid  down;  they  regarded  it  as  something 
accomplished  because  for  the  moment  it 
stood  out  as  the  clear  desire  of  the  world, 
and  were  heedless  and  contemptuous  of  the 
wisest  words  that  were  uttered  at  the  start, 
the  words  of  Georges  Clemenceau,  who,  at 
the  first  session,  told  the  delegates  of  all 
the  nations  of  the  world  that  if  this  daring 
thing,  which  he  doubted  but  to  which  he 
consented,  went  through  it  meant  sacrifice 
for  everybody.  But  your  idealist  had  not 
85 


PEACEMAKERS 

come  for  sacrifice.  He  had  come  to  put  into 
operation  his  particular  formula  for  a  per- 
fect world. 

With  every  day  the  numbers  in  Paris 
grew  who  had  come  to  help — to  get  a  hear- 
ing— to  help  in  the  group  at  the  top — to  be 
heard  by  principals.  They  failed.  Disap- 
pointment, wounded  vanity,  the  sense  that 
they  were  somebody,  had  something  to  con- 
tribute, stirred  them  to  resentment.  They 
would  serve,  and  they  were  rejected.  There 
was,  to  be  sure,  one  thing  that  those  who 
resented  this  apparent  unconsciousness  of 
their  importance  by  those  charged  with  the 
conduct  of  things  might  have  done — one 
surely  useful  thing,  and  that  was,  casting 
an  eye  about  and  seeing  the  multitude  of 
problems  that  shrieked  for  solution,  master 
one,  little  as  it'  might  be: — the  .case  of 
Teschen,  of  the  Banat  of  Tamesvar,  the  his- 
tory of  a  boundary,  the  need  of  a  coal  mine 
here  or  there — and  working,  really  working, 
on  this  particular  problem,  produce  some 


SHEINE  OF  OUE  LADY  OP  HATES 

sound  presentation,  something  that  men 
could  not  get  around.  The  whole  bubbling 
pot  of  trouble  called  for  such  cooling  drops 
of  real,  carefully  considered  work. 

But  this  demanded  self -direction,  poise,  a 
wiP.ingness  to  make  a  very  small  contribu- 
tion, to  have  no  pretense  of  being  called 
into  council,  to  trust  to  the  gods  and  your 
own  knowledge  of  what  really  counts  in 
solving  complications.  It  called  for  going 
aside,  of  not  pretending  to  be  on  the  in- 
side. Minds  were  too  troubled,  vanity  was 
too  keen.  You  eased  your  mind  and  poul- 
ticed your  vanity  by  talk — talk  at  dinner 
tables,  over  restaurant  coffee,  over  tea — 
and  talk  in  endless  articles. 

One  of  the  banes  of  the  Paris  Peace  Con- 
ference was  that  there  were  so  many  men 
and  women  on  the  field  under  contract  to 
write,  to  produce  so  many  words  every  day 
or  every  week.  There  was  no  contract  that 
these  words  should  add  something  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  many  things  about  which 
87 


PEACEMAKERS 

it  was  so  necessary  for  men  and  women  to 
learn — no  contract  that  they  should  con- 
tribute by  ever  so  little  to  the  great  need 
of  control  on  every  side,  that  they  should 
comfort,  soften  hates,  stimulate  common 
sense.  Writers  covered  up  their  ignorance 
of  things  doing  by  prophecies,  by  shrieks  of 
despair,  by  poses  of  intimacy  with  the 
great,  by  elaborately  spun-out  theories. 
And  they  built  up  superstitions.  They 
created  things — absolutely  created  supersti- 
tions that  may  never  be  dispelled  from  the 
minds  of  those  who  read  them  back  home. 
There  was  the  superstition  of  the  mys- 
terious four  who,  without  advice,  without 
use  of  the  vast  machinery  of  expert  knowl- 
edge that  had  been  called  into  existence, 
without  consideration  of  political  prejudice, 
of  ancient  hates  and  struggles,  carved  up 
countries,  made  artificial  boundaries,  and 
did  it  with  a  nicely  calculated  sense  of  re- 
venge, hate,  self-advantage.  This  "Big- 
Four"  came  in  popular  minds  to  be  a  hydra- 
88 


SHRINE  OF  OUR  LADY  OF  HATES 

headed  tyrant — more  irresponsible,  brutal, 
and  cynical  than  any  czar  of  Bussia  or 
Machiavelli  of  the  Middle  Ages. 

And  it  was  a  creation  that  left  out  of  con- 
sideration facts  that  were  there  for  every- 
body to  read  if  they  were  willing  to  work. 
It  was  a  Putois  they  created.  Who  was 
Putois?  Head  your  Anatole  France,  or  if 
Crainquebille  is  not  at  hand,  read  Joseph 
Conrad's  review. 

The  malevolence  of  those  not  charged 
with  the  conduct  of  affairs  against  those  so 
charged  grew  thicker  and  thicker  as  the  days 
went  on.  Gossip  became  more  and  more  un- 
restrained. It  was  the  only  refuge  of  the 
numbers  who  had  no  definite  business  in  the 
scene  but  who  had  come  to  watch — often 
with  the  idea  in  their  minds  that  they  might 
be  able  to  contribute  some  definite,  salutary, 
stimulating  something,  often  again  with  a 
very  definite  idea  that  they  might  be  able 
to  pull  down  this1  or  that  person  having  some 
actual  inside  hold. 


PEACEMAKEES 

There  were  those  who  set  themselves  with 
calculation  to  destroy  the  prestige  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States;  not  to  de- 
stroy it  by  sound  criticism  of  his  point  of 
view,  by  the  presentation  of  a  larger  aspect 
of  things  than  his,  but  to  do  it  by  a  calcu- 
lated meanness  of  mind.  In  the  general  and 
frightful  disorder  left  by  the  war,  every- 
thing begged  that  men  should  sink  their 
littleness  and  show  bigness,  if  there  was 
any  in  them,  or  if  not  leave  the  scene,  in 
order  at  least,  by  their  absence,  there  might 
be  so  much  less  of  littleness  of  mind  around. 
But  these  men — and  women — stayed  on. 
They  sat  at  the  tables  of  the  Ritz  and 
smacked  their  lips  over  a  nasty  piece  of 
scandal,  born  of  mischief-making  partisans 
in  far  distant  places;  the  meanness  of  the 
"outs"  against  the  leader  of  the  "ins."  And 
there  were  always  those  to  listen  and  to 
spread. 

In  the  greatness  of  the  calamity  that  had 
overwhelmed  the  world,  it  would  seem  that 
90 


SHRINE  OF  OUE  LADY  OF  HATES 

men  should  have  gone  beyond  the  point  not 
only  of  this  wanton  mischief  but  beyond 
the  point  of  sneering.  A  sneer  in  the  face 
of  this  vast  destruction  of  mankind  was  like 
a  sneer  at  an  angry  Jehovah.  But  men 
everywhere  sneered  at  the  attempts  at  order, 
at  justice.  And,  curiously  enough,  it  was 
those  who  labeled  themselves  liberal,  hu- 
mane, that  sneered  most. 

There  was  a  despairing  consciousness  at 
times  that  in  every  heart  some  unextinguish- 
able  hatred  was  nourished.  There  were  the 
hatreds  against  those  who  did  not  believe 
with  you.  You  began  to  see  growing  in 
Paris  among  Americans  what  we  have  seen 
growing  here  at  home  since  the  war — the 
revival  of  that  old,  old  hate  of  England. 
What  hope  is  there  of  the  world,  one  felt 
sometimes  like  asking,  when  some  man  or 
woman  who  literally  had  given  his  life  to 
good  works  or  good  causes  poured  a  vial 
of  vitriol  on  the  English  nation?  It  took 
you  back  to  the  Civil  War,  and  the  delivery 
91 


PEACEMAKEES 

up  to  England,  by  the  wisdom  of  Abraham 
Lincoln,  of  the  Confederate  commissioners. 
Owen  Love  joy,  lifelong  friend  of  human 
freedom,  enemy  of  human  slavery,  rose  in 
the  Congress  of  the  United  States  then  and 
swore,  so  that  all  the  country  heard,  his 
own  undying  hatred  of  England. 

What  was  the  world  problem,  after  all, 
but  to  extinguish  hatred? 

Unless  that  hymn  of  hate  could  be  si- 
lenced, what  hope  was  there  of  peace,  order, 
or  the  forms  of  order?  And  yet  the  advo- 
cates of  peace  fed  the  fires  in  their  own 
hearts  and  did  their  best  to  enkindle  them 
in  others. 

And  it  was  not  alone  American  hatred  of 
England,  French  hatred  of  Germany,  or 
English  hatred  of  Germany  that  you  heard 
of,  but  new  hates.  They  ran  about  like  fire 
maniacs,  pouring  oil  on  old  factional,  na- 
tional and  international  troubles, — the 
Egyptian  against  the  English,  the  Greek 
against  the  Turk — the  Pole  against  the 
Russian. 

92 


SHRINE  OF  OUR  LADY  OF  HATES 

There  used  to  stand  in  Brittany  one  of 
those  frank,  realistic  shrines  that  the  Gallic 
— honest  with  the  ways  of  his  own  heart — so 
often  sets  up,  a  statue  to  Notre  Dame  des 
Haines — Our  Lady  of  the  Hates.  A  mob 
from  all  over  the  earth  flocked  to  Paris,  car- 
rying under  their  arms  big  or  little  replicas 
of  Notre  Dame  des  Haines — intent  on  rear- 
ing them  at  the  doors  of  the  Conference. 

Savage  instincts  came  to  the  top,  and  no 
contradiction,  in  all  this  sea  of  contradic- 
tion, stared  at  you  more  hatefully  than  that 
of  announced  pacifists  lending  all  their  ef- 
forts to  a  May  Day  riot,  almost  panting  to 
see  blood  run,  and  perching  themselves  on 
possible  vantage  points,  to  cheer  on  any 
possible  disorder  at  a  time  when  tormented 
authorities  had  ordered  the  public  to  stay 
indoors,  and  had  taken  taxis  and  omni- 
buses from  the  streets.  They  wanted  the 
protest  of  blood  against  what?  As  nearly 
as  one  could  see,  it  was  against  the  only 
organized  widespread  effort  then  making  in 
the  tormented  world  to  bring  the  peace  and 
93 


PEACEMAKEBS 

justice  which  they  had  made  it  their  pro- 
fessional business  to  preach. 

A  despairing  fact  was  that  individuals 
and  groups,  whose  profession  in  life  it  had 
been  to  be  auxiliaries  of  peace  and  order, 
became  auxiliaries  of  war  and  disorder. 
There  was  one  way  of  counteracting  their 
power,  and  that  was  using  them,  putting  it 
up  to  them  as  Mr.  Lincoln  put  it  up  to 
Horace  Greeley  in  1864. 

To  put  it  up  to  them  in  the  way  of  the 
Niagara  Conference — that  was  the  real  wis- 
dom, the  real  wisdom  of  the  leader  always 
toward  protesting  groups — let  them  try 
their  hand.  Possibly  they  can  pull  it 
through,  contribute  something  which  he  and 
those  of  his  type  cannot  do.  But  in  this 
avalanche  of  demands — causes,  old  and  new ; 
injustices  running  back  to  the  Flood;  with 
a  hundred  unsolvable  problems  for  every 
hour — how  place  all  this  pestiferous  mob 
that  knew  how  to  do  it?  It  was  to  bale  out 
the  Seine  with  a  teaspoon — a  vaster  river 

than  the  Potomac  and  a  smaller  teaspoon. 
94 


SHEINE  OF  OUE  LADY  OF  HATES 

And  the  trying  came  so  often  to  naught. 
There  was  Prinkipo — modeled  on  the  real 
idealist's  formula,  sound  enough  for  a  lim- 
ited scene,  with  a  limited  cast — "get  to- 
gether around  a  table  and  talk  it  over." 

But  the  table?  How  find  it  in  this  still 
seething  land  over  so  much  of  which  the 
lava  was  still  hot  and  uncrossable,  with 
so  many  craters  where  at  every  instant  new 
eruptions  threatened.  They  tried  it — went 
into  the  sea  for  their  table,  at  a  spot  of 
which  some  of  those  who  chose  it  had  never 
heard,  and  to  which  one  at  least  objected — 
soundly  enough — because  the  name  sounded 
so  like  the  name  of  a  comic  opera. 

And  the  table  selected,  how  get  contest- 
ants there?  In  this  Europe  they  were  re- 
making, such  was  the  physical,  military  and 
political  hampering  that  there  was  no  spot 
to  which  it  was  certain  that  everybody  could 
reach.  And,  as  in  the  Prinkipo  case,  you 
ran  up  against  things  more  unyielding  than 
armies  or  parties — that  hardening  of  will, 
that  deadening  of  the  spirit  of  cooperation 
95 


PEACEMAKEES 

which  is  one  of  the  most  terrible  works  of 
revolutions — something  happening  to  men 
who  have  all  their  lives  been  good  men,  de- 
voted to  the  end  of  human  happiness,  freez- 
ing them  until  they  will  no  longer  work 
with  other  men  to  bring  order  and  peace  to 
a  tormented  land  for  which  they  have  al- 
ways slaved. 

To  sit  at  a  table  and  hear  a  great  noble, 
white-bearded  advocate  of  human  rights, 
turned  to  bitterness  and  scorn  of  those  who 
have  ruined  his  plan  of  doing  things  but 
who,  for  the  moment,  are  in  the  saddle, 
carrying  out  their  own  violent,  fanatic  way, 
refuse  to  even  meet  at  the  Prinkipo  table 
the  representative  of  those  advocates  of  vio- 
lence in  order  to  attempt  to  somehow  soften 
their  madness — you  know  then  that  you 
have  reached  a  human  limit,  a  limit  to  the 
human  being's  capacity  to  face  those  who 
disagree  and  those  whom  he  despises  though 
in  that  meeting  there  may  be  a  remote, 
though  -ever  so  remote,  chance  to  stay  a 


SHKIKE  OF  OUE  LADY  OF  HATES 

murderous  hand  and  soften  a  murderous 
spirit. 

It  was  not  only  such  curious  impressions 
of  the  limitations  of  the  human  mind  one 
received,  but  of  the  human  heart  as  well. 
It  seemed  as  if  it  were  not  big  enough — 
even  in  the  case  of  those  whose  profession 
it  is  to  be  humane — not  big  enough  to  cover 
anything  but  some  special  group  whose 
cause  they  espoused.  There  were  many  dis- 
heartening exhibits  of  this  limitation.  One 
that  will  always  stick  in  my  mind  as  one  of 
the  most  hideous  was  the  tears  of  a  great 
humanitarian  over  the  German  prisoner  in 
France — a  prisoner  at  that  time  receiving 
the  same  rations  and  even  better  shelter 
and  more  clothes  than  most  French  refugees, 
and  an  absolute  setting  of  lips  and  hardness 
of  eyes  at  the  mention  of  children  and 
women  in  the  caves  of  Lens,  the  shattered 
ruins  of  Peronne — it  was  not  humanity  but 
an  espoused  group  of  humanity  that  stirred 
his  sympathy. 

97 


PEACEMAKERS 

Limits  to  human  endurance,  human  ca- 
pacity, human  kindness,  human  foresight — 
that  was  what  every  day  of  the  Peace  Con- 
ference cried  louder  and  louder  into  your 
ear. 


98 


CHAPTER  VI 

WHY  DID  HE  DO  IT? 

BUT  Washington  was  not  to  parallel 
Paris.  The  uproar  caused  by  M.  Briand's 
speech  died  away  in  an  amazingly  short 
time — so  far  as  Washington  was  concerned. 
The  violence  and  indiscretions  of  the  press 
to  which  so  much  of  the  disturbance  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Atlantic  was  due  was  not 
followed  up.  Those  that  had  been  responsi- 
ble were  all  of  them,  I  think,  a  little 
ashamed,  though  Mr.  Wells  obstinately  came 
back  one  or  twice  to  tell  what  he  thought  of 
the  French.  Explanations  quieted  the  Ital- 
ians. M.  Briand  had  never  used  the  offen- 
sive word  attributed  to  him,  it  had  been  but 
a  mistake  of  the  cables — and  a  serious  mis- 
take, it  should  be  said,  too,  of  the  journal- 
99 


PEACEMAKERS 

1st  that  had  cabled  it  without  verification. 
On  all  sides  lectures  were  read  to  the  cor- 
respondents. Go  on  this  way  and  they  could 
easily  wreck  the  whole  thing.  Go  on  this 
way  and  peace  never  at  any  time  could  be 
made  in  the  world.  Any  effort  of  man  could 
be  easily  upset  if  passionate  judgments  and 
unconfirmed  suspicions  were  to  be  sent 
broadcast  through  the  newspapers.  Peo- 
ple believe  what  they  read,  unhappily,  and 
have  little  or  no  way  of  verifying.  There 
was  much  of  this  reproving  talk  going  on 
and  some  of  those  who  handled  it  most  vig- 
orously belonged  to  the  Washington  press. 
It  had  its  effect  at  once. 

Then,  too,  it  was  hard  to  be  continuously 
violent  and  suspicious  in  Washington.  The 
lovely  days,  the  wide  streets,  the  freedom 
from  the  turmoil  of  business  and  industry, 
the  very  absence  of  exciting  night  life — all 
tended  to  calm  the  spirit.  How  different 
from  Paris  in  1919 !  There  one  lived  in  a 
city  encircled  by  vast  hospitals  where  thou- 
100 


WHY  DID  HE  DO  IT? 

sands  upon  thousands  of  shattered  men 
tossed  on  their  beds  of  pain.  Soldiers  of  all 
nations  swarmed  everywhere.  In  many 
streets  of  the  city  the  shops  were  still  sealed 
up.  On  all  sides  one  found  great  staring 
gaps — the  wounds  of  the  city  made  by  the 
shells  of  Big  Bertha  or  the  nightly  visits  of 
airplanes.  Everywhere  you  went  you  saw 
still  the  signs  "Abri"  (shelter),  vividly  re- 
calling the  long  years  in  which  no  man  safely 
went  out  without  knowing  that  there  was 
a  refuge  near  by.  The  streets  at  night  were 
still  dark,  and  those  within  still  tightened 
their  shutters  and  drew  close  their  curtains, 
unable  to  believe  that  light  was  no  longer 
a  danger. 

You  rode  in  battered  taxicabs  over  streets 
that  were  rough  from  long  inattention.  In 
every  house  you  entered  the  marks  of  war 
still  remained.  Nothing  had  been  mended 
or  repaired  in  Paris  for  five  years.  A  heat- 
ing apparatus  out  of  order,  it  stayed  out  of 
order.  A  window  broken,  it  stayed  broken. 
101 


PEACEMAKERS 

A  hinge  off,  it  stayed  off.  Carpets  and 
furniture  went  uncleaned.  And  in  the 
homes  of  the  rich  where  there  had  been  beau- 
tiful pictures,  empty  frames  hung  on  the 
wall,  the  canvas  having  been  cut  out  and 
sent  to  some  place  of  safety.  There  was 
no  color.  All  Paris  was  in  black.  Even  in 
the  windows  of  the  shops  you  saw  nothing 
but  black.  Your  dressmaker  and  milliner 
had  no  heart  to  work  in  colors,  it  still  to 
them  was  bad  taste.  It  was  only  the  influx 
and  the  demand  of  the  visiting  foreigners, 
who  multiplied  as  the  Conference  went 
on,  that  brought  back  colors  to  the  shop 
windows. 

What  a  contrast  to  all  this  was  Washing- 
ton in  the  fall  of  1921,  with  its  gayety  and 
lavishness,  its  incessant  round  of  lunches 
and  teas  and  dinners,  its  over-weighted 
tables,  unbelievable  in  their  abundance  to 
the  visiting  strangers,  so  long — and  still — 
on  stricter  rations.  You  could  not  be  tragic 
long  in  Washington. 


WHY  DID  HE  DO  IT? 

Then  there  was  Mr.  Hughes'  steady  hand. 
He  laughed  daily  at  his  press  conferences 
at  the  insinuations  and  solemnity  of  the 
questioning  press  correspondents.  Every- 
thing was  going  on  swimmingly,  he  asserted. 
"Excellent  progress."  The  naval  commit- 
tee was  at  work,  the  Far  Eastern  commit- 
tee had  begun  its  sessions,  the  agenda  would 
be  followed  step  by  step,  but  one  thing  at 
a  time  would  be  attempted;  when  they  had 
finished  what  they  were  at  now  they  would 
take  up  the  next  step,  and  not  before.  It 
was  certainly  steadying,  if  not  exciting.  It 
gave  confidence,  if  not  headlines.  All  of  this 
quieted  the  storm,  but  it  was  left  to  the 
President  of  the  United  States  to  sweep  it 
entirely  from  the  Conference  sky,  though 
whether  he  did  it  intentionally  or  acci- 
dentally is  still,  I  think,  an  unanswered 
question. 

Why  did  President  Harding,  without 
warning,  inject  an  Association  of  Nations 
into  the  Conference  on  the  Limitation  of 
103 


PEACEMAKERS 

Armament,  on  the  last  day  of  its  second 
week  of  life?  The  Conference  had  a  definite 
agenda.  Mr.  Hughes,  its  chairman,  was  fol- 
lowing it  with  the  rigor  of  a  good  school- 
master. That  agenda  made  no  mention  of 
a  conference,  association  or  league  of  na- 
tions. So  far  as  it  was  concerned,  the  world 
war  is  made  up  of  nine  nations.  And  here 
came  the  President  of  the  United  States 
and  casually  announced  that  before  the 
work  was  completed  it  should  include  an 
association  of  all  the  nations  of  the  earth. 

Why  did  he  do  it?  Did  he  want  to  divert 
public  attention  from  the  dangerous  irri- 
tations of  the  moment?  We  do  not  yet  know 
enough  of  the  workings  of  Mr.  Harding's 
mind  to  be  able  to  say  whether  he  would, 
like  Napoleon  III,  gild  a  dome  when  there 
was  squally  public  weather.  All  we  do 
really  know  about  the  President,  so  far,  is 
his  genuinely  beneficent  intent.  Is  he  canny 
enough  to  know  that  the  public  is  as  easily 
diverted  as  a  child  and  capable  of  attempt- 
104 


WHY  DID  HE  DO  IT? 

ing  the  trick  when  things  are  getting  a 
bit  out  of  hand? 

Whether  this  is  true  or  not,  he  certainly 
put  an  end  to  the  ticklish  situation  in  which 
the  Conference  found  itself  in  Thanksgiv- 
ing week.  Everybody  fell  to  discussing  the 
proposition.  Was  the  Conference  really  to 
end  up  in  an  Association  of  Nations?  Did 
this  mean  that  the  United  States  would 
suggest  to  the  delegates  gathered  at  the 
Conference — all  of  them  members  of  the 
League  of  Nations — that  they  scrap  that  in- 
stitution? There  had  been  much  specula- 
tion in  Geneva  before  the  Washington  Con- 
ference was  called  as  to  whether  the  inten- 
tion was  to  force  the  League  out  of  existence. 
So  great  was  the  anxiety  of  more  than  one 
European  country  to  be  in  any  congrega- 
tion in  which  the  United  States  figured, 
that  it  was  pretty  generally  agreed  that  if 
such  a  proposition  should  be  made  it  would 
be  assented  to.  Was  this  Mr.  Harding's 
first  feeler  then  toward  substituting  some- 
105 


PEACEMAKERS 

thing  of  his  own  for  the  League?  But  this 
was  only  a  speculation.  Nobody  could  get 
from  any  official  source  any  confirmation 
that  Mr.  Harding  had  anything  definite  in 
mind.  And  yet  they  were  not  unwilling  to 
accept  the  notion  that  he  had  inadvertently 
thrown  out  so  important  a  suggestion. 

There  were  those  who  had  an  unamiable 
explanation.  We  are  all  human,  they  said. 
We  must  remember  that  this  has  ceased  to 
be  Mr.  Harding's  conference.  His  fine  senti- 
ments on  Armistice  Day  on  the  opening  of 
the  Conference  had  been  greeted  with  loud 
acclaim  the  world  over.  But  after  he  had 
opened  the  Conference  he  left  the  hall. 
Secretary  Hughes  appeared,  and  it  was  Sec- 
retary Hughes  who  stirred  the  world. 
From  that  time  on,  the  Secretary  had  been 
the  one  man  quoted.  We  have  had  great 
secretaries — Mr.  Boot,  for  instance,  who 
never  allowed  his  shadow  to  fall  across  that 
of  the  President  of  the  United  States. 
When  Mr.  Boosevelt  was  President,  Mr. 
Boot  prepared  some  very  remarkable  state 
106 


WHY  DID  HE  DO  IT? 

papers,  but  they  always  began  "The  Presi- 
dent instructs  me  to  say."  Mr.  Hughes 
has  been  speaking  for  himself.  It  is  quite 
possible,  said  these  interpreters,  that  the 
President  thinks  the  time  has  come  to  let 
the  public  know  that,  after  all,  it  is  he  who 
occupies  the  White  House. 

I  am  quite  sure  that  if  this  had  been  true, 
we  should  have  had  other  evidence  of  it 
as  time  went  on,  but  none  came.  Mr.  Hard- 
ing knew  well  enough  that  a  successful  Con- 
ference was  in  the  long  run  his  triumph. 
He  knew  well  enough  that  the  only  man  who 
could  give  him  this  success  was  Secretary 
Hughes.  Possibly  the  wisest  thing  that  Mr. 
Harding  has  yet  done  as  President  has  been 
to  let  the  members  of  his  cabinet  do  their 
own  work.  Jealousy  is  not,  I  am  sure,  an 
explanation  of  Mr.  Harding's  sudden  intro- 
duction of  an  Association  of  Nations  into 
the  Conference  on  the  Limitation  of  Arma- 
ment. Was  it  to  be  found  in  M.  Briand's 
speech? 

M.  Briand  did  not  convince  his  audi- 
107 


PEACEMAKERS 

ence,  as  we  have  seen.  That  is,  he  did  not 
bring  it  to  the  point  at  which  he  was  aim- 
ing. But  one  thing  that  he  did  do  was  to 
bring  into  sharp  relief  the  fact  that  land 
and  naval  armaments  cannot  be  handled 
separately.  They  dovetail  in  the  game  of 
war,  are  mutually  defensive  and  offensive; 
to  cut  the  navy  of  a  nation  whose  main 
defense  is  ships,  without  considering  the 
relation  of  that  cut  to  the  size  of  the  armies 
of  those  nations  in  which  armies  are  the 
chief  defense,  is  to  leave  an  unbalanced 
situation. 

A  second  realization  went  along  with  this, 
and  that  was  that  the  scrapping  and  cutting 
by  nine  nations  must  be  done  with  an  eye 
to  the  actual  or  potential  naval  armaments 
of  the  other  forty-five  or  so  nations  of  the 
earth.  Senator  Schanzer  had  already  sug- 
gested this  in  his  speech  made  on  November 
15,  accepting  in  principle  for  Italy  the  naval 
program.  "I  think  it  rather  difficult,"  he 
said,  "to  separate  the  question  of  Italian 
and  French  naval  armament  limitation  from 
108 


WHY  DID  HE  DO  IT? 

the  general  question  of  naval  armaments  of 
the  world." 

M.  Briand's  speech  made  one  realize  how 
France  and  Italy  must  consider  possible 
continental  alliances  of  powers  that  were 
not  represented  at  this  Conference;  must 
consider  a  possible  Russian  crusade  to  con- 
vert the  world  by  force  to  its  gospel.  And 
if  France  and  Italy  must,  or  thought  they 
must,  secure  themselves  against  these  possi- 
bilities, could  England  weaken  herself  dis- 
proportionately? When  you  began  to  con- 
sider the  question  of  armament  in  terms  of 
the  world  and  not  simply  of  nine  nations, 
you  could  not  if  you  were  candid  find  any 
peaceful  solution  but  by  bringing  everybody 
in — Germany,  Turkey,  Russia.  Now  it  may 
be,  though  we  do  not  know  Mr.  Harding 
well  enough  yet  to  say,  that  the  logic  of 
the  experiences  that  the  Conference  had 
been  through  up  to  date  laid  hold  of  him 
and  he  said  it  like  a  man — "there  is  but  one 
way  out,  and  that  is  by  One  Big  Union." 

Of  course  there  is  another  explanation  of 
109 


PEACEMAKEKS 

why  he  did  it  and  I  rather  think  it  may  be 
the  true  one,  after  all.  The  President  may 
have  been  hearing  from  the  country.  One 
thing  that  we  do  know  about  him  is  that  he 
is  a  man  who  with  almost  religious  care  lis- 
tens to  the  voices  that  come  up  to  him  from 
the  people.  And  it  was  no  secret  that  a 
multitude  of  them,  strong  and  weak,  had 
been  calling  to  him  in  the  weeks  preceding 
—  "conference,"  "association,"  "league," 
"some  method  of  carrying  on  in  which  every- 
body can  join,"  "in  no  other  way  can  we 
hope  for  permanent  peace."  It  may  be  that 
Mr.  Harding  had  heard  so  much  of  this  that 
he  felt  he  must  reply.  And  if  this  was  true, 
he  did  wisely. 

We  may  lay  it  down  as  one  of  the  great 
facts  of  the  present  international  state  of 
mind,  that  the  world  is  intent  on  some  sort 
of  an  association  of  nations.  It  is  not  set, 
so  far  as  one  can  determine,  on  any  particu- 
lar  covenant,  though  of  course  there  is  one 
to  which  some  fifty  nations  of  the  world 
110 


WHY  DID  HE  DO  IT? 

have  subscribed  and  in  which  for  some  two 
years  now  they  have  been  doing  increasingly 
practical  work  in  adjusting  difficulties  be- 
tween nations.  The  very  fact  that  the 
League  of  Nations  lives — the  divers  ways 
in  which  its  adventures  in  world  unionism 
come  to  us — only  makes  the  idea  of  associ- 
ation stronger  in  the  minds  of  the  peoples  of 
the  earth. 

The  Conference  might  limit  armaments, 
naval  and  land,  in  the  nine  nations  that 
were  here  gathered.  It  might  make  settle- 
ments of  the  Far  Eastern  questions,  but 
there  still  would  remain  the  rest  of  the 
world.  It  is  a  part  of  things.  The  world 
is  one.  It  has  come  to  a  consciousness  of 
its  oneness.  Nothing  can  dull  that  con- 
sciousness, stop  the  determination  to  real- 
ize it.  Not  Mr.  Borah,  not  Mr.  Lodge. 
Somehow  we  have  got  to  learn  to  come  to- 
gether and  stay  together.  Walt  Whitman 
once  said  of  Abraham  Lincoln's  passion  for 
the  Union  that  unionism  had  become  "a 
111 


PEACEMAKERS 

new  virtue"  with  Mm, — a  virtue  like  hon- 
esty, goodness,  truthfulness.  There  is  no 
manner  of  doubt  that  in  the  minds  of  this 
world  unionism  is  coming  to  be  regarded  as 
a  virtue;  that  the  demand  for  its  realiza- 
tion as  the  only  road  to  world  peace  is  be- 
coming more  and  more  universal. 

Mr.  Harding  may  have  seen  this.  He  may 
have  gone  over  in  his  mind  the  steps  that 
in  the  last  twenty-five  years — not  to  go  back 
farther — the  world  has  taken  toward  this— 
the  steps  at  the  Hague,  the  various  peace 
conferences,  the  greatest  of  all  experiments 
now  making  at  Geneva — and  he  may  have 
seen  that  he  could  no  longer  deny  the  de- 
mand of  this  people  that  he  take  another 
step  toward  the  realization  of  this  great 
hope.  Whatever  the  reason,  however,  of 
his  unexpected  suggestion,  it  served  the 
excellent  purpose  of  turning  the  mind  of 
the  public  to  the  fact  that  however  complete 
the  work  of  the  Conference  might  be  there 
would  still  be  more  to  do  if  the  world  was 
to  remain  at  peace. 

112 


WHY  DID  HE  DO  IT? 

In  the  meantime  the  Conference  itself  was 
going  steadily  ahead.  Everybody  seemed 
cheerful.  Everybody  was  cheerful.  If  the 
Conference  had  rocked  on  its  base  for  a  mo- 
ment, it  had  come  back  to  its  position ;  and 
it  was  obvious  enough,  too,  from  all  that 
one  heard  and  saw,  that  there  was  going 
soon  to  be  something  definite  and  important 
to  announce  as  a  result  of  the  work  that 
was  going  on. 


113 


CHAPTER  VII 

DRAMATIC  DIPLOMACY 

WHO  was  the  dramatist  of  the  Confer- 
ence on  the  Limitation  of  Armament?  Mr. 
Hughes?  I  would  never  have  believed  it. 
I  could  never  have  conceived  of  his  delib- 
erately staging  his  diplomatic  achievements 
with  an  appreciation  of  the  time,  the  place 
and  the  world  at  large  which  was  really 
amazing.  It  did  not  need  Mr.  Balf our's  deli- 
cate and  humorous  understanding  to  point 
out  to  those  who  were  present  at  the  open- 
ing on  November  12  that  the  dramatic  qual- 
ity of  Mr.  Hughes'  great  speech  rivaled,  if 
it  did  not  outstrip,  its  splendid  matter.  But 
who  would  have  believed  that  he  would  re- 
peat himself?  Yet  he  did  it.  Just  four 
weeks  from  his  first  great  coup  he  pulled 
114 


DRAMATIC  DIPLOMACY 

off  another  that  had  every  element  of  drama 
which  characterized  the  first — and  it  had 
more — strains  of  genuine  emotion  and  one 
scene  of  biting  satire.  (Not  for  a  moment, 
however,  do  I  believe  that  Mr.  Hughes  in- 
tended that.) 

The  surprise  of  the  opening  day  of  the 
Conference,  November  12,  lay  in  the  unex- 
pectedness of  what  Mr.  Hughes  had  to  say. 
The  first  surprise,  of  December  10,  lay  in 
the  fact  that  there  was  to  be  a  full  session. 
It  was  not  until  nearly  midnight  of  the  9th 
that  it  was  announced.  A  few  diners  linger- 
ing late  heard  of  it.  The  press  of  course 
was  informed.  But  to  most  of  us  the  news 
came  when  we  opened  our  morning  paper 
over  our  coffee — a  full  headline  across  the 
top  of  the  page — 

PLENARY  SESSION  TO-DAY 

Of  course  we  realized  that  it  was  going  to 
be  a  big  day.    For  days  there  had  been  hid- 
den in  the  mists  about  the  Conference 
115 


PEACEMAKEES 

thing  which  those  who  were  able  to  pene- 
trate near  to  the  center  of  things  declared 
to  be  a  treaty.  Watching  this  treaty  emerge 
was  like  watching  a  ship  come  out  of  a 
thick  fog.  There  were  warning  signals, 
faint  at  first,  but  growing  more  and  more 
distinct — the  Anglo-Japanese  pact  was  dy- 
ing. If  the  United  States  wished  it,  it 
should  go;  and  it  was  certain  that  the 
United  States  had  for  a  long  time  wished 
it, — also  Australia  and  other  parts  of  the 
British  Empire.  Then  we  began  to  hear 
more  and  more  from  another  direction — sig- 
nals that  had  been  sounded  at  intervals 
for  weeks  before  the  Conference  convened. 
Japan  was  uneasy  about  the  naval  bases  in 
the  Pacific.  She  would  like  to  have  them 
dismantled.  As  one  listened  one  began  to 
understand  that  Mr.  Hughes'  program  of 
naval  limitation  would  stay  where  it  was 
until  something  had  been  done  about  both 
the  Anglo-Japanese  Pact  and  the  Islands  of 
the  Pacific. 

116 


DEAMATIC  DIPLOMACY 

The  logic  of  the  situation  began  to  be 
clear.  The  fair-minded  began  to  ask  them- 
selves, "Well,  now,  after  all,  how  can  we 
expect  Japan  to  strip  herself  of  ships,  if 
she  must,  as  seeins  to  be  inevitable,  give 
up  her  understanding  with  England?  How 
can  we  expect  her  to  weaken  her  defenses 
and  take  no  exception  to  the  fortifications 
in  the  waters  near  her?  She  is  the  member 
of  this  Conference  that  is  being  asked  to 
sacrifice  until  it  hurts,  and  the  only  one. 
Is  it  fair  to  ask  her  to  sacrifice  without 
guarantees?  Is  there  any  way  out  but  a 
treaty — a  treaty  in  which  we  join?" 

Moreover,  if  you  ask  her  to  sacrifice  with- 
out a  guarantee,  will  she  do  it?  Not  Japan. 
Thus  it  became  more  and  more  clear  that 
the  success  of  the  naval  program  depended 
on  some  kind  of  a  pact  which  would  satisfy 
Japan  that  she  could  agree  to  what  Mr. 
Hughes  had  asked  and  still  have  no  reason 
to  feel  herself  in  danger. 

The  first  definite  black-faced,  full-width- 
117 


PEACEMAKEES 

of-the-page  headline  came,  as  I  remember, 
on  December  5 — "Four  Power  Entente  to 
Keplace  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance."  The 
morning  after  this  bold  announcement  it 
was  not  quite  so  sure.  The  newspapers 
were  keeping  a  line  of  retreat  open.  As 
they  now  put  it:  "Discussions  of  the  pro- 
posals have  reached  a  well-advanced  stage," 
none  of  the  governments  concerned  had 
given  final  approval.  There  was  enough 
that  was  sure,  however,  to  give  the  wicked 
a  chance  to  jeer  at  approaching  "entan- 
gling alliances." 

By  Friday,  December  9,  the  most  careful 
journals  were  saying,  on  what  they  declared 
to  be  the  best  sort  of  authority,  that  the 
United  States  was  going  into  a  pact  with 
Japan  and  England  and  France,  guarantee- 
ing various  things.  There  was  considerable 
diversity  in  the  assertions  about  what  it 
guaranteed.  Washington  said  nothing.  The 
news  came  from  all  of  the  capitals  of  the 
powers  concerned,  except  our  own.  It  was 
118 


DEAMATIC  DIPLOMACY 

evidently  very  hard  for  Washington  to  say 
"treaty." 

There  was  much  entertaining  gossip  run- 
ning around  as  to  how  Tokyo  and  London 
and  Paris  had  been  able  to  give  the  press 
the  news  of  what  was  going  to  be  done,  while 
Washington  was  silent.  One  story  was  that 
a  clever  Japanese  journalist  had  managed 
to  get  a  glimpse  of  the  document  in  prepara- 
tion and  had  cabled  what  he  had  been  able 
to  make  out  of  its  contents  to  Tokyo;  that 
from  there  it  had  gone  to  Paris  and  London 
and  finally  came  here.  That  was  one  story. 
Another  was  a  rather  thin  version  of  that 
old,  old  device  of  writers  of  diplomatic 
fiction — a  lively  and  lovely  lady  lunches 
with  an  elderly  diplomat,  who,  to  win  her 
favor,  reveals  the  secret  that  is  in  the  air. 
That  evening  she  dines  with  a  young  jour- 
nalist whom  she  naturally  (and  necessarily 
for  the  purpose  of  the  plot)  much  prefers, 
and  to  prove  her  devotion  she  tells  him  what 
her  elder  suitor  has  revealed.  Threadbare 
119 


PEACEMAKERS 

as  the  formula  is,  it  was  honored  the  week 
that  the  treaty  was  coming  out  of  the  fog 
by  at  least  one  important  newspaper. 

Mr.  Hughes  seems  to  have  concluded  by 
the  end  of  Friday,  the  9th,  that  unless  he 
acted  quickly  his  reputation  for  dramatic 
diplomacy  might  be  shaken,  and  so  the 
hasty  summons,  the  thrill  at  the  break- 
fast table,  the  quick  readjustments  of  plans, 
the  rush  to  make  sure  that  your  credentials 
were  all  right  and  your  ticket  waiting  you. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  Conference, 
sun  and  air  were  in  league  with  those  who 
were  staging  it  writh  such  a  sense  of  dra- 
matic values.  Never  was  there  a  morning 
of  lovelier  tenderness  than  that  on  which 
they  carried  the  Unknown  Soldier  to  his 
grave ;  Mr.  Hughes'  big  gun  was  fired  under 
a  perfect  morning  sky — it  was  only  when 
we  came  out  that  things  had  grown  stern 
and  the  clouds  were  dark,  as  if  to  give 
us  a  sense  that  a  serious  thing  had  been  done 
that  morning  and  it  was  well  to  get  down  to 
work,  if  it  was  to  be  made  good. 
120 


DEAMATIC  DIPLOMACY 

The  morning  of  December  10  there  was 
frost  on  all  the  Washington  roof  tops,  the 
sky  was  clear,  there  was  an  air  that  put  a 
spring  in  your  heels  and  it  was  a  joy  to 
hurry  down  with  the  crowd  to  get  your 
ticket;  it  put  you  in  mood  for  something 
exciting,  helped  enormously  the  keen  antici- 
pation that  stirred  the  town. 

The  scene  in  the  Conference  was  what  it 
had  been  at  the  three  previous  open  ses- 
sions: each  delegate  in  his  place,  the  ad- 
visory board  banked  behind  them,  the  boxes 
overflowing  with  ladies,  the  press  in  their 
usual  seats,  the  House  gallery  even  more 
amusing  than  on  the  opening  day.  It  was 
quite  full,  for  somehow  the  House  had  ob- 
tained permission  to  bring  its  family  along, 
and  there  were  many  ladies  sprinkled 
through  the  gallery.  They  made  it  more 
animated  but  not  a  whit  more  dignified  in 
its  behavior. 

And  then,  on  the  tick  of  the  hour,  Mr. 
Hughes  arose.  What  an  orderly  mind!  A 
mind  that  must  know  where  it  is  headed, 
121 


PEACEMAKEKS 

how  it  is  going  to  get  there,  the  exact  point 
it  has  reached  at  the  given  moment!  He 
must  know  himself,  and  he  never  fails,  when 
he  presents  his  case,  to  make  sure  that  you 
know.  Again  and  again  in  his  talks  to  the 
press  he  would  carefully  point  out  to  the 
correspondents  who  were  given  to  jumping 
to  the  future,  running  back  to  the  past, 
wanting  to  know  this  or  that  that  was  not  on 
the  agenda  by  any  stretch  of  the  imagina- 
tion, just  what  "the  muttons"  were  in  this 
particular  Conference.  "The  agenda  is  our 
chart,  here  is  where  we  have  arrived  to- 
day. We  are  moving  in  this  or  that  direc- 
tion. I  shall  have  nothing  to  say  about 
what  we  find  when  we  arrive  until  we  are 
there,  then  you  shall  know  everything." 
That  is,  Mr.  Hughes  did  his  utmost  to  keep 
the  mind  of  press  and  public  concentrated 
on  the  actual  problem  under  his  hand.  He 
started  the  Plenary  Conference  of  December 
10  in  the  same  fashion. 

The  session,  he  said,  was  to  be  devoted  to 
that  part  of  the  agenda  which  concerned 
122 


DRAMATIC  DIPLOMACY 

itself  with  the  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  ques- 
tions. The  committee  charged  with  these 
questions  had  taken  up  first  a  consideration 
of  China;  certain  conclusions  in  regard  to 
China  already  given  out  to  the  public  had 
been  reached.  It  was  the  business  of  the 
full  Conference,  however,  to  assent  to  these 
conclusions.  In  turn,  Mr.  Hughes  reviewed 
them,  and  in  turn  the  Conference  assented 
to  them : 

(1)  The  four  resolutions  which  will  go  down  in 
history  as  the  Boot  resolutions;  they  are,  as  Mr. 
Hughes   pointed   out   eloquently,    a   charter   given 
China  by  the  eight  powers  at  this  Conference,  pro- 
tecting her  sovereignty  and  independence  and  guar- 
anteeing that  no  one  hereafter  shall  Beek  within 
China  special  advantages  at  the  expense  of  the  rights 
of  others. 

(2)  The  agreement  between  powers  not  to  con- 
clude between  themselves  any  treaty  affecting  China 
without  previously  notifying  China  and  giving  her 
an  opportunity  to  participate. 

(3)  A  pledge  given  by  all  the  members  of  the 
Conference  not  to  enter  into  any  treaty  or  under- 
standing either  with  one  another  or  with  any  power 
which  would  infringe  the  principles  laid  down  in 
the  Root  resolutions. 

This  business  done,  Mr.  Hughes  sprang 
the  second  surprise  of  the  day : 

"I  shall  now  ask  Senator  Lodge  to  make  a  com- 
munication to  the  Conference  with  respect  to  a 
123 


PEACEMAKEES 

matter  which  is  not  strictly  within  the  agenda,  but 
which  should  be  made  known  to  the  Conference  at 
this  first  opportunity/7 

It  was  the  treaty  that  had  been  lurking 
so  long  behind  the  fog.  A  simple  enough 
treaty  in  form,  brief,  only  196  words,  but 
how  portentous  for  us,  the  United  States. 
Those  few  words  bind  us  to  Great  Britain, 
the  French  Republic,  the  Empire  of  Japan 
in  a  contract  to  respect  one  another's  rights 
in  relation  to  all  insular  possessions  and 
dominions  in  the  region  of  the  Pacific  Ocean. 
We  agree  to  settle  quarrels,  if  any  there 
should  be,  by  conference,  when  it  cannot  be 
done  by  diplomacy.  We  agree  also  if  the 
rights  of  any  one  of  the  four  associates  are 
threatened  from  the  outside  "to  communi- 
cate with  one  another  fully  and  frankly  as 
to  the  most  efficient  measures  to  be  taken 
jointly  and  separately  to  meet  the  exigen- 
cies of  the  particular  situation.  " 

Article  X  of  the  League  of  Nations!  I 
pinched  myself  to  be  sure  I  was  not  asleep. 
Swift  glances  right  and  left  reassured  me, 

124: 


DEAMATIC  DIPLOMACY 

for  I  could  see  sly  little  smiles — and  some 
looks  of  disgust — on  near-by  faces.  And 
then  I  fixed  my  eyes  on  the  American  dele- 
gation. They  were  taking  it  like  gentle- 
men, though  it  did  seem  to  me  that  Mr. 
Hughes  was  not  sitting  quite  so  straight 
and  looking  quite  so  proud  as  usual.  Article 
X  read  by  Henry  Cabot  Lodge!  Was  the 
dramatist  for  the  Conference  for  the  Limita- 
tion of  Armament  also  a  great  satirist? 
Surely  you  must  search  far  in  American 
history  to  find,  another  iscene  so  full  of 
irony. 

Mr.  Lodge  read  the  treaty  through  in  his 
fine,  clear  voice ;  digested  it  in  a  few  simple 
words;  followed  it  with  a  nice  little  liter- 
ary talk  on  the  romance  that  hangs  over 
the  isles  of  the  Pacific,  which  we  were  pro- 
tecting from  all  future  aggressors;  said 
some  hard  things  about  war,  quite  justified 
—but  I  was  incapacitated  for  appreciating 
his  eloquence,  for  all  I  could  see  was  the 
United  States  climbing  into  the  League  of 
125 


PEACEMAKERS 

Nations  through  the  pantry  window,  while 
Senator  Lodge  held  up  the  sash. 

But  it  was  a  fine  climb  for  the  United 
States! 

In  the  week  thus  opened  there  followed 
more  agreements,  more  settlements, — all 
necessary  to  round  out  the  Four  Power 
Pact.  These  were  presented  to  the  public 
not  in  open  sessions  of  the  Conference  but 
through  the  press  in  what  might  be  called 
private  rehearsals.  Standing  at  one  end  of 
the  long  audience  room,  opening  from  his 
own  office  in  the  State  Department,  a  hun- 
dred or  more  newspaper  folk  of  various  na- 
tionalities, pressing  close  to  him,  Secre- 
tary Hughes  read  on  Monday  afternoon,  De- 
cember 12,  the  text  of  an  arrangement 
with  Japan  concerning  Yap,  an  arrange- 
ment hanging  since  last  June  and  now  set- 
tled and  settled  rightly  by  a  fair  give  and 
take  on  both  sides. 

He  followed  this  by  reading  the  written 
consent  of  the  United  States  to  another 
chunk  of  the  League  of  Nations.    What  it 
126 


DEAMATIC  DIPLOMACY 

amounted  to  was  that  the  United  States 
agreed  to  the  mandate  given  Japan  by  the 
Versailles  Treaty  over  the  islands  in  the 
Pacific  north  of  the  equator,  late  the  prop- 
erty of  Germany.  The  United  States  also 
accepted  all  the  terms  of  the  mandate  as 
laid  down  by  the  League  of  Nations.  Ex- 
cellent terms  they  are,  too.  We  are  even 
to  get  a  copy  of  the  annual  report  of  her 
stewardship  which  Japan,  like  all  other 
League  mandatories,  is  obliged  to  make, 
showing  that  she  is  really  developing  and 
not  exploiting  the  territory  which  she  is 
being  allowed  to  administer.  This  was  a 
good  deal  for  one  day! 

What  did  it  mean?  Why,  most  important 
of  all,  that  the  delegates  of  the  United  States 
had  seen  that  limitation  of  armament  means 
sacrifice.  It  was  unwillingness  to  sacrifice 
that  had  prevented  the  disarmament  pro- 
posed at  Paris. 

England  must  have  her  navy ;  her  security 
required  it. 

127 


PEACEMAKEES 

France  and  Italy  must  have  their  armies ; 
their  security  required  it. 

Each  one  of  the  little  new  nations  that 
one  would  have  supposed  to  have  been  so 
fed  up  on  war  that  they  never  again  would 
have  been  willing  to  spend  a  dollar  on  a 
soldier,  must  have  their  armies ;  their  secur- 
ity required  it. 

Japan  must  have  her  army,  her  navy,  her 
war  loot ;  her  security  required  it. 

That  is,  no  one  of  the  allied  nations  was 
ready  to  make  a  sacrifice  to  carry  out  the 
plank  of  disarmament  they  had  adopted. 
They  insisted  on  applying  the  plank  to  the 
enemy  they  had  beaten,  but  not  to  them- 
selves. This  was  not  in  any  large  degree 
because  of  greed  or  revenge,  it  was  because 
of  fear — fear  of  the  vanquished.  There  was 
utter  lack  of  confidence  in  the  plan  of  peace- 
ful international  cooperation  which  they 
had  written  into  their  program.  Force 
alone  spelt  security  in  their  minds.  They 
had  no  sense  of  safety  in  a  mere  covenant, 
128 


DEAMATIC  DIPLOMACY 

though  all  the  nations  of  the  world  did 
commit  themselves  to  its  provisions. 

It  has  been  our  boast  that  we  alone  asked 
nothing  at  Paris.  But  was  this  true? 
When  it  came  to  working  out  the  code  which 
the  world  had  acclaimed  as  the  true  path 
to  permanent  peace,  we  refused  to  accept 
the  one  point  on  which  all  the  rest  hung; 
that  for  an  association  of  nations  looking 
to  the  continuous  peaceful  handling  of  in- 
ternational difficulties.  Such  an  associa- 
tion we  saw  would  invade  our  isolation  and 
that  isolation  we  have  come  to  believe  to  be 
our  chief  security.  That  is,  in  essence,  the 
United  States  was  no  more  willing  to  make 
a  sacrifice  for  permanent  peace  than  were 
the  distracted  and  disheveled  nations  of 
Europe.  We  and  they  all  held  on  to  the 
particular  device  which  we  had  come  by 
national  experience  to  believe  essential  to 
safety — England  her  navy,  France  her  army, 
Japan  her  army  and  her  navy,  we  our  free- 
dom from  entangling  alliances. 
129 


PEACEMAKERS 

The  Four  Power  Pact  proved  that  we 
were  willing  to  sacrifice  something  of  our 
isolation — just  how  much  the  future  would 
have  to  show.  But  would  we  be  willing  to 
sacrifice  anything  of  our  naval  program? 
There  had  been  rumors  of  changes  asked  by 
both  England  and  Japan.  The  ugliest  ges- 
ture seen  in  Washington  in  the  early  days  of 
the  Conference  had  greeted  these  rumors. 
We  were  not  going  to  tolerate  tampering 
with  the  great  work.  It  must  be  accepted  as 
it  was  laid  down,  and  if  it  was  not,  we  would 
build  the  biggest  navy  on  earth ;  we  had  the 
money ;  moreover  we  would  call  our  foreign 
loans  and  then  we'd  see ! 

Various  rumors  of  objections  to  the  naval 
program,  now  that  it  had  gone  to  the  com- 
mittee for  detailed  examination,  were  said 
to  have  been  made.  There  was  a  disturb- 
ing rumor  that  England  wanted  the  sub- 
marine banished  from  the  navies  of  the 
world,  and  that  we  flatly  refused  to  con- 
sider a  request  which  could  not  but  be  wel- 
130 


DEAMATIC  DIPLOMACY 

come  to  the  mass  of  the  country,  anxious  to 
see  not  only  capital  ships  scrapped,  as  had 
been  proposed  on  the  opening  day,  but  aux- 
iliary craft  of  all  sorts.  The  chief  irrita- 
tion, however,  had  been  over  Japan's  strenu- 
ous objection  to  doing  away  with  the  great- 
est of  her  ships — indeed,  the  greatest  ship 
afloat,  the  Mutsu.  It  was  just  what  we 
might  have  expected  of  Japan ;  her  accepta- 
tion of  the  program  at  the  opening  of  the 
Conference  was  a  pretense.  She  was  going 
to  object  at  every  point.  What  the  public 
was  still  not  realizing  in  regard  to  the 
Mutsu  was  that  to  Japan  it  had  become  a 
tremendous,  almost  sacred,  symbol.  It  was 
a  ship  designed  entirely  by  the  Japanese 
naval  architects,  built  of  materials  prepared 
by  Japanese  workmen,  named  for  a  beloved 
emperor.  The  delegation  feared  to  consent 
to  her  destruction.  So  much  national  pride 
had  been  aroused  by  the  great  ship  that  to 
consent  to  her  destruction  might  ruin  the 
whole  naval  program  with  Japan. 
131 


PEACEMAKERS 

It  was  hard  for  Americans  to  understand 
any  such  feeling  as  this.  We  have  little  or 
no  sentiment  about  any  ship,  big  or  little. 
They  mean  nothing  to  us  but  taxes.  We 
don't  depend  upon  battleships  for  safety  as 
an  island  nation  does.  There  is  Japan, 
a  little  land  all  told,  Formosa  and  Korea 
included,  not  as  large  as  the  state  of  Texas, 
with  a  sea  front  of  over  18,000  miles.  Ships 
mean  food,  contacts,  security  to  her.  When 
we  asked  her  to  sacrifice  them  we  must 
remember  that  we  were  asking  much  more 
of  her  than  we  were  of  ourselves  though  our 
ratio  might  have  been  larger.  We  must  re- 
member the  world  is  not  ruled  simply  by 
tons  of  material.  Symbols  weigh  more  with 
nations  than  tonnage.  We  could  give  up 
our  ships  without  a  sigh;  but  when  Japan 
scrapped  hers,  something  of  her  heart  went 
with  the  scrapping. 

So  far  as  the  Mutsu  was  concerned,  the 
answer  came  three  days  after  the  agree- 
ment over  Yap  and  the  Caroline  Islands  had 
132 


DRAMATIC  DIPLOMACY 

been  made  public.  On  the  15th  of  December, 
at  six  o'clock  in  the  evening,  Mr.  Hughes 
staged  one  of  his  private  rehearsals  for  the 
press.  It  was  the  decision  as  to  the  capital- 
ship  ratio  which  had  been  so  long  expected 
and  which  had  been  settled  on  the  basis  that 
had  been  proposed  on  November  12 — 5-5-3. 
But,  while  the  ratio  had  been  kept,  the  de- 
tails had  been  changed.  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States  had  had  the  good  will 
and  the  wisdom  to  recognize  that  Japan's 
feeling  about  the  Mutsu  was  genuine. 

One  has  only  to  read  the  revised  agree- 
ment to  understand  what  pains  the  two 
countries  took  to  readjust  the  calculations 
of  the  United  States  in  such  a  way  that  the 
desired  ratio  would  be  preserved  and 
Japan's  pride  and  sentiment  saved.  When 
nations  come  to  the  point  that  they  are  will- 
ing to  try  to  understand  and  to  consider 
one  another's  feelings  as  well  as  one  an- 
other's force,  there  is  some  hope  for  the 
peace  of  the  world. 

133 


PEACEMAKERS 

There  was  no  gainsaying  the  fact  that  the 
great  triumph  of  this  dramatic  week  was 
Japan's.  It  was  a  legitimate  triumph,  hon- 
estly won.  She  understood  what  she  gained. 
As  the  session  of  December  10  broke  up,  one 
of  the  ablest  members  of  her  delegation — a 
bitter  critic  of  what  had  been  doing — came 
out  from  the  Conference  hall  with  tears  in 
his  eyes,  though  they  do  say  that  no  Japa- 
nese knows  how  to  shed  tears.  "It  is  the 
greatest  day  in  the  history  of  the  new 
world,"  he  said.  And  that  was  true, — if 
Japan  would  now  be  as  generous  toward 
the  rights  and  aspirations  of  her  great 
neighbor  China  as  she  had  been  tenacious 
of  her  own  safety  and  dignity.  The  world 
had  recognized  her  power  and  her  diplo- 
matic skill.  Would  she  now  win  its  confi- 
dence in  her  moral  integrity? 

But  if  December  10  was  the  beginning  of 
Japan's  week  of  triumph,  it  was  Mr.  Bal- 
four's  day.  He  made  a  little  speech  which 
will  stick  long  in  the  minds  of  those  who 
heard  it. 

134 


DRAMATIC  DIPLOMACY 

"It  so  happens,"  said  Mr.  Balfour,  "that 
I  was  at  the  head  of  the  British  administra- 
tion which  twenty  years  ago  brought  the 
great  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  into  exist- 
ence. It  so  happens  that  I  was  at  the  head 
of  the  British  Administration  which  brought 
into  existence  an  entente  between  the  British 
Empire  and  France,  and  through  all  my  life 
I  have  been  a  constant,  ardent  and  persist- 
ent advocate  of  intimate  and  friendly  re- 
lations between  the  two  great  branches  of 
the  English-speaking  race. 

"You  may  we1!  conceive,  therefore,  how 
deep  is  my  satisfaction  when  I  see  all  these 
four  powers  putting  their  signatures  to  a 
treaty  which  I  believe  will  for  all  time  in- 
sure perfect  harmony  of  cooperation  be- 
tween them  in  the  great  region  with  which 
the  treaty  deals." 

That  little  speech  gave  one  a  clearer  sense 
of  what  through  all  these  years  Arthur  Bal- 
four has  been  doing  than  anything  that 
ever  has  before  come  to  me.  There  is  some- 
thing supremely  brave  about  a  man  of  such 
135 


PEACEMAKERS 

fine  understanding,  such  humorous  and  dis- 
tinguished cynicism,  standing  by  through 
all  of  the  disillusions,  disgust,  deceptions, 
forced  evil  choices  of  public  life,  never  quit- 
ting  whatever  the  temptation.  For  forty 
years  now  Arthur  Balfour  has  stood  by. 
He  is,  I  believe,  73  years  old.  He  has  never 
had  so  much  reason  in  all  his  long  political 
career  to  believe  that  the  good  will  of  men 
can  be  mobilized  for  the  world's  service. 

It  was  a  great  week,  noble  in  its  under- 
taking, dramatic  in  its  planning,  the  just 
triumph  of  a  people  who  know  what  they 
want  and  are  willing  to  wait  to  get  it.  And 
for  us,  America,  it  was  a  week  of  brave 
deeds.  We  were  coming  to  our  senses,  real- 
izing that  we  are  of  the  world,  and  if  we 
are  to  enjoy  its  fruits,  we  must  bear  our 
share  of  its  burdens ;  that  if  we  would  have 
peace,  the  surest  way  is  to  use  our  strength 
and  our  good  will  to  guarantee  it.  \ 


136 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  MOODS  OF  AN  INTERNATIONAL  CONFER- 
ENCE 

IF  we  are  to  succeed  in  repairing  this  bat- 
tered world  through  the  medium  of  the  In- 
ternational Conference,  then  plainly  it  is 
the  business  of  us  all  to  try  to  understand 
the  methods,  the  conduct  and  particularly 
the  moods  of  this  instrument  of  peace.  It 
is  as  temperamental  as  a  stock  exchange. 
The  Washington  Conference  began  with  a 
period  of  tremendous  exultation.  Mr. 
Hughes'  great  naval  program  lifted  the 
world.  For  ten  days  this  mood  prevailed. 
Then  came  the  French  in  the  person  of  their 
Prime  Minister,  Briand,  and  in  an  hour  he 
had  the  temple  of  peace  rocking  on  its  base. 

It  was  very  interesting  to  see  how  the 
137 


PEACEMAKEKS 

men  who  made  up  the  Conference  went 
steadily  ahead  from  ten  to  six  every  day — 
and  sometimes  longer — in  spite  of  the  ex- 
citement M.  Briand  had  stirred  tip.  It 
was  a  fine  example  of  the  stabilizing  effect 
of  a  daily  task  regularly  followed.  They 
went  on  for  four  weeks  and  then  again 
stirred  the  world  to  enthusiasm  by  their 
Four  Power  Pact ;  their  removal  of  the  Yap 
irritation;  their  consent  to  the  Japanese 
mandate  in  the  Pacific ;  their  acceptance  of 
the  Five-Five-Three  naval  ratio.  At  one 
swoop  the  war  with  Japan  that  a  part  of 
the  American  public  has  so  sedulously  cul- 
tivated for  a  good  term  of  years  was  wiped 
off  the  map — unless  the  United  States  Sen- 
ate prefer  to  restore  it  to  its  position. 

However,  the  naval  program  was  not  a 
fact  accomplished  until  France  and  Italy 
had  consented  to  a  ratio.  That  was  the 
next  step,  and  Mr.  Hughes  seemed  to  have 
turned  to  it  with  the  utmost  confidence — 
1.75  was  the  ratio  he  had  fixed  on  as 
proper;  then  suddenly,  without  any  warn- 
138 


INTERNATIONAL  CONFERENCE 

ing,  the  soaring  stock  of  the  Conference 
dropped  way  below  par.  A  British  jour- 
nalist, with  more  love  of  sensation  than  the 
honor  of  his  profession,  announced  that  the 
French  had  told  th6  naval  committee  that 
France  wanted  to  build  ten  35,000  ton  ships. 
The  effect  of  those  numbers  suddenly  thrown 
on  a  table  where  the  figuring  for  weeks  had 
been  down,  not  up,  was  more  nearly  to  throw 
the  Conference  delegates  off  their  feet  than 
anything  that  had  happened  to  date.  There 
was  no  questioning  their  dismay,  for  while 
Mr.  Balfour  and  Mr.  Hughes  refused,  as  it 
was  proper  for  them  to  do,  to  discuss  the 
matter,  while  the  French  likewise  kept  their 
mouths  shut,  and  complained  that  they  had 
been  betrayed,  Mr.  Hughes  showed  his  ex- 
citement by  a  long  cablegram,  appealing  to 
M.  Briand,  over  the  head  of  the  then  acting 
chief  of  the  French  delegation,  M.  Sarraut. 
Outside  the  Conference  an  excited  world 
declared  the  whole  thing  was  wrecked  and 
that  France  had  wrecked  it. 

Could  this  unhappy  incident  have  been 
139 


PEACEMAKERS 

avoided?  If  the  Conference  had  shown  a 
more  sympathetic  understanding  of  the  way 
France  is  feeling  to-day,  if  there  had  been 
the  realization  which  we  certainly  should 
expect  of  the  effect  of  calling  her  into  a 
gathering  of  this  kind  and  then  letting  her 
Premier  sit  for  a  week  with  practically  no 
attention,  it  probably  would  have  been. 
When  M.  Briand  was  leaving  the  Confer- 
ence on  the  opening  day  an  American  jour- 
nalist asked  him  what  he  thought  of  it.  The 
American  way,  he  said,  "a  la  Am6ricaine." 
And  then  he  went  on  to  remark  that  when 
the  time  came  France  would  do  like  Mr. 
Hughes  and  talk  in  the  American  way. 
Weeks  went  on  and  France  had  no  chance 
to  talk  in  anybody's  way  about  her  naval 
ratio.  Everybody  else  but  herself  seems 
to  have  taken  it  for  granted  that  1.75  was 
to  be  her  proportion.  When  her  turn  finally 
came,  however,  she  began  to  hurl  capital 
ships  at  Mr.  Hughes'  program — ten  of  them, 
35,000  tons  each.  The  figures  looked  ap- 
140 


INTEKNATIONAL  CONFEKENCE 

palling,  preposterous — they  produced,  as  I 
have  said,  almost  a  panic.  Now,  obviously, 
the  panic  would  have  been  avoided,  as  far 
as  the  public  is  concerned,  if  the  matter  had 
been  kept  in  committee  where  it  belonged 
and  where  the  French  intended  to  keep  it. 
Given  to  the  public,  it  stirred  up  anger  on 
both  sides  of  the  water,  whipped  up  sus- 
picion, set  all  the  busybodies  at  inventing 
far-fetched  explanations  and  reading  sin- 
ister meanings  into  the  French  proposal. 

There  was  little  trouble  when  Mr.  Hughes 
appealed  to  M.  Briand  in  getting  the  capi- 
tal-ship ratio  dropped  back  to  the  1.75  first 
suggested.  But  along  with  this  concession 
in  the  matter  of  capital  ships  went  the  de- 
cision that  France  would  not  limit  her  sub- 
marines and  auxiliary  craft.  She  wanted 
unlimited  submarines  for  defense — defense 
against  whom?  It  must  be  us,  said  Eng- 
land. She  wanted  auxiliary  craft  for  the 
protection  of  scattered  colonies.  Here  she 
took  her  position  and  here  she  remained. 
141 


PEACEMAKERS 

Mr.  Hughes'  naval  program  leaves  the  num- 
ber of  submarines  and  light  craft  a  nation 
builds  at  its  discretion.  Too  bad — could  it 
have  been  avoided? 

One  thing  seems  quite  certain,  that  Mr. 
Hughes  missed  a  tremendous  opportunity 
in  not  boldly  declaring  in  his  original  pro- 
gram that  as  for  the  United  States,  it  was 
done  with  submarines.  We  did  that  at 
Paris  in  1919.  The  head  of  our  delegation, 
President  Wilson,  and  his  naval  advisers 
agreed  that  in  the  disarmament  pledged  by 
the  League  of  Nations  the  submarine  was 
one  weapon  which  could  and  should  be  put 
entirely  out  of  existence.  Its  record  of  cow- 
ardice and  plain  murder  no  one  could  de- 
fend. The  treaty  of  Versailles  forbade  the 
Germans  to  construct  submarines  for  any 
purpose,  and  it  certainly  was  the  farthest 
from  the  thought  of  the  majority  of  those 
who  made  that  treaty  that  they  were  lay- 
ing down  one  rule  for  Germany  and  another 
for  themselves.  The  idea  there  was  to  dis- 
arm and  to  begin  with  Germany. 
142 


INTEEFATIONAL  CONFEKEJSTCE 

Why  the  American  delegation  should  not 
have  followed  that  policy  here  in  regard 
to  the  submarine  is  not  clear.  But  when 
it  was  not  done  in  the  opening  program,  it 
is  still  less  understandable  why  they  did  not 
seize  the  British  suggestion  when  it  was 
made  by  Mr.  Balfour.  The  British  had  the 
American  program  for  naval  reduction 
flung  into  their  faces  without  warning,  and 
they  picked  it  up  like  wonderful  sports,  as 
did  the  Japanese.  But  when  Mr.  Balfour 
notified  the  Conference  that  he  should  pro- 
pose complete  abolition  of  the  submarine, 
there  was  no  such  response.  There  were  not 
a  few  of  us  who  had  an  uncomfortable  chill 
over  the  Washington  Conference  when  our 
government  failed  promptly  to  follow  the 
British  in  this  policy,  failed  to  say,  "Yes, 
we  are  with  you,  it's  beastly  business  this 
submarine  warfare — one  thing  we  can  do 
away  with.  We  will  join  you  in  outlawing 
it."  But  this  was  not  done,  and  because  it 
was  not  done,  coupled  with  France's  de- 
termination to  seize  every  chance  that  came 
143 


PEACEMAKERS 

along  to  secure  recognition  for  herself,  to 
enforce  her  argument  that  she  must  be  pre- 
pared to  defend  herself,  since  nobody  in  the 
world  seemed  prepared  to  give  her  the  guar- 
antees which  she  thought  necessary,  if  she 
were  to  disarm,  the  submarine  came  in  to 
trouble  Mr.  Hughes'  program,  and,  inci- 
dentally, to  spoil  the  Conference's  holiday 
week. 

The  regret  was  the  greater  because  the 
arguments  that  Lord  Lee  and  Mr.  Balfour 
had  put  up  for  the  abolition  of  the  sub- 
marine were  so  weighty  and  conclusive  that 
if  they  could  have  been  presented  at  the 
start,  or  at  least  earlier  in  the  negotiations, 
there  seems  to  be  little  doubt  that  they 
would  not  have  won  over  the  Conference. 
These  arguments  have  the  backing  of  Great 
Britain's  experience  with  submarines,  the 
most  serious  and  extensive  experience  that 
any  nation  has  yet  had  with  this  particular 
weapon.  Lord  Lee  and  Mr.  Balfour  had 
the  facts  to  show  that  the  German  sub- 
144 


INTEKNATIONAL  CONFEHENCE 

marine  fleet  was  able  to  accomplish  rela- 
tively little  in  the  Great  War  in  the  way  of 
legitimate  naval  warfare.  It  left  the  Brit- 
ish Grand  Fleet  untouched.  In  spite  of  all 
its  efforts,  it  did  not  prevent  the  British  tak- 
ing fifteen  million  troops  across  the  English 
Channel,  and  the  Americans  two  million 
across  the  Atlantic.  It  was  of  little  use  to 
the  British  in  guarding  their  coast  line, 
which,  as  Lord  Lee  pointed  out,  was  almost 
as  great  as  the  combined  coast  line  of  the 
four  other  powers  in  the  discussion.  What 
the  German  submarine  fleet  did  do,  how- 
ever, was  to  destroy  some  twelve  million 
tons  of  mercantile  shipping*  and  murder 
twenty  thousand  non-combatants — men, 
women  and  children.  The  counter  defense 
against  the  submarine  has  been  so  devel- 
oped, Lord  Lee  claimed,  that  an  attacking 
fleet  could  be  equipped  to  resist  any  number 
of  them.  That  is,  the  methods  of  detecting, 
locating  and  destroying  submarines  have 
greatly  outstripped  their  offensive  power. 
145 


PEACEMAKERS 

One  of  the  strong  arguments  for  the  aboli- 
tion of  the  submarine  is  the  fact  that  it  is 
possible  to  abolish  it  by  general  consent. 
Its  case  is  very  different  from  that  of  poison 
gas,  which  is  a  by-product  of  essential  in- 
dustries. You  do  not  need  to  set  out  to  find 
poison  gasses;  they  come  to  you  in  the  nat- 
ural course  of  chemical  research,  and  they 
do  not  have  to  be  manufactured  until  you 
are  forced  to  do  it  for  defense.  Moreover, 
they  have  the  enormous  advantage  of  not 
looking  like  war.  They  are  disgusting,  hate- 
ful things  against  which  man  instinctively 
revolts.  They  do  not  tempt  the  adventur- 
ous, as  the  submarine  does. 

Although  the  French  particularly, 
through  Admiral  le  Bon  and  M.  Sarraut, 
did  their  utmost  to  combat  the  British  posi- 
tion, their  arguments  had  little  weight  in 
comparison  with  the  British.  The  entire 
discussion  which  ran  more  than  a  week  and 
which  was  given  out  day  by  day  practically 
in  full  to  the  press  only  emphasized  my  feel- 
146 


INTERNATIONAL  CONFERENCE 

ing  that  the  French,  in  insisting  on  a  fleet 
of  submarines  all  out  of  proportion  to  that 
contemplated  in  the  original  American  pro- 
gram, were  actuated  more  by  a  desire  to 
assert  themselves  in  this  council  of  nations, 
to  demonstrate  that  it  is  not  safe  to  over- 
look their  susceptibilities,  than  from  any 
desire  to  have  submarines  for  defense.  If 
the  representatives  of  the  United  States  are 
to  work  successfully  with  other  nations  in 
international  conferences,  they  must  learn 
that  diplomats  can  no  more  afford  to  over- 
look the  feelings  of  other  nations  than  an 
engineer  can  afford  to  overlook  the  suscepti- 
bilities of  the  iron  and  steel  which  he  em- 
ploys. France's  acute  sensitiveness,  her 
black  imaginations,  may  irritate  Americans 
who  know  nothing  of  invaded  and  devas- 
tated territory,  who  have  not  had  to  sit 
through  five  long  years  with  the  sound  of 
bursting  shells  continually  in  their  ears; 
but  if  they  have  not  the  imagination  and 
the  sympathy  to  tell  them  what  the  results 
147 


PEACEMAKERS 

of  such  an  experience  are,  then  let  them 
accept  the  judgment  of  physicians  and 
realize  that  in  whatever  negotiations  they 
have  with  the  French  people  at  this  time, 
their  shell-shocked  minds  and  souls  must  be 
taken  into  account. 

Mr.  Hughes  lost  a  second  great  oppor- 
tunity in  the  submarine  matter.  A  few  days 
before  Christmas,  when  it  became  obvious 
that  the  submarine  was  in  danger  of  de- 
stroying the  American  delegation's  plans 
for  a  glorious  Christmas  present  to  the  na- 
tion, Mr.  Balfour  asked  for  an  open  session 
in  which  to  discuss  the  matter.  For  some 
reason  not  at  all  clear,  Mr.  Hughes  did  not 
consent.  Our  Secretary  of  State  proved 
himself  a  superior  dramatist  at  the  Confer- 
ence, but  in  this  instance  a  poor  psycholo- 
gist !  If  there  was  to  be  no  holiday,  as  had 
become  clear,  then  an  open  session  with  a 
chance  to  hear  Mr.  Balfour,  Lord  Lee,  M. 
Sarraut,  Admiral  le  Bon,  Senator  Schanzer, 
in  the  free  discussion  of  a  matter  in  which 
148 


INTERNATIONAL  CONFERENCE 

the  whole  country  was  tremendously  inter- 
ested— such  an  open  session  would  have  been 
a  Christmas  present  in  itself,  and  it  would 
have  done  much  to  have  cleared  up  the  thick 
atmosphere. 

In  these  conferences  the  atmosphere  eas- 
ily becomes  heavy  with  suspicion.  The 
sight  of  a  group  of  eminent  gentlemen  of 
various  nationalities  shutting  themselves 
up  morning  after  morning,  for  hours,  con- 
sidering matters  which  concern  the  peace 
and  happiness  of  the  world,  if  too  long  con- 
tinued, stirs  up  resentment  in  the  best  of 
us.  If  you  are  an  impersonal,  detached, 
philosophical,  fairly  well-informed  person, 
it  is  not  difficult  for  you  to  visualize  what 
those  gentlemen  are  doing;  if  you  take  the 
trouble  you  can  even  build  up  in  your  mind 
what  they  are  saying.  Suppose  it  is  a  ques- 
tion of  the  ratio  of  capital  ships.  You  know 
that  they  are  listening  to  disputes  over  ton- 
nage and  the  way  it  has  been  computed,  are 
studying  long  arrays  of  figures,  matters  dull 
149 


PEACEMAKEES 

in  themselves  and  requiring  the  closest  at- 
tention. Most  of  us  would  not  remain  a 
half  hour,  unless  we  were  compelled  to  when 
such  discussions  were  going  on.  But  if  you 
are  a  suspicious  person,  if  you  have  been 
trained  in  the  cynical  school  of  sensational 
journalism,  to  look  for  mischief  and  intrigue 
— and  often  it  must  be  confessed  finding 
it — you  have  dark  thoughts  about  the 
gentlemen. 

The  only  way  in  which  such  suspicions 
can  be  cleared  up — or  better,  prevented, — 
is  by  frequent  open  sessions  and  much  freer 
discussion  at  those  sessions  than  we  had  at 
the  Conference  for  Limitation  of  Armament. 
Some  of  the  Americans  prominent  in  the 
Conference  have  in  the  last  two  years  fre- 
quently criticized  the  secrecy  with  which 
the  Paris  Conference  was  conducted  but 
there  was  very  little  difference  in  the  proce- 
dure from  that  in  Paris.  The  work  there 
as  here  was  done  in  committees.  There  as 
here  there  were  daily  communications  to  the 
150 


INTEKNATIONAL  CONFEBENCE 

press.  They  were  more  satisfactory  here, 
fuller,  but  that  was  made  possible  by  the 
fact  that  the  situation  here  was  far  less 
complicated  and  by  the  rigor  with  which 
Mr.  Hughes  kept  one  thing  at  a  time  on  the 
table.  As  for  the  press  conferences,  in 
Paris  as  here  they  were  held  daily  by  the 
Americans  and  frequently  by  all  of  the  other 
delegations.  Nobody  in  Paris,  of  course, 
was  so  satisfactory  to  the  press  as  Mr. 
Hughes.  His  candor,  his  good  humor,  his 
out-and-out,  man-to-man  conduct  of  his 
daily  meeting  cannot  be  too  highly  praised. 
He  has  set  a  pace  for  this  sort  of  thing  very 
hard  to  follow.  There  was  no  American  in 
Paris  in  a  position  to  do  for  the  press  what 
Mr.  Hughes  did  in  Washington.  President 
Wilson  had  not  the  time.  The  other  mem- 
bers of  the  delegation  were  not  in  Mr. 
Hughes'  position.  Nobody  else  in  our  dele- 
gation here  would  have  had  the  authority, 
even  if  he  had  had  the  ability,  to  do  what 
Mr.  Hughes  did.  The  difference  here  and  in 
151 


PEACEMAKEES 

Paris  was  mainly  a  difference  of  situation 
— the  difference  between  an  infinitely  diffi- 
cult and  complicated  situation  and  a  com- 
paratively well  defined  and  definite  one. 

Mr.  Hughes  himself  was  partly  respon- 
sible for  the  resentment  that  the  press  felt 
at  the  failure  to  follow  Mr.  Balfour's  sug- 
gestion and  conduct  the  submarine  discus- 
sion in  the  open.  Any  one  who  took  the 
pains  to  read  the  text  of  these  discussions  as 
they  were  printed  in  the  leading  journals  of 
the  country,  can  see  how  well  adapted  they 
were  to  a  public  meeting.  There  was  noth- 
ing in  them  that  would  jeopardize  any  na- 
tion; there  was  much  in  them  that  would 
have  been  illuminated,  its  impression  in- 
tensified, if  it  could  have  been  heard  in- 
stead of  read.  Mr.  Hughes  in  his  talk  of 
these  discussions  to  the  correspondents  was 
actually  tantalizing.  When  he  walked 
briskly  into  his  press  conference  at  the  end 
of  a  long  committee  discussion  and  told  a 
hundred  and  more  men  and  women  gath- 
152 


INTERNATIONAL  CONFERENCE 

ered  around  him  what  an  intellectual  treat 
it  had  been,  of  how  Mr.  Balfour  had  been 
in  his  best  form,  of  how  lively  the  exchange 
had  been  between  French  and  English,  his 
snapping  eyes,  his  appreciative  voice,  his 
glow  of  enthusiasm,  were  actually  antago- 
nizing. He  overlooked  entirely  the  fact  that 
he  was  making  more  than  one  in  the  as- 
sembly say :  Selfish  man,  don't  you  suppose 
that  we  would  have  enjoyed  seeing  and  hear- 
ing Mr.  Balfour  in  his  best  form?  Is  there 
anything  at  this  Conference  that  we  would 
have  liked  so  much,  except  of  course  hear- 
ing you?  Do  you  think  we  are  going  to  be 
satisfied  with  your  promise  that  we  shall 
have  full  reports  of  all  that  was  said? 

I  know  very  well  that  it  is  not  considered 
good  form  to  use  the  words  League  of  Na- 
tions in  connection  with  the  Conference  on 
the  Limitation  of  Armament,  and  no  offense 
is  intended — but  if  one  is  really  interested 
in  trying  to  decide  just  how  much  publicity 
is  wise  in  such  a  conference  as  this,  any  ex- 
153 


PEACEMAKEES 

perience  of  other  similar  bodies  should  be 
considered,  and  after  all  it  cannot  be  denied 
that  the  assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations 
is  a  similar  body  to  this,  the  chief  differ- 
ence being  that  it  includes  some  fifty  na- 
tions instead  of  nine.  At  the  second  meet- 
ing of  the  assembly  of  the  League  last  fall, 
lasting  four  and  a  half  weeks,  there  were  33 
plenary  conferences.  One  cannot  say  that 
the  matters  under  consideration  there  were 
less  delicate  and  dangerous  than  in  Wash- 
ington. They  were  even  more  inflamed  at 
the  moment,  including  such  open  irruptions 
as  the  boundary  dispute  between  Jugo- 
slavia and  Albania. 

It  was  not  only  Mr.  Hughes'  naval  pro- 
gram that  was  seeing  heavy  weather;  the 
Four  Power  Pact  was  in  trouble.  The  Presi- 
dent did  not  agree  with  the  American  dele- 
gation that  the  mainland  of  Japan  was  cov- 
ered by  the  treaty.  For  my  part  I  had 
never  questioned  that  when  this  Four  Power 
Pact  talked  about  insular  dominions  as 
154 


INTERNATIONAL  CONFERENCE 

well  as  insular  possessions  it  meant  what  it 
said,  and  that  Nippon  as  well  as  Australia 
and  New  Zealand  was  included.  Moreover, 
Mr.  Hughes  had  repeatedly  told  the  press 
that  was  the  intention.  There  seems,  how- 
ever, to  have  been  doubts  in  some  minds, 
and  when  finally  twelve  days  after  the  Pact 
itself  was  submitted  and  accepted  by  the 
full  Conference,  an  insistent  journalist  pre- 
sented Mr.  Harding  at  his  biweekly  press 
meeting  with  a  written  question.  (The 
President  was  now  requiring  all  questions 
at  these  gatherings  to  be  submitted  in  writ- 
ing.) He  remarked  in  his  casual  manner, 
"No,  the  Japan  mainland  is  not  included 
in  the  treaty."  To  be  sure  he  took  it  back 
that  night  in  a  public  document,  but  here 
was  food  for  the  trouble  makers — a  disagree- 
ment in  the  cabinet !  All  of  those  who,  while 
loudly  declaring  themselves  advocates  of 
peace,  were  doing  their  utmost  to  belittle 
the  efforts  of  the  responsible,  to  magnify 
differences  in  interpretation,  to  fan  partisan 
155 


PEACEMAKERS 

jealousies,  to  read  in  intrigue  and  deceit  and 
concealment  where  there  was  usually  noth- 
ing worse  than  blundering  or  stupidity,  de- 
clared with  satisfaction  or  despair  that  the 
Conference  was  now  surely  wrecked.  Joined 
to  the  cry  of  anguish  that  was  rising  over 
the  failure  to  limit  the  submarine  and  aux- 
iliary craft,  the  chorus  was  dismal  enough. 

Little  by  little,  however,  events  shut  off 
the  pessimists.  For  instance,  one  of  the 
"intrigues"  that  had  been  brought  to  light 
was  that  Japan  and  France  had  combined 
on  the  submarine  issue,  and  were  lining  up 
in  the  Conference  against  England  and 
America.  But  Japan  destroyed  that  fine 
morsel,  declaring  formally  that  she  felt 
it  would  be  a  misfortune  if  the  Conference 
failed  to  come  to  an  agreement  on  limita- 
tion ;  that  she  supported  the  original  Ameri- 
can proposal  of  November  12  in  regard  to 
auxiliary  craft  and  hoped  that  agreement 
would  be  reached  on  that  basis. 

She  followed  this  quieting  information  by 
156 


INTERNATIONAL  CONFERENCE 

an  announcement  that  she  did  not  consider 
it  consistent  with  her  dignity  as  one  of  the 
four  powers  to  accept  any  special  protection, 
and  that  she  therefore  asked  that  the  Four 
Power  treaty  be  t  amended  so  as  to  exclude 
her  mainland. 

Even  the  submarine  became  less  threat- 
ening as  the  discussion  went  on.  If  it  was 
not  to  be  limited  in  number,  it  was  in  field 
of  action — so  far  as  a  rule  of  war  could 
limit.  If  auxiliary  craft  were  to  be  built  ac- 
cording to  the  "needs"  of  each  nation,  their 
tonnage  was  not  to  run  over  10,000  tons 
each  and  their  guns1  were  to  be  but  eight 
inch.  Add  this  to  the  ratio  in  capital  ships 
now  fixed — 5-5-3 — 1.75 — 1.75 — and  to  a  ten 
years'  naval  holiday,  and  you  had  a  solid 
something. 

One  grew  philosophical  again  and  re- 
flected how  childish  it  was  to  suppose  that 
a  Conference  of  this  importance  could  be 
carried  on  without  sharp  differences  of  opin- 
ion, without  those  periods  which  we  call 
157 


PEACEMAKEES 

"deadlocks,"  without  the  flaring  up  at  times 
of  century-old  feuds,  such  as  that  between 
Great  Britain  and  France.  All  of  these 
things,  we  told  ourselves,  were  part  of  the 
problem  of  working  out  new  understand- 
ings, and  to  overemphasize  them  or  will- 
fully to  exploit  them  in  order  to  increase 
ill  will  and  obstruct  a  progress  which  was 
necessarily  slow  and  difficult,  was  work  fit 
only  for  the  irresponsible  and  the  malicious. 
The  naval  program  was  certain  of  adop- 
tion. There  were  details  still  unsettled,  but 
it  seemed  safe  to  assume  that  if  the  patience 
and  good  will  of  the  delegates  stood  the 
strain,  these  details  would  be  satisfactorily 
arranged;  but,  as  from  the  start,  the  final 
success  of  the  Conference  depended  upon 
removing  the  fears  that  England,  Japan  and 
the  United  States  had  of  one  another,  of 
our  securing  reasonable  assurance  that  our 
policies  of  the  open  door  in  China  and  of 
moral  trusteeship  for  Kussia  and  China 
were  adopted.  We  had  proposed  a  pact  and 
158 


INTERNATIONAL  CONFERENCE 

it  had  been  accepted;  principles  regarding 
China  and  they  had  been  accepted ;  but  this 
was  by  no  means  all  of  the  Far  Eastern 
problem.  By  Christmas  we  were  at  the 
heart  of  it — the  hostile  relations  of  China 
and  Japan,  and  whether  it  was  possible 
to  help  them  to  peacefully  adjust  these 
relations. 


159 


CHAPTER  IX 

PUT  YOURSELF  IN  THEIR  PLACES 

A  SHREWD,  reflective  and  cynical  doorman 
with  whom  I  sometimes  discussed  affairs  of 
state  in  Washington,  confided  to  me  on  one 
of  the  busy  days  just  before  the  opening 
of  the  Conference  on  the  Limitation  of 
Armament  that  in  his  judgment  there  was 
a  peck  of  trouble  about  to  be  turned  loose 
on  the  American  Government. 

"Take  them  Japs  and  Chinamen/'  he  said, 
"they're  coming  with  bags  of  problems,  and 
they're  going  to  dump  them  on  us  to  sort 
and  solve!  And  to  think  we  brought  it  on 
ourselves  I" 

There  were  people  nearer  to  the  admin- 
istration than  this  anxious  observer  who 
said  the  same  thing.  "The  Far  East  is  a 
160 


PUT   YOURSELF  IN  THEIR   PLACES 

veritable  Pandora's  box,  and  why  did  we 
open  it?" 

I  don't  remember  ever  to  have  seen  in 
Washington,  even  in  war  times,  so  many  re- 
sponsible people  who  gave  me  the  impres- 
sion of  wanting  to  hold  their  heads  to  keep 
them  from  splitting. 

Of  one  thing  there  was  no  doubt — if  the 
troubles  that  were  to  be  loosed  on  the 
Conference  were  as  serious  as  these  serious 
observers  feared,  it  was  better  that  they 
be  out  than  in  the  box,  for  they  were  of  a 
nature  that,  confined,  would  be  sure  to  ex- 
plode, but  give  them  time  and  they  might 
dissolve  under  the  healing  touch  of  light, 
sun  and  air. 

But  why  were  there  people  close  to  things 
in  Washington  aghast  at  the  program  of  the 
Conference,  people  who  two  months  before 
had  looked  forward  to  it  with  confidence  and 
even  exultation?  No  doubt  this  was  ex- 
plained partly  by  the  realization  that  cut- 
ting down  armaments  did  not  necessarily 
161 


PEACEMAKERS 

mean  long-continued  peace ;  that  there  must 
be  settlements.  When  they  looked  over  the 
problems  to  be  settled,  attempted  to  put 
themselves  in  the  place  of  the  people  con- 
cerned, find  solutions  through  agreements 
which  did  not  require  force  behind  them, 
they  were  appalled  at  the  difficulties  in  the 
way. 

Put  the  problems  which  disturbed  them 
into  their  simplest  terms : — Japan  could  not 
get  enough  food  on  her  six  big  and  her  600 
little  islands  for  her  60,000,000  people.  She 
was  spilling  over  into  China  and  its  de- 
pendencies— not  merely  as  a  settler,  content 
to  till  the  soil,  to  work  the  mines,  to  sell 
in  the  market  place,  but  as  an  aggressive 
conqueror,  aspiring  to  military  and  political 
control  as  well  as  economic  opportunity. 

China — that  is,  Young  China,  the  founder 
of  the  Republic — said  she  would  not  have 
it,  that  she  must  govern  and  administer  her 
own,  and  we,  China's  friend,  were  backing 
the  integrity  she  demanded.  But  Japan  was 
162 


PUT  YOURSELF  IN  THEIR  PLACES 

"in  China" — "in"  as  was  Great  Britain  and 
France.  She  had  an  army  and  navy  to  back 
her  pretensions  and  she  could  very  well  say 
— and  did — "Why  should  Great  Britain  and 
France  be  allowed  to  hold  their  political 
and  military  control  in  Hongkong  and  in 
Tonkin,  raise  and  train  troops,  not  of  their 
own  people  but  of  natives,  collect  taxes, 
run  post  offices,  and  we  be  forbidden?  If 
they  do  these  things,  and  they  do,  why 
should  Japan  not  have  equal  privileges?" 

Young  China  answered  this  pertinent  in- 
quiry: "It  was  Old  China  that  arranged 
those  things.  You  are  dealing  now  with 
a  new  China,  one  that  does  not  intend  to 
barter  its  inheritance,  that  proposes  to  rule 
its  own;  a  China  that  will  no  longer  sub- 
mit to  having  a  carving  knife  applied  to 
its  heart. 

"What  Old  China  did  we  inherited  and 

must  make  the  best  of,  but  it  is  our  duty  to 

see  that  no  nation  on  earth  ever  again  takes 

from  us  what  we  do  not  willingly  give.    You 

163 


PEACEMAKERS 

must  abandon  your  effort  to  direct  our  pol- 
icies, administer  our  railroads,  keep  your 
troops  on  our  soil." 

What  frightened  my  doorkeeper,  who  got 
his  views  from  the  press,  and  the  press  that 
got  its  views  from  a  hundred  conflicting 
sources,  was  how  peacefully  Japan's  right 
to  food  for  her  people  and  China's  right  to 
her  own  were  to  be  squared.  Could  the  one 
inalienable  right  be  fitted  into  the  other  in- 
alienable right  by  other  means  than  force? 
Of  course  there  were  many  places  on  the 
earth  beside  China  where  Japan  might  ex- 
pand, but  search  as  they  would  these  anx- 
ious observers  did  not  find  any  available 
spot  except  in  Asia. 

One  of  the  chief  occupations  of  these 
friends  of  mine  in  Washington  as  the  peace 
conference  opened  was  trying  to  find  some 
territory  from  which  Japan  could  get  her 
food;  something  the  Conference  could 
"give"  her;  something  that  would  satisfy 
her.  As  things  now  are  such  a  search  must 
164 


PUT  YOUBSELF   IN  THEIE   PLACES 

start  with  the  provision  that  there  is  noth- 
ing for  Japan  on  the  Western  Hemisphere. 
Obviously  there  is  no  place  for  her  in  Eu- 
rope. Australia  will  not  have  her ;  we  will 
not  have  her. 

"If  it  were  a  question  of  war  or  restricted 
immigration,"  I  asked  a  Calif  ornian  in  the 
course  of  the  Far  Eastern  discussion,  "which 
would  you  choose?"  The  look  of  surprise 
at  the  question  answered  me — "War."  I 
received  the  same  reply  from  a  Canadian — 
from  an  American  labor  leader — and  they 
were  all  "pacifists" ! 

The  narrower  the  confines  were  drawn 
around  Japan,  the  more  hysterical  observ- 
ers grew  in  their  search,  the  more  they  in- 
sisted the  Conference  must  "give"  Japan 
something.  "Give  it  Eastern  Siberia  !•"  But 
what  right  did  the  Conference  have  to  deal 
with  any  part  of  Siberia?  The  United 
States  had  finally  settled  her  attitude  to 
this  suggestion  by  declaring  that  she  would 
not  consider  any  partitioning  of  Russian 
165 


PEACEMAKERS 

territory.  She  refused  to  countenance  the 
carving  up  of  Russia  as  she  did  the  further 
carving  up  of  China.  She  refused  even  to 
recognize  the  government  that  was  now 
struggling  to  plant  itself  in  Eastern  Si- 
beria. It  was  Russia's  problem  to  take  care 
of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic.  She  must  be 
free,  as  China  must  be  free,  to  work  out  her 
own  destiny. 

Then  "give"  Japan  Manchuria!  She  al- 
ready had  important  recognized  rights  in 
Southern  Manchuria,  rights  that  came  from 
old  wars;  the  territory  borders  on  Korea 
which  Japan  holds  and  governs,  and  un- 
doubtedly the  Conference  would  not  dispute 
her  claim  to  Korea,  since  that  claim  stands 
on  about  the  same  kind  of  a  bottom  as  Eng- 
land's claim  to  Hongkong  and  France's 
to  Tonkin.  It  was  the  fruit  of  the  na- 
tion's dealing  with  Old  China.  This  being 
so  and  Japan  having  her  established  hold 
in  Southern  Manchuria  and  having  made 
a  remarkable  record,  give  her  the  country. 
166 


PUT   YOURSELF  IN  THEIR  PLACES 

But  here  came  Young  China  again. 
"Manchuria  is  ours/'  she  said.  "We  will  not 
recognize  the  rights  that  Japan  claims 
through  her  treaty  made  in  1915.  It 
really  was  a  treaty  with  Old  China,  still 
alive  in  our  Republic.  It  was  wrested, from 
us  by  cunning  and  bribery.  There  are 
twenty  million  Chinese  in  Manchuria.  They 
have  made  that  province  grow  more  rapidly 
in  wealth  in  recent  years  than  any  other 
part  of  the  land.  They  are  converting  the 
wilderness,  raising  such  a  crop  of  soy  beans 
as  no  other  part  of  the  earth  has  ever  seen. 
We  propose  to  stand  by  our  people.  We 
cannot  give  Manchuria  to  Japan,  nor  can 
we  give  her  Mongolia.  Here,  too,  our  peo- 
ple are  good,  patient,  hardy  settlers,  peace- 
fully converting  the  wilderness.  True, 
there  are  great  tracts  still  untouched,  but 
remember  that  we  have  surplus  millions, 
and  it  is  here  that  we  expect  them  to 
expand." 

What  set  my  doorman  and  many  serious 
167 


PEACEMAKEES 

onlookers  to  holding  their  heads  was  that 
they  could  not  find  a  place  to  put  Japan; 
that  is,  a  place  to  which  she  would  not  have 
to  fight  her  way. 

But  what  are  they  doing  in  the  search  of 
the  earth  for  something  to  "give"  her?  Was 
it  anything  but  following  the  old  formula 
that  has  always  gone  with  wars?  Was  war 
anything  but  a  necessary  corollary  to  this 
way  of  dealing  with  the  earth's  surface? 
No  nation  or  group  of  nations  ever  has  or 
will  give  away  without  its  consent  the  prop- 
erty of  another  nation  without  sowing 
trouble  for  the  future. 

Races  must  settle  their  own  destinies. 
Japan  must  settle  her  food  problem  by  war 
or  by  peace,  and  whether  it  was  to  be  by 
the  one  or  by  the  other  depended  largely 
upon  Young  China.  What  did  Young 
China  think  about  it?  Not  a  hasty,  violent 
Young  China,  expecting  to  convert  its  great 
masses  in  an  hour  to  the  Republican  form 
of  government  that  came  into  being  ten 
168 


PUT   YOURSELF  IN  THEIR  PLACES 

years  ago,  but  a  moderate  Young  China,  that 
has  stayed  at  home,  that  knows  its  people, 
that  is  conscious  of  the  length  of  time,  the 
patience,  the  sacrifices,  the  pain  that  adapt- 
ing the  mind  of  China  to  a  new  order 
requires. 

What  did  this  moderate  Young  China 
think  about  the  relation  of  Japan  to  itself? 
I  looked  him  up  and  asked. 

He  made  it  quite  clear  that  the  Eepublic 
had  come  to  stay.  He  did  not  attempt  to 
minimize  its  difficulties.  He  did  claim,  how- 
ever, that  whatever  the  surface  indications, 
the  whole  Yangtze  Valley,  which  is  the  very 
heart  of  the  country,  is  committed  to  the 
Republic,  and  is  cooperating  with  it.  He 
gave  a  hundred  indications  of  how  from  this 
great  central  artery  running  east  and  west 
democratic  influences  are  surely  and 
steadily  spreading  north  and  south.  He 
showed  how  in  the  northern  provinces  the 
progress  was  slowest,  most  difficult,  because 
here  conservatism  was  strongest,  most  cor- 
169 


PEACEMAKEES 

nipt.  He  pointed  out  how  Old  China  is  con- 
centrating in  the  Peking  government  all  its 
cunning,  its  wisdom,  its  appeal  to  the  old 
thing,  but  he  claimed,  and  unquestionably 
believed,  that  Young  China  was  going  to 
be  too  much  for  it.  He  went  over  the  south- 
ern provinces  and  showed  how  in  all  of  them, 
except  Canton,  there  was  a  steadily  im- 
proving cooperation  with  the  Peking  gov- 
ernment. 

Moderate  Young  China  thinks  Canton  is 
wrong  in  its  haste.  He  does  not  believe 
that  the  people  can  assimilate  the  new  ideas 
as  rapidly  as  Canton  claims.  He  believes 
that  its  hurry  to  make  over  a  great  coun- 
try is  one  of  the  most  dangerous  factors  in 
the  nation's  present  problem.  To  sustain, 
guard,  and  develop  the  struggling  Peking 
government  is  his  program. 

"We  are  quarreling,  to  be  sure,"  moderate 
Young  China  said,  "but  it  is  our  quarrel. 
We  are  like  brothers  who  have  fallen  to 
beating  one  another — let  a  neighbor  inter- 

iro 


PUT  YOURSELF  IN  THEIR  PLACES 

fere  and  both  turn  on  him.  China  will  turn 
on  any  nation  or  nations  that  attempt  to 
coerce  her.  She  alone  can  work  out  her 
difficulties.  She  can  work  out  best  her  dis- 
putes with  Japan,  and  if  let  alone,  will  do 
so." 

"Of  course/'  continued  Young  China, 
"Japan  must  resign  control  of  Shantung, 
and  particularly  of  the  Shantung  railroad. 
Look  at  the  map  and  you  will  understand 
why.  If  Japan  controls  the  Shantung  rail- 
road she  can  at  any  moment  cut  our  main 
rail  communication  between  Peking  and 
Shanghai,  destroy  the  main  artery  of  our 
circulatory  system.  She  can  do  more  than 
that.  By  that  control  she  will  be  able  to 
cut  off  the  two  arteries  across  the  mainland, 
the  Yellow  Eiver  and  the  Yangtze.  No  gov- 
ernment in  its  senses  could  permit  that. 

"Nor  can  we  consent  to  her  political  and 

military  control,   either,   in   Shantung   or 

Manchuria.     But  that  does  not  mean,  as 

some  people  pretend,  that  we  want  to  drive 

171 


PEACEMAKEES 

Japan  from  our  country.  No  intelligent 
Chinaman  does.  We  need  the  Japanese 
to  help  us  open  and  develop  our  resources, 
to  buy  our  raw  material;  and  Japan  needs 
our  market  in  which  to  sell.  We  are  will- 
ing she  should  have  the  fullest  economic 
privileges  if  she  will  cease  to  interfere  with 
our  policies  and  will  withdraw  her  troops. 

"If  she  will  cooperate  with  us  on  an  eco- 
nomic basis  purely  and  simply  Young  China 
will  welcome  Japan  and  there  are  liberal 
Japanese  that  will  do  that.  It  is  only  Mili- 
tary Japan,  believing  in  progress  by  force, 
that  threatens  us." 

"How  are  you  going  to  carry  out  your 
program?  How  enforce  it?" 

"The  economic  boycott,"  he  said.  "It  has 
been  successful  so  far.  We'll  neither  buy 
of  Japan  nor  sell  to  her  until  she  gives  up 
her  pretensions." 

There  is  something  tremendous  in  the 
idea  of  that  great  passive  three  hundred  and 
twenty-five  million  or  more,  the  greatest 
172 


PUT  YOURSELF  IN  THEIR  PLACES 

single  market  on  earth,  and  Japan's  natural 
market,  passing  by  on  the  other  side,  leaving 
the  goods  untouched  on  docks  and  ware- 
houses— but  they  do  it.  There  are  children 
of  China  who  will  refuse  a  toy  to-day  if 
told  it  was  made  in  Japan,  will  go  hungry 
rather  than  eat  Japanese  food,  so  they  told 
me,  these  ardent  young  Chinamen. 

"But  if  Japan  insists  on  her  demands, 
turns  her  navy  on  you?"  I  asked. 

"Ah,  then,"  said  trustful  Young  China, 
"our  great  friend  the  United  States  will 
take  a  hand.  She  will  not  permit  Japan  to 
force  us." 

This  confidence  in  America's  friendship 
was  China's  strongest  card  at  the  peace 
table.  For  over  sixty  years  we  have  been 
her  avowed  protector — ever  since  in  1858 
we  signed  the  quaintly  worded  compact: 
"They  (the  United  States  and  China) 
shall  not  insult  or  oppress  each  other  for 
any  trifling  cause  so  as  to  produce  an  es- 
trangement between  them,  and  if  any  other 
173 


PEACEMAKEES 

nation  should  act  unjustly  or  oppressively, 
the  United  States  will  exert  their  good  of- 
fices on  being  informed  of  the  case  to  bring 
about  an  amicable  arrangement  of  the  ques- 
tion, thus  showing  their  friendly  feeling." 

Faith  in  the  protection  of  the  United 
States  has  worked  its  way  far  inland,  to 
the  very  sources  of  the  Yellow  and  the 
Yangtze  rivers.  I  am  told  that  many  China- 
men in  those  distant  places  who  never  have 
looked  on  a  white  face  will  point  to  the 
Stars  and  Stripes  and  say  "our  friend." 

According  to  moderate  Young  China's 
view  of  the  case,  the  work  of  the  Conference 
on  the  Limitation  of  Armament  was  to  per- 
suade Japan  that  her  real  economic  prog- 
ress lay  in  giving  up  the  political  and  mili- 
tary privileges  in  China  which  she  believes 
are  fairly  hers,  as  spoils  of  the  late  war,  and 
to  accept  full  opportunities  of  "peaceful 
penetration" — persuade  if  possible,  force  if 
not! 

There  was  no  question  of  where  sympathy 
174 


PUT  YOURSELF  IN  THEIR  PLACES 

lay  at  the  opening  of  the  Conference — it 
was  with  moderate  Young  China.  Sym- 
pathy for  her  and  suspicion  for  Japan — this 
showed  in  a  catlike  watchfulness  of  Japan's 
every  move,  particularly  by  the  newspaper 
correspondents. 

As  a  rule,  newspaper  people  are  instinc- 
tively suspicious.  It  seems  sometimes  to  be 
the  pride  of  the  profession,  and  a  smart 
characterization  of  a  suspicion  has  almost 
the  value  of  a  scoop.  There  was  an  instance 
at  the  opening  of  the  Conference,  just  after 
the  naval  program  was  announced,  when 
Ambassador  Shidehara  fell  ill  of  intestinal 
trouble.  It  had  been  announced  that  Japan 
could  make  no  reply  to  the  naval  program 
until  she  had  communicated  with  Tokyo, 
and  somebody  remarked  brilliantly  that  the 
Baron's  illness  was  probably  a  "conges- 
tion of  the  cables."  As  a  matter  of  fact  it 
turned  out  that  the  poor  Baron  was  se- 
riously ill,  but  the  phrase  stuck. 

At  the  first  press  conference  given  by 
175 


PEACEMAKEES 

Admiral  Baron  Kato  there  was  another 
evidence  of  this  instinct.  An  interpreter 
translated  the  questions  of  the  correspond- 
ent to  the  Admiral  who  replied  in  his  native 
tongue,  a  delightfully  musical  voice;  you 
could  hardly  believe  you  did  not  understand 
him,  so  understandable  did  his  words  sound. 
Once  or  twice  Baron  Kato  did  not  wait  for 
the  interpreter  to  repeat  the  English  ques- 
tion to  him,  but  gave  his  answer  at  once 
in  Japanese.  Instantaneously  there  ran 
around  the  big  circle  of  men  the  signal 
"He  understands  English."  Any  one  who 
has  had  any  experience  with  a  foreign  lan- 
guage knows  that  often  one  does  under- 
stand, but  cannot  speak;  moreover,  one  un- 
derstands when  the  question  is  simple  but 
cannot  follow  it  when  involved.  The  point 
is  simply  here,  that  the  moment  Baron 
Kato  showed  he  understood  any  English, 
the  guards  of  the  men  were  up.  He  was 
a  Jap  and  must  be  watched.  That  is, 
Japan  came  to  the  Washington  Conference 
176 


PUT  YOUKSELF  IN  THEIE  PLACES 

handicapped  by  the  suspicion  of  the  Ameri- 
can press  and  public,  while  China  came 
strong  in  our  good  will. 

Was  there  anything  to  be  said  for  Japan? 
I  had  believed  so  a  long  time,  but  felt  that 
my  impressions  were  treasonable,  so  con- 
trary were  they  to  the  expressed  judgment 
of  practically  all  of  my  liberal  and  radical 
friends — many  of  them  knew  vastly  more 
than  I  did  about  the  Far  East — and  to  the 
feeling  of  the  general  public  as  I  caught  it 
in  the  press  and  in  conversation.  My  trea- 
son consisted  in  thinking  that  although,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  Japan  had  been  doing  a 
variety  of  outrageous  things,  if  you  com- 
pared her  operations  with  those  of  most  of 
us,  there  was  little  reason  to  make  a  scape- 
goat of  her.  I  have  been  impressed  often  in 
the  last  three  years  that  there  were  a  good 
many  people  trying  to  help  China  by  cry- 
ing down  Japan — a  practice  that  has  played 
a  mischievous  part  in  history.  I  felt  that 
we  were  not  giving  Japan  the  fair  deal  we 
177 


PEACEMAKERS 

should,  even  if  we  had  no  other  object  than 
aiding  China.  The  books  I  read,  the  ob- 
servers from  the  Far  East  with  whom  I 
talked,  almost  invariably  were  partisan  in 
their  attack.  They  liked  one  and  did  not 
like  the  other.  Everything  that  one  did 
was  understandable  and  excusable;  every- 
thing that  the  other  did  was  oppressive 
and  inexcusable. 

The  Japanese  had  not  been  long  at  the 
Washington  Conference,  however,  before 
their  stock  began  to  rise.  The  delegation 
was  the  most  diligent,  serious,  modest  body 
at  the  Conference,  and  so  very  grateful  for 
every  kind  word!  The  contrast  between 
the  Chinese  and  Japanese  delegations  was 
striking.  Nothing  more  modernized  in  man- 
ner and  appearance,  democratized  in 
speech,  gathered  in  Washington  than  the 
Chinese.  They  looked,  talked,  acted  like 
the  most  sophisticated  and  delightful  of 
cultivated  Europeans.  They  understood 
and  practiced  every  social  amenity — suave, 
178 


PUT  YOURSELF  IN  THEIR  PLACES 

at  home,  frank,  gay — I  have  never  encoun- 
tered anything  more  socially  superior  than 
some  of  the  young  Chinese.  The  two  dele- 
gations were  perfectly  characterized  by  a 
woman  friend  of  mine  familiar  with  both 
peoples — "The  Chinese  look  down  on  every- 
body; the  Japanese  look  up  to  everybody." 
That  was  the  impression.  But  when  it  came 
to  diplomacy,  the  Chinaman  was  the  aris- 
tocrat begging  favors,  the  Japanese  the 
plebeian  fighting  for  his  rights. 

The  Japanese  seemed  to  have  felt  that 
possibly  there  might  be  some  intent  on  the 
part  of  their  Western  brothers  to  throw 
them  out  of  China  and  go  in  themselves. 
We  cannot  blame  Japan  for  such  a  thought 
if  we  review  her  experience  with  the  West 
in  the  last  twenty-five  years.  She  was 
forced  into  Korea,  after  China  had  agreed 
with  her  to  jointly  suppress  disorders  if 
they  broke  out  and  both  of  them  to  with- 
draw when  there  was  no  longer  need  for 
their  work.  It  was  China's  refusal  to  abide 
179 


PEACEMAKERS 

by  the  treaty  of  1885  that  led  Japan  into 
war  and  that  brought  her,  as  a  result  of 
that  war,  Formosa,  the  Pescadores,  Liao- 
tung,  with  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny.  We  all 
remember — that  is,  those  of  us  living  then — 
how  only  a  few  days  after  the  treaty  with 
China  which  gave  Japan  these  territories 
the  Czar  stepped  in  and  told  Japan  that  he 
would  "give  her  a  new  proof  of  his  sincere 
friendship"  by  taking  over  Liaotung.  There 
was  nothing  for  Japan  to  do  but  accept  the 
offer. 

Pretty  nearly  all  Europe  at  once  pro- 
ceeded, as  everybody  remembers,  to  give 
China  and  Japan  further  "proofs  of  sincere 
friendship.'7  Germany  took  over  Kiaochow ; 
England,  Weihaiwei ;  France,  Kwang  chow- 
wan.  This  is  only  a  little  over  twenty  years 
ago. 

It  was   Kussia's   obvious   effort   to   get 

Japan  out  of  Korea  that  caused  the  Eusso- 

Japanese  war,  a  war  which  amazed  the 

world  by  its  result,  put  Japan  on  the  map, 

180 


PUT   YOURSELF   IN  THEIR   PLACES 

very  possibly  turned  her  head  a  bit.  She 
had  been  studying  the  West,  and  the  re- 
markable thing  about  this  country  which 
we  call  imitative,  in  studying  it  she  had 
learned  not  only  its  power  but  its  weakness. 
She  had  accepted  its  militarism  at  its  full 
face  value,  but  she  had  quickly  put  her  fin- 
ger on  the  weak  spots  in  the  militarism  of 
different  nations.  She  had  seen  how  corrup- 
tion, bribery,  self-indulgence  had  weakened 
the  militarism  of  Kussia;  she  saw  how 
the  half-heartedness  of  France  and  England 
in  war  weakened  them,  how  liberalism  and 
pacifism  undermined  militarism;  she  saw 
how  Germany  had  the  pure  science  and  un- 
divided devotion,  and  she  took  Germany  as 
her  model.  And  then  in  1914  her  great 
chance  came.  She  did  exactly  what  the 
Prussian  would  have  done  if  he  had  been  in 
her  place.  She  joined  the  strong,  her  great 
ally,  England,  against  Germany,  for  Ger- 
many had  possessions  in  China  which  Japan 
coveted.  She  out-Prussianized  Prussia  in 
181 


PEACEMAKEKS 

the  demands  she  made  upon  the  corrupt 
and  unstable  Peking  crowd.  There  is  no 
shadow  of  defense  for  the  twenty-one  de- 
mands, except  the  defense  that  she  was  ap- 
plying the  lessons  that  she  had  learned 
from  Kussia,  from  Germany — lessons  which 
she  had  seen  applied,  in  a  modified  form,  it 
is  true,  but  still  in  a  form  by  England  and 
by  the  United  States  in  the  Philippines. 

I  could  never  forget  all  this  in  Paris. 
Japan  came  to  the  Conference  peace  table 
with  her  treaties — read  them  in  that  inval- 
uable compilation  of  treaties  which  John  Mc- 
Murray  has  made  and  the  Carnegie  Peace 
Foundation  published.  England  there  sets 
down  her  approval;  France  sets  down  her 
approval;  they  promise  the  German  rights 
in  Shantung  to  Japan  when  the  treaty  shall 
be  made;  they  promise  her  the  Caroline 
Islands  and  the  other  island  possessions  of 
Germany  north  of  the  equator.  This  is  all 
written  down  in  the  books,  and  this  was 
what  faced  President  Wilson  when  the  mat- 
183 


PUT   YOURSELF   IN  THEIR  PLACES 

ter  of  Shantung  was  taken  up.  What  were 
England  and  France  to  do?  England  had 
gone  into  a  war  and  we  had  followed  her, 
largely,  so  we  both  claimed,  because  a 
treaty  had  been  regarded  as  a  scrap  of 
paper.  Were  you  now  to  treat  other 
treaties  as  scraps  of  paper? 

Italy  would  not  have  it  so.  She  held 
France  and  England  to  their  war  promises. 
And  when  President  Wilson  balked,  she  left 
the  peace  table. 

One  of  the  things  that  interested  me  most 
in  Paris  was  that  Japan  never  left  the 
peace  table.  She  was  apparently  willing  to 
trade  anything  to  get  that  recognition  of 
racial  equality  denied  her,  so  far  as  one  can 
make  out,  because  she  is  so  able,  not  at  all 
because  she  is  an  inferior.  She  hung  on, 
and  by  the  sheer  strength  of  her  position, 
her  refusal,  whatever  she  got  or  did  not  get 
to  quit  the  game,  came  out  with  a  recogni- 
tion, partial  at  least,  of  what  may  be  cor- 
rectly called  her  nefarious  demands. 
183 


PEACEMAKERS 

And  then  she  found  herself  with  a  whole 
world  jumping  on  her  back.    She  had  played 
the  Western  game  and  the  West  despised 
her.    I  could  not  help  feeling  in  Paris  that 
Japan  must  have  been  bewildered  a  little  by 
the  contradictions  of  the  Occident  she  had 
tried  so  faithfully  to  follow.     She  saw  the 
doctrine  of  force  she  had  accepted  grappling 
with  the  gospel  of  the  brotherhood  of  man. 
There  are  many  who  think  that  the  brother- 
hood got  the  worst  of  it  in  Paris.    That  gos- 
pel was  driven  into  the  world  as  never  be- 
fore there.    More  people  were  committed  to 
it  than  ever  before.     More  people  realized 
that  it  is  a  power  that  you  must  count  with 
in  the  affairs  of  nations  as  well  as  of  indi- 
viduals.   More  people  accepted  it  and  tried 
to  get  together  to  make  it  a  practical  real- 
ity.   Japan  herself  bowed  before  the  power 
of  this  spirit  before  she  left  Paris.     She 
never  gave  up  more  because  of  it  than  she 
felt  she  must,  but  she  gave  up  rather  than 
quit  the  game.    She  was  learning.    She  has 
been  learning  ever  since.     She  has  never 
184 


PUT   YOUKSELF   IN  THEIR   PLACES 

stayed  away  from  any  international  attempt 
to  bring  order  to  the  world.  She  has  had  a 
bevy  of  her  people  at  every  meeting  of  the 
League  of  Nations.  She  has  taken  an  ac- 
tive part  in  the  work  of  all  of  its  commis- 
sions. In  1919  Japan  had  eighty-seven  dele- 
gates at  the  International  Labor  Confer- 
ence held  in  Washington,  and  those  dele- 
gates accepted  the  radical  program  there 
adopted.  Japan  means  to  understand  the 
Occident;  and  she  is  making  the  same  val- 
iant attempt  to  ally  herself  with  the  best  of 
the  Occident  that  before  the  war  she  made 
to  ally  herself  with  the  worst. 

What  we  have  to  remember  is  that  Japan 
is,  like  all  nations  to  a  degree,  a  dual  na- 
tion; there  are  two  Japans — the  one  cling- 
ing to  the  old  militaristic,  autocratic  notion 
of  government,  the  other  struggling  to  un- 
derstand and  realize  the  meaning  of  a 
united,  cooperating  world  in  which  each 
man  and  each  nation  shall  have  a  chance  at 
peaceful,  prosperous  living. 


185 


CHAPTER  X 

CHINA  AT  THE  CONFERENCE 

THE  most  difficult  problems  with  which 
the  Conference  for  the  Limitation  of  Arma- 
ment had  to  deal  were  those  centering  about 
China.  We  wanted  China  to  have  her  own. 
We  wanted  her  to  be  let  alone,  to  run  her 
government  to  suit  herself,  to  be  free  from 
exploitation,  duress,  intrigues.  As  a  people 
we  wanted  this  very  much.  We  came  as 
near  being  sentimental  over  China  as  one 
nation  can  be  over  another.  We  like  the 
Chinese  as  a  people.  We  would  like  to  see 
them  as  sanitary  as  they  are  friendly,  as 
honest  as  they  are  industrious,  as  free  from 
their  own  vices  as  they  are  from  most  of 
ours. 

We  are  more  sentimental  about  them  be- 
186 


CHINA  AT  THE  CONFERENCE 

cause  our  own  dealings  with  them  have 
been  on  the  whole  so  fair.  We  are  proud 
of  the  position  we  have  taken  as  a  nation 
toward  China  and  we  would  like  to  keep  up 
our  record,  justifying  the  Chinese  convic- 
tion that  we  are  a  disinterested  and  reliable 
friend.  Our  dealings  have  been  decent — 
the  policy  of  the  Open  Door,  the  return  of 
a  large  share  of  the  Boxer  indemnity,  the 
protest  that  we  made  in  1915  when  we 
learned  of  the  outrageous  twenty-one  de- 
mands that  Japan  had  forced  from  the 
Peking  government:  we  have  prided  our- 
selves on  these  things,  and  when  at  Paris 
in  1919  President  Wilson  consented  to  the 
transfer  of  the  German  rights  in  Shantung 
to  Japan,  there  was  a  chorus  of  disap- 
proval, and  we  came  to  this  Conference  re- 
solved that  Shantung  should  be  restored  to 
China;  moreover,  that  a  long  list  of  inter- 
ferences with  her  freedom  of  administration 
should  cease.  The  disappointment  came  in 
finding  that  what  China  wanted,  and  we 
187 


PEACEMAKEES 

wanted  her  to  have,  was  much  more  difficult 
to  realize  than  we  had  appreciated,  and  that 
in  a  majority  of  cases,  probably  the  worst 
thing  that  could  happen  would  be  to  have 
her  full  requests  granted. 

The  primary  difficulty  in  China's  getting 
what  she  wanted  was  that  she  has  no  stable 
government,  nothing  upon  which  she  can 
depend  and  with  which  the  nations  can  deal 
with  any  assurance  that  the  engagements 
that  are  entered  into  will  be  faithfully  car- 
ried out.  The  Conference  began  with  an 
exhibit  of  disorganization  in  the  Peking  gov- 
ernment which  was  most  unfortunate — the 
failure  to  pay  a  loan  due  us  at  that  moment. 
Moreover,  it  soon  became  a  matter  of  com- 
mon knowledge  at  the  Conference  that  the 
Peking  government  was  failing  to  meet  all 
sorts  of  financial  obligations  at  home  as 
well  as  abroad,  that  it  was  not  paying  the 
salaries  of  its  officials,  its  school-teachers. 
There  were  delegates  in  Washington  who,  it 
was  claimed,  had  had  no  funds  from  their 
188 


CHINA  AT  THE  CONFERENCE 

government  for  many  months.  A  greater 
part  of  the  moneys  collected  seemed  to  go 
into  the  pockets  of  the  military  chiefs  of 
the  provinces,  whose  leading  occupation 
was  to  make  life  and  property  unsafe  for 
the  rich  and  to  prevent  political  conditions 
becoming  settled. 

All  of  this1  had  an  important  relation  to 
these  demands  that  the  Chinese  delegation 
presented  to  the  Conference.  Take  the  mat- 
ter of  tariff  autonomy — nothing  shows  bet- 
ter China's  position.  She  does  not  and  has 
not  for  many  years  controlled  her  customs. 
They  are  fixed  by  treaty  with  the  powers  and 
collected  by  them.  They  have  been  netting 
her  recently  but  3%  per  cent,  on  her  impor- 
tations. Moreover,  there  have  been  vexatious 
discriminations  and  special  taxes  which 
have  been  both  unfair  and  humiliating. 
China  came  to  the  Conference  begging  for 
freedom  from  all  these  restrictions.  She 
wanted  a  tariff  autonomy  like  other  nations, 
and  on  the  face  of  it  what  more  reasonable 
189 


PEACEMAKEES 

request?  And  yet,  after  a  very  thorough 
inquiry  by  a  sub-committee  of  the  Confer- 
ence, headed  by  Secretary  Underwood,  con- 
trol of  her  tariff  was  denied  her.  To  be 
sure,  some  of  the  worst  of  the  discrimina- 
tions were  cleared  up.  She  was  given  a 
rate  which  would  immediately  raise  her 
revenue  by  some  $17,000,000,  and  the  prom- 
ise of  other  changes  in  the  near  future  which 
would  increase  the  amount  to  something 
like  $156,000,000.  It  looks  small  enough! 
But  why  should  China's  tariffs  remain  in 
the  hands  of  foreigners?  Why  should  she 
not  be  allowed  to  collect  more  than  an 
effective  5  per  cent,  on  her  importations, 
while  her  exportations  to  this  country,  for 
instance,  are  weighted  with  tariffs  all  the 
way  from  20  to  100  per  cent.  ?  Why,  simply 
because  the  committee,  after  a  long  study 
made,  as  it  declares  and  as  there  is  no  rea- 
son to  doubt,  in  a  spirit  of  sympathy  and 
friendliness,  believed  that  tariff  autonomy 
would  be  a  bad  thing  for  China  herself. 
190 


CHINA  AT  THE  CONFERENCE 

When  the  committee  presented  its  report, 
Senator  Underwood  said:  "I  am  sure  this 
sub-committee  and  the  coinmitttee  to  which 
I  am  now  addressing  myself  would  gladly 
do  much  more  for  China  if  conditions  in 
China  were  such  that  the  outside  powers 
felt  they  could  do  so  with  justice  to  China 
herself.  I  do  not  think  there  was  any  doubt 
in  the  minds  of  the  sub-committee  on  this 
question  that,  if  China  at  present  had  the 
unlimited  control  of  levying  taxes  at  the 
customs  house,  in  view  of  the  unsettled  con- 
ditions now  existing  in  China,  it  would 
probably  work  in  the  end  to  China's  detri- 
ment and  to  the  injury  of  the  world." 

So  far  as  tariff  autonomy  was  concerned, 
this  judgment  had  to  be  accepted.  It  did 
not,  however,  answer  the  question  why 
China  should  be  able  to  collect  but  5  per 
cent,  on  the  machinery  we  send  her,  and  we 
collect  35  to  50  per  cent,  on  her  silks.  That 
is,  it  does  not  seem  that  if  the  powers  be- 
lieve that  it  is  for  the  good  of  China  that  her 
191 


r 


PEACEMAKEES 

duties  should  be  kept  at  this  low  rate  they 
would  feel,  as  a  matter  of  fairness,  that  they 
should  grant  reciprocity  and  collect  no  more 
on  her  goods  than  she  is  allowed  to  collect 
on  theirs. 

When  you  come  to  the  question  of  extra- 
territoriality, by  which  is  meant  the  estab- 
lishment and  conduct  of  judicial  courts  by 
foreigners  in  China,  a  humiliating  condition 
that  dates  back  almost  to  the  beginning  of 
her  treaty  relations  with  other  countries, 
you  find  her  own  delegates  asking  no  more 
than  that  the  powers  cooperate  with  China 
in  taking  initial  steps  toward  improving 
and  eventually  abolishing  the  existing 
system. 

There  is  no  real  solution  of  most  of  the 
problems  which  the  Chinese  delegation 
pleaded  so  eloquently  and  persistently  in 
Washington  to  have  solved,  except  the  es- 
tablishment within  the  country  of  a  stable, 
representative  government.  That  is,  if  the 
fine  young  Chinese  that  represented  their 
192 


CHINA  AT  THE  CONFERENCE 

country  want  to  see  their  program  carried 
out,  they  must  go  back  to  China  and  work 
within  the  country  to  secure  order,  educa- 
tion, development  of  their  people  along  mod- 
ern lines.  There  were  too  many  Chinese 
at  the  Washington  Conference  who  had 
spent  the  greater  part  of  their  lives  in  Eu- 
rope and  America  and  who  were  actually 
unfamiliar  with  home  conditions. 

A  stable  Chinese  Republic  depends,  then, 
upon  long,  faithful  efforts  at  reconstruction 
as  well  as  upon  freeing  China  from  foreign 
encroachments.  Not  a  few  people  came  to 
the  Conference  believing  that  the  only  prob- 
lem was  to  expel  the  Japanese  from  Shan- 
tung and  force  her  to  withdraw  her  twenty- 
one  demands.  If  China  had  had  a  strong, 
united  government  in  the  past  there  would 
have  been  no  Japanese  now  in  Shantung, 
and  no  twenty-one  demands.  Shantung  is 
a  spoil  of  war  and  under  the  old  code  by 
which  the  world  has  acquired  power  and 
possessions  "belonged"  to  Japan.  That  is, 
193 


PEACEMAKEES 

her  claim  to  it  was  as  valid  as  the  claim  of 
many  nations,  ourselves  included,  to  cer- 
tain territories  which  we  hold  without  dis- 
pute. Japan  pointed  out  that  she  had  spent 
blood  and  treasure  for  Shantung,  and  this 
is  true.  And  always  when  in  the  past  men 
spent  blood  and  treasure,  the  world  has 
sanctioned  their  performance.  Japan's 
right  to  Shantung  was  questioned  now  be- 
cause of  the  new  code  we  are  trying  to  put 
in  force.  That  is,  men  are  trying  to  prove 
that  it  shall  be  no  longer  by  blood  and 
treasure  that  we  progress,  but  by  good  will, 
fair  dealing,  superior  efficiency  of  mind  and 
hand.  The  practical  question  now  seems  to 
be,  When  is  this  new  code  to  begin  to  op- 
erate? In  1922,  as  Japan  wished,  or  with 
the  first  entrance  of  the  foreigner  into 
China,  as  radical  Chinese  wished?  And  if 
it  is  to  be  adopted,  is  it  to  apply  only  to 
China?  The  code  that  would  sweep  Japan 
entirely  out  of  China  would  also  sweep  us 
out  of  the  Philippines  and  Haiti;  England 
194 


CHINA  AT  THE  CONFERENCE 

out  of  India  and  Egypt.  There  are  strong 
young  nationalist  parties  to-day  in  the 
Philippines  and  in  Haiti,  in  India  and  in 
Egypt,  using  the  same  arguments  that  the 
Chinese  delegation  used  in  Washington, 
that  the  foreigners  shall  go;  and  in  all 
of  these  countries  as  in  China  to-day,  the 
reason  given  by  the  protecting  or  invading 
power,  as  you  choose  to  regard  it,  that  they 
stay,  is  that  their  going  would  be  the  worst 
thing  in  the  world  that  could  happen  to  the 
country. 

In  the  case  of  Shantung  and  the  twenty- 
one  demands,  the  solution  was  going  to  de- 
pend upon  how  far  Japan  realized  that  these 
"valid"  claims  of  hers — that  is,  valid  under 
the  old  code — were  handicaps  and  not  ad- 
vantages to  her.  How  far  she  realized  that 
by  attempting  to  keep  them  in  force  she 
was  going  to  cripple  her  own  real  advance- 
ment in  China,  increase  and  prolong  the 
boycott  of  her  goods,  and  incur  the  ill  will 
of  other  nations,  particularly  of  this  nation. 
195 


PEACEMAKEES 

It  became  clear  early  in  the  Washington 
Conference  that  we  were  not  going  to  help 
China's  case,  or  encourage  Japan  in  gen- 
erous dealing  by  continuing  to  cultivate 
mistrust  and  hatred  of  the  Japanese.  A 
systematic  effort  to  make  one  nation  hate 
another  belongs  to  the  old  way  of  doing 
things.  Indeed,  it  has  been  one  of  the  chief 
methods  by  which  we  have  thought  to  pro- 
gress in  the  world.  You  built  up  distrust, 
dislike,  suspicion,  until  you  had  created  an 
enemy  in  the  minds  of  the  mass  of  the  peo- 
ple so  hateful  that  it  became  an  almost 
religious  duty  to  overthrow  it.  We  have 
had  this  sort  of  thing  going  on  in  this  coun- 
try in  regard  to  Japan  for  years,  a  calcu- 
lated, nation-wide,  extremely  able  effort  to 
make  the  American  people  fear  and  despise 
the  Japanese,  to  bring  them  to  a  point  where 
they  would  gladly,  as  a  relief  to  their  feel- 
ings, undertake  a  war  against  Japan.  I  do 
not  know  that  a  sterner  rebuke  to  the  Ameri- 
can public — the  sterner  because  unconscious 
196 


CHINA  AT  THE  CONFERENCE 

— could  have  been  given  than  the  remarks 
of  Prince  Tokugawa  in  one  of  his  little 
talks  before  he  sailed  for  home.  He  was 
telling  how  surprised  as  well  as  grateful 
the  Japanese  had  been  at  American  hospi- 
tality, "Because,"  he  said,  "when  we  came 
we  feared  that  the  Americans  were  so  hos- 
tile to  us  that  it  might  be  impossible  for  us 
to  go  with  safety  on  the  streets." 

Those  who  know  the  Orient  best  all  agree 
that  its  future  peace,  and  therefore  the  fu- 
ture peace  of  the  world,  depends  largely 
upon  Japan.  She  is  the  one  strong,  stable, 
unified  nation  in  the  East.  She  has,  it  is 
true,  a  powerful  militaristic  party,  but  op- 
posed to  that  is  a  great  liberal  group. 
Prince  Tokugawa,  who  played  so  fine  a  part 
in  his  delegation  during  the  Conference,  is 
a  man  who  has  taken  keen  interest  in  labor 
questions,  education  of  the  people,  the  de- 
velopment of  industry,  and  has  thrown  all 
his  great  interest  against  the  military 
spirit.  It  is  said  by  those  who  know  much 
197 


PBACEMAKEES 

of  Japan's  interior  workings  that  the  Em- 
press herself  is  convinced  that  either  the 
empire  must  have  a  democratic  leadership, 
a  constitutional  monarchy  with  a  responsi- 
ble cabinet,  an  army  and  navy  under  civil 
control,  of  that  it  will  be  overthrown,  and 
that  the  reason  that  the  young  Crown  Prince 
was  sent  on  his  visit  to  England  was  that  he 
might  have  a  look  at  a  democratic  mon- 
archy. There  are  many  Japanese  saying 
openly  in  the  press  and  in  public  assemblies 
that  the  future  of  Japan  depends  upon  an 
entire  change  of  policy,  that  the  hard  deal- 
ings in  Korea,  the  wresting  of  the  twenty- 
one  demands  from  Peking,  the  methods  in 
Shantung  have  all  been  a  mistake,  that 
Japan  must  deny  them,  correct  the  wrongs 
done  under  them  if  she  is  to  have  the  sym- 
pathy and  enjoy  the  cooperation  of  the  out- 
side world.  It  is  most  important  that  the 
people  of  the  United  States  particularly 
should  understand  these  liberal  leanings  in 
Japan,  should  give  them  all  the  support 
within  their  power. 

198 


CHINA  AT  THE  CONFERENCE 

There  was  much  irritation  at  different 
times  in  Washington  because  the  Japanese 
delegation  insisted  on  holding  up  the  march 
of  negotiations  until  it  could  hear  from 
Tokyo,  and  between  Tokyo  and  poor  cable 
connections  the  answers  were  slow  in  com- 
ing. The  delegation  always  insisted  on  wait- 
ing, however,  and  in  this  it  was  wise.  It 
could  go  no  further  safely  than  the  govern- 
ment at  home  would  back  it.  If  it  at- 
tempted to  do  so,  it  would  mean  the  final 
repudiation  of  the  measures  to  which  it  had 
agreed.  Certainly  Americans  should  have 
understood  this.  It  might  take  time  for  the 
Japanese  to  stop  at  every  point  in  the  nego- 
tiations to  consult  their  government,  but  it 
was  a  much  safer  method  in  the  long  run 
than  making  such  haste  that  a  situation 
could  arise  such  as  that  between  our  own 
delegation  and  the  President  of  the  United 
States — the  difference  in  the  interpretation 
of  the  Four  Power  Pact,  a  difference  which 
no  doubt  arose  from  a  failure  to  see  that 
the  busy  President  did  have  in  his  head 
199 


PEACEMAKEES 

just  what  the  meaning  of  the  short  and 
simple  document  really  was.  It  sometimes 
pays  to  make  haste  slowly. 

If  the  Japanese  were  cautious  in  their 
dealings,  haggled  over  details,  were  slow  to 
make  concessions  which  it  was  likely  they 
intended  all  the  time  to  make,  gave  up  noth- 
ing until  they  were  sure  they  would  be 
backed  by  the  home  government,  it  might 
be  exasperating  but  it  was  not  necessarily 
a  proof  of  intrigue  or  of  a  lack  of  sympathy 
with  the  larger  purposes  of  the  Conference. 
In  spite  of  these  methods  so  irritating  to 
people  whose  only  thought  is  to  put  things 
through  in  the  shortest  time  possible, .  the 
Japanese  made  a  better  impression  on  the 
Conference  than  the  Chinese,  for  the  simple 
reason  that  the  one  were  workers,  the  other 
talkers.  More  than  once  in  the  course  of 
the  negotiations  it  was  necessary  to  recall 
the  Chinese's  attention  to  the  fact  that  what 
was  under  discussion  was  not  theories,  but 
conditions.  All  one's  sympathies  were  with 
200 


CHINA  AT  THE  CONFERENCE 

the  talkers,  and  all  one's  practical  sense 
with  the  workers. 

The  nations  in  adopting  the  principles 
that  they  did  in  regard  to  China,  in  insuring 
her  a  protecting  ring  within  which  they 
promise  to  see  that  she  has  the  chance  to 
develop  and  maintain  effective  and  stable 
government,  and  to  give  all  nations  an  equal 
opportunity  of  carrying  on  commerce  and 
industry  with  her,  are  attempting  some- 
thing that  has  never  before  been  done  in 
this  world — they  are  insuring  a  great  weak, 
divided  nation  its  chance.  Never  again 
under  the  protection  adopted,  if  the  prom- 
ises made  are  kept,  can  anybody  chip  off  a 
piece  of  Chinese  territory,  secure  a  mo- 
nopoly of  her  resources;  never  again  can 
there  be  in  China  a  Shantung,  a  Twenty- 
one  demands,  a  Port  Arthur.  The  pacts 
and  principles  adopted  establish  over  China 
that  "moral  trusteeship"  of  which  Mr. 
Hughes  talks.  They  put  upon  all  nations 
agreeing  and  particularly  upon  this  nation 
201 


PEACEMAKEES 

the  obligation  to  see  that  this  moral  trus- 
teeship is  something  more  than  a  phrase. 

Although  the  immediate  results  to  China 
are  not  as  sweeping  and  generous  as  many 
of  her  friends  desire  and  many  believe 
would  have  been  possible  and  wise,  they  are 
substantial.  She  will  control  her  own  post 
offices  beginning  with  January,  1923;  the 
correction  of  the  humiliating  extra-terri- 
toriality  is  being  undertaken ;  foreign  troops 
will  be  withdrawn;  a  beginning  at  least 
toward  tariff  autonomy  has  been  made.  No 
future  concessions  and  agreements  will  be 
made  by  China  to  other  powers  except 
under  an  international  board  of  review,  the 
office  of  which  will  be  to  see  that  no  terms 
unjust  to  China  or  discriminatory  in  the 
favor  of  any  particular  outside  nation  are 
made.  This  leaves  old  commitments  where 
they  are,  but  it  is  fair  to  suppose,  if  the 
board  does  its  duty,  that  any  manifest  injus- 
tice or  flagrant  discrimination  now  existing 
can  and  will  be  eventually  cured. 
202 


CHINA  AT  THE  CONFERENCE 

The  Shantung  question  has  been  settled 
— settled  in  the  way  that  President  Wilson 
believed  at  Paris  that  it  finally  would  be 
settled — by  Japan's  withdrawing.  The  real 
bone  of  contention  between  the  two  coun- 
tries— the  Tsingtau-Tsinanfu  railway — will 
go  back  entirely  to  China  within  a  few 
years — five  at  the  shortest,  fifteen  at  the 
longest — upon  terms  of  payment  and  of 
management  which,  if  painful  to  both  coun- 
tries— Japan  feeling  that  she  is  giving  up 
too  much,  China  that  she  is  getting  too  lit- 
tle— yet  seemed  reasonable  and  the  best 
that  could  be  done  by  the  American  and 
British  delegation. 

With  the  withdrawal  of  Japan  from  Shan- 
tung, will  go  England's  from  Weihaiwei, 
and  probably  a  little  later,  France's  from 
Kwangchow-wan. 

As  for  the  twenty-one  demands,  Japan  so 

thoroughly  realized  the  discredit  they  had 

brought  her  in  the  eyes  of  the  liberal  world 

that  she  began  the  discussion  upon  them  by 

203 


PEACEMAKERS 

voluntarily  withdrawing  one  whole  section, 
that  which  compelled  China  to  employ  Jap- 
anese advisers  in  the  military,  financial 
and  political  departments  of  her  govern- 
ment. She  also  declared  her  intention  to 
give  up  her  preferential  rights  in  Southern 
Manchuria  and  to  open  to  the  international 
consortium  the  railway  loans  in  Manchuria 
and  Mongolia  which  she  has  been  holding  as 
her  exclusive  possession.  This  is  going  a 
long  way  to  clear  up  the  difficulties  under 
the  commitments.  With  this  start  and  with 
intelligent  international  supervision,  it 
ought  to  be  possible  in  a  reasonable  time 
to  free  China  entirely  from  whatever  is  op- 
pressive in  the  twenty-one  demands. 

It  is  a  beginning.  If  Young  China  will 
take  hold  vigorously  now  there  is  reason  to 
believe  that  the  thongs  about  her  feet  will 
in  time  be  cut.  She  has  work,  long,  slow 
work,  before  her,  but  she  is  assured  sym- 
pathy and  protection  in  carrying  it  on.  That 
is  a  vastly  more  important  result  than  to 
204 


CHINA  AT  THE  CONFERENCE 

have  been  granted  all  the  demands  of  her 
eager  young  democrats  and  left  alone  in 
the  world. 

It  is  the  old,  old  story — nations  must 
climb  step  by  step — they  have  no  wings. 


205 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  MEASURE  OF  THE  WASHINGTON 
CONFERENCE 

How  are  we  to  measure  the  Washington 
Conference?  There  are  people  who  think 
it  should  be  by  the  things  that  it  did  not 
undertake  to  do.  The  Conference  was  in- 
dicted in  Washington  in  January  by  a 
league  of  people  of  considerable  ability  who 
declared  that  it  had  not  lessened  the  chance 
of  war  by  a  fraction  of  one  per  cent.  The 
reason  they  gave  for  this  verdict  was  that 
it  had  not  taken  up  the  causes  of  India, 
Korea,  the  Far  Eastern  Republic,  Persia, 
the  Philippines,  Haiti,  the  "Republic  of  Mt. 
Lebanon." 

It  is  certain  that  the  world  is  going  to 
have  no  quiet  until  these  troubled  coun- 
206 


MEASURE  OF  THE  CONFERENCE 

tries  are  satisfied.  But  they  are  not  the 
only  problems  to  be  solved.  Mr.  Hughes 
named  a  considerable  number  on  his 
agenda.  Is  an  international  conference  to 
be  declared  a  farce  because  it  selects  one 
set  of  problems  instead  of  another,  and  be- 
lieves it  more  practical  to  give  exclusive  at- 
tention to  one  side  of  the  globe  than  to  the 
entire  surface?  You  could  not  persuade 
Mr.  Hughes  and  his  colleagues  that  any 
other  policy  than  that  of  one  thing  at  a  time 
would  contribute  a  "fraction  of  one  per 
cent/'  to  the  peace  of  the  earth.  They  be- 
lieve the  block  system  is  the  only  practical 
one  for  setting  the  world  aright.  They  lay 
it  out  something  like  this: 

"Let  us  clean  up  the  Pacific,  then  we  can 
disarm.  Having  disarmed,  we  can  lend  a 
hand  in  the  next  most  distressed  and  trou- 
blesome block — France,  Central  Europe, 
Russia.  Having  helped  set  them  straight, 
one  at  a  time,  then  possibly  we  may  con- 
sider an  association  of  nations — but  not 
207 


PEACEMAKERS 

now."  So  convinced  was  Mr.  Hughes  of 
the  soundness  of  his  system  that  he  threw 
out  one  of  the  chief  subjects  on  his  agenda 
— the  limitation  of  land  armament — when 
he  discovered  he  must  leave  his  block — the 
Pacific — and  pass  into  Europe  if  it  was 
considered. 

The  only  system  a  man  can  successfully 
handle  is  that  in  which  he  has  faith, — the 
only  fair  way  to  judge  what  he  does  is  by 
what  he  undertakes  to  do — not  what  you 
would  like  him  to  undertake.  Measured 
by  the  method  it  adopted  and  the  limita- 
tions it  set  for  itself,  how  does  the  Confer- 
ence come  out? 

I  began  my  observations  on  the  Confer- 
ence with  a  quarrel  with  the  agenda.  Put- 
ting the  problem  of  the  limitation  of  arma- 
ment before  the  settlement  of  the  difficul- 
ties or  threats  of  difficulties  in  the  Pacific, 
which  were  keeping  the  countries  concerned 
in  arms,  looked  illogical.  It  proved  good 
psychology.  The  naval  program  stirred  the 
208 


MEASURE  OF  THE  CONFERENCE 

imagination  of  the  country,  became  at  once 
something  tremendously  desirable — a  real 
move  toward  peace.  When  England  and 
Japan  at  once  agreed  it  became  possible  and 
practical.  If  they  agreed,  why,  then — it 
must  be — the  difficulties  could  be  settled 
which  many  had  doubted.  The  Conference 
thus  at  the  start  gained  what  it  needed  most, 
popular  faith  that  it  meant  to  do  a  con- 
crete, tangible  thing.  The  proposition  that 
England,  the  United  States,  Japan,  France 
and  Italy  should  adopt  a  naval  ratio  of 
5-5-3,  1.75 — 1.25  and  agree  not  to  build 
for  ten  years  was  a  big,  substantial,  stir- 
ring fact.  To  have  them  accept,  as  they  did, 
strengthened  the  faith  of  the  world.  It  was 
the  first  time  big  powers  had  ever  said 
"scrap,"  had  ever  been  actually  eager  for  a 
naval  holiday. 

The  fact  that  neither  the  submarine  nor 
the  auxiliary  craft  are  to  be  limited  in  ton- 
nage, as  the  original  program  proposed,  if 
disappointing,    still    does    not    upset    the 
209 


PEACEMAKEES 

achievement.  The  submarine  comes  out  of 
the  Conference  unlimited  in  number  but 
crippled  in  its  field  of  action.  Merchant 
ships  are  forbidden  it  on  penalty  of  piracy. 
That  will  not  in  the  thick  of  war  prevent 
merchant  ships  being  destroyed  but  it  will 
take  the  heart  out  of  the  business.  Out- 
lawry helps  if  it  does  not  prohibit.  There  is 
compensation  also  in  the  failure  in  regard 
to  the  tonnage  of  auxiliary  craft,  for  at 
least  their  size  is  limited — to  10,000  tons — 
and  their  guns  to  8  inches,  and  that  is  a 
fairly  satisfactory  substitute  for  the  origi- 
nal proposal. 

In  spite  of  the  changes,  cutting  and  trim- 
ming, the  naval  program  remains  some- 
thing which  the  country  wants,  something 
which  it  feels  to  be  a  blow  at  war  as  wel] 
as  a  relief  to  its  tax  burdens. 

If  the  naval  program  could  stand  on  its 
own  feet,  it  alone  would  make  the  Confer- 
ence a  brilliant  success,  but  it  cannot.  It 
was  no  sooner  raised  to  its  feet  than  its 
makers  had  to  rush  in  with  props.  The 
210 


MEASUEE  OF  THE  CONFEKENCE 

first  was  a  policy  in  regard  to  China.  The 
reason  was  clear  enough.  Unless  the  na- 
tions at  the  Conference  conld  agree  among 
themselves  on  a  method  of  assisting  in  the 
development  of  China  which  would  pre- 
vent any  one  of  them  taking  an  unfair  ad- 
vantage of  the  others,  there  were  sure  to  be 
quarrels  sooner  or  later  and  they  would 
need  their  ships.  Unless  they  could  fix  on 
a  policy  under  which  not  only  they  each  had 
a  fair  chance  but  nations  outside — not  at 
the  Conference,  but  likely  in  the  future  to 
desire  to  invest  in  China — were  not  discrimi- 
nated against,  they  would  need  their  ships. 
They  would  surely  need  them,  too,  one  of 
these  days,  if  they  did  not  satisfy  China  that 
what  they  agreed  upon  was  as  good  for  her 
as  for  them. 

Mr.  Koot  hurried  in  with  his  four  prin- 
ciples. Mr.  Hughes  outlined  his  Nine  Power 
Pact,  which  was  to  assent  to  the  principles 
and  the  practical  applications  of  them  which 
were  to  be  worked  out. 

But  the  naval  program  had  to  have  an- 


PEACEMAKEES 

other  prop  before  it  could  proceed.  It  was 
not  worth  the  paper  it  was  written  on  un- 
less England  and  Japan  agreed  to  it.  They 
agreed  in  principle  at  the  start,  but  in  prac- 
tice they  could  and  would  not  until  they 
were  sure  that  the  nation  that  was  asking 
them  to  disarm  wanted  peace  in  the  Pacific 
badly  enough  to  join  them  in  a  league  to  as- 
sure it  by  cooperation.  Before  they  scrapped 
their  ships  they  wanted  to  know  whether 
their  present  boundaries  and  rights  were  to 
be  respected  by  their  colleagues — whether 
if  one  of  them  suffered  aggression  from  with- 
out the  others  were  to  remain  indifferent  or 
were  willing  to  pledge  at  least  moral  sup- 
port. The  Four  Power  Pact  was  the  prop 
desired.  England,  the  United  States, 
France  and  Japan  agree  in  it  to  face  the  fu- 
ture in  the  Pacific  together.  Pull  out  this 
prop  and  your  program  for  scrapping  ships 
and  a  naval  holiday  falls  flat — as  flat  as 
the  disarmament  of  France  has  fallen  and 
for  the  same  reason.  If  this  Conference  for 
212 


MEASURE  OF  THE  CONFERENCE 

the  Limitation  of  Armament  does  nothing 
more  than  to  make  the  American  public 
understand  better  what  has  been  at  the  bot- 
tom of  the  conduct  of  France  since  the 
Armistice,  it  will  have  been  worth  all  it 
cost. 

France  has  held  up  the  peace  of  Europe, 
delayed  its  reconstruction,  lessened  her  own 
chances  of  reparation,  alienated  her  best 
friends  by  her  persistent  militarism.  Go 
back  to  the  peace  treaty  of  1919  when  dis- 
armament was  one  of  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples adopted  by  the  allied  nations.  From 
the  start  France's  argument  in  regard  to  dis- 
armament was  that  for  her  it  was  impossi- 
ble unless  England  and  the  United  States 
would  guarantee  her  against  aggression 
from  Germany — if  they  would  do  that  she 
would  disarm.  In  order  to  get  disarma- 
ment;, Mr.  Wilson  and  Lloyd  George  agreed 
to  protect  France  against  unprovoked  at- 
tacks. Our  Senate  refused  to  ratify  the 
agreement. 

213 


PEACEMAKERS 

Having  no  guarantees,  France  kept  her 
arms.  Keeping  her  arms,  the  military 
spirit  spread,  the  military  group  grew 
stronger.  How  strong  recent  events  have 
shown. 

One-third  of  the  agenda  of  the  Washing- 
ton Conference — that  in  regard  to  land  dis- 
armament— had  to  be  scrapped  ten  days 
after  the  opening  because  a  reduction  of 
land  armament  still  meant  to  France  a 
guarantee,  the  same  kind  of  a  guarantee  in 
principle  that  a  little  later  we  gave  to 
Japan  in  order  to  make  it  possible  for  her 
to  agree  with  Great  Britain  and  ourselves 
on  the  naval  program.  Perhaps  the  great- 
est achievement  of  the  Conference  on  the 
Limitation  of  Armament  is  its  demonstra- 
tion that  disarmament  means  a  union  of  the 
nations  that  disarm,  that  in  no  other  way, 
the  world  being  what  it  is,  can  it  be  accom- 
plished. 

Along  with  this  demonstration  has  gone 
another,  frequently  repeated,  that  this  union 
214 


MEASURE  OF  THE  CONFERENCE 

to  which  you  are  to  pin  your  faith  instead  of 
ships  and  armies,  if  it  is  to  be  permanent, 
must  be  all  inclusive. 

Again  and  again  the  Conference  ran  up 
against  the  difficulty  that  although  all  the 
nations  represented  in  Washington  might 
make  agreements  to  cut  down  their  capital 
ships,  limit  their  auxiliary  craft  to  10,000 
tons  and  their  guns  to  8  inches,  put  the 
mark  of  pirate  on  a  submarine  that  attacked 
a  merchant  vessel,  forbid  chemical  warfare, 
limit  the  number  of  air-craft  ships — any 
one  or  all  of  these  restrictions  might  over- 
night be  frustrated  by  one  nation  or  a 
group  of  nations  outside  of  the  alliance,  en- 
tering on  an  ambitious  and  aggressive  cam- 
paign of  naval  construction.  That  is,  this 
fine  program  for  the  limitation  of  arma- 
ment— almost  certain  to  be  carried  out  if 
the  Four  Power  Pact  in  regard  to  the  waters 
of  the  Pacific  and  the  Mne  Power  Pact  in 
regard  to  the  protection  of  China  are  rati- 
fied by  the  different  governments — still  may 
215 


PEACEMAKERS 

be  destroyed  overnight  by  some  part  of  the 
world  not  included  in  this  union  for  peace. 
So  obvious  is  this  that  the  naval  pact  in- 
cludes an  agreement  that  in  case  any  one 
of  the  signing  nations  finds  itself  in  a  dan- 
gerous position  in  regard  to  an  aggressive 
neighbor,  it  shall  have  the  right  to  with- 
draw. Every  step  that  has  been  taken  in 
the  Washington  Conference  leads  inevitably 
to  the  conclusion  that  it  is  all  or  none — if 
the  work  is  to  stand. 

The  difficulty  in  the  way  of  most  people 
and  most  nations  accepting  this  conclusion 
is  that  they  do  not  believe  any  such  union 
of  all  nations  practical.  They  cannot  see 
men  of  all  races  working  together,  settling 
only  by  agreement  the  misunderstandings 
that  inevitably  come  up. 

If  the  Conference  on  the  Limitation  of 
Armament  has  demonstrated  the  necessity 
of  world  cooperation  if  we  are  to  have  peace, 
it  has  also  demonstrated  its  practicability. 
Mr.  Hughes  started  off  by  calling  on  the  two 
216 


MEASUEE  OF  THE  CONFEKENCE 

nations  which  the  people  of  this  country 
have  for  a  long  time  regarded  with  the  most 
suspicion — the  two  nations  against  which 
we  have  conducted  a  persistent  campaign  of 
ill  will — England  and  Japan.  Yet  for  three 
months  the  delegations  of  these  two  nations 
worked  with  ours  in  the  utmost  friendliness. 
Again  and  again  I  heard  Mr.  Hughes  de- 
clare that  nobody  could  have  been  more 
cooperative,  as  he  expressed  it,  than  the 
delegates  from  England  and  Japan.  It  was 
obvious  that  those  countries  were  quite  as 
eager  as  ourselves  to  work  out  agreements 
that  would  enable  them  to  declare  a  naval 
holiday.  AJ1  those  initial  suspicions  that 
we  had  of  England  and  Japan  and  that  Eng- 
land and  Japan  had  of  us  did  not  prevent 
the  delegates  of  the  three  countries  from 
coming  to  conclusions  on  matters  on  which 
they  had  differed.  What  it  seems  to  prove 
is  that  you  can  get  peace  by  friendly  nego- 
tiation, that  a  cooperation  of  nations  is  not 
a  dream,  that  it  is  a  reality. 
217 


PEACEMAKEES 

What  more  amazing  and  convincing  proof 
of  this  than  the  fact  that  China  and  Japan 
did,  by  conference,  agree  on  Shantung? 
Who  would  have  believed  it  possible?  What 
made  it  possible  was  the  faith  and  the  wis- 
dom of  Mr.  Hughes  and  Mr.  Balfour,  their 
determination  that  the  Chinese  and  Jap- 
anese should  learn  to  work  together.  "Talk 
it  over"  was  their  instruction.  "The  Shan- 
tung question  can  only  be  settled  peaceably 
by  yourselves."  It  was  one  of  the  wisest, 
one  of  the  most  significant  decisions  of  the 
Washington  Conference.  Day  after  day  the 
Chinese  and  Japanese  held  conversations— 
not  conferences.  They  talked,  they  quar- 
reled. Day  after  day  they  went  home  in 
wrath  and  disgust,  refusing  suggested  com- 
promises, pleading  the  danger  of  losing  their 
heads  if  they  consented.  If  the  Chinese  dele- 
gates offered  Peking  anything  less  than  an 
immediate  and  completely  free  Shantung, 
they  could  never  again  pass  the  border  of 
China.  If  the  Japanese  gave  up  even  what 
218 


MEASUKE  OF  THE  CONFERENCE 

they  had  promised  to  give  up,  their  lives 
would  not  be  worth  a  song  in  Tokyo.  Yet, 
day  by  day,  Japan  was  giving  in  a  little, 
China  becoming  a  little  more  cooperative. 
Mr.  Harding,  Mr.  Huges  and  Mr.  Balfour 
stayed  on  the  outside,  genial  but  determined 
friends — determined  that  these  two  Eastern 
neighbors  should  begin  now  to  settle  their 
disagreements.  More  than  once,  China 
came  to  them :  "Make  Japan  be  good,  great 
friends.  You  know  Shantung  is  ours. 
Make  her  be  good." 

Patience  won  the  day.  It  took  thirty- 
eight  "conversations,"  interminable  cables, 
breaks,  returns,  the  constant  counsel  of 
Mr.  Balfour  and  Mr.  Hughes — "Steady  now, 
steady.  Don't  give  it  up.  You  must  do  it 
yourselves" — to  bring  a  final  agreement  be- 
tween the  two  nations.  But  in  the  end  they 
did  settle  the  Shantung  difficulty.  It  was 
a  tremendous  victory  for  the  new  interna- 
tional method  of  handling  quarrels. 

How  reasonable  it  is  that  it  should  be  so. 
219 


PEACEMAKEES 

It  is  a  direct  attack  on  a  difficulty  not  a 
roundabout  one  by  correspondence  through 
ambassadors.  Face  to  face,  you  examine  the 
basis  of  suspicion.  You  ask,  Is  this  true 
or  not?  Are  you  doing  so-and-so  or  not? 
Do  you  aim  to  do  so-and-so?  Thus  the 
actual  situation,  not  the  imagined  one,  is  ar- 
rived at.  It  becomes  the  actual  property  of 
a  group  of  negotiators  sitting  at  the  same 
table;  and  when  the  actuality  is  before 
them  all,  being  turned  over  and  examined 
by  them  all,  adjustment  is  almost  certain 
if  there  is  good  will.  And  here  you  come  to 
the  crux  of  the  whole  matter — you  get  no 
adjustment  unless  the  negotiators  are  work- 
ing in  a  spirit  of  good  will. 

When  I  first  set  out  to  observe  the  Wash- 
ington Conference  I  looked  up  a  man  un- 
usually wise  and  experienced  in  interna- 
tional affairs,  one  who  for  many  years  has 
been  collecting,  arranging  and  explaining 
the  diplomatic  adventures  of  men  and  of  na- 
tions so  that  each  coming  generation  might 
have,  if  it  would,  the  materials  from  which 
220 


MEASURE  OF  THE  CONFERENCE 

to  find  out  what  men  had  already  done  in 
making  peace  and,  if  it  were  wise  enough, 
why  they  so  often  had  failed.  I  was  in 
search  of  just  the  material  of  which  he  of 
all  men  knew  most.  "What  shall  I  read 
first  ?"  I  asked  him.  His  instant  reply  was, 
"JEsop's  Fables.  That  should  be  the  text- 
book of  the  Conference.  Kead  ^sop,"  he 
said,  "to  see  what  they  can  do,  and  follow 
with  Don  Quixote  to  see  what  they  cannot 
do. 

"But  there  is  one  book  more  important 
than  all  for  the  Conference — the  Gospels. 
But  not  King  James'  version.  That  is  a 
great  and  wonderful  translation,  but  it  has 
done  some  harm  in  the  world  by  not  always 
giving  true  values  to  great  truths.  It  prom- 
ises peace  on  earth  and  good  will  to  men. 
But  that  is  not  what  was  promised.  Peace 
was  promised  to  men  of  good  will.  The  suc- 
cess of  the  Conference  will  depend  upon  the 
degree  to  which  men  of  good  will  are  able 
to  prevail  over  those  of  ill  will." 

This  is  the  way  it  turned  out  in  Washing- 
221 


PEACEMAKERS 

ton.  At  every  stage  it  was  good  will  which 
carried  the  undertaking  forward.  What 
will  happen  now  in  the  various  countries 
to  which  the  pacts  of  the  Conference  go  will 
depend  upon  the  spirit  of  the  peoples  to 
which  they  are  submitted,  whether  it  be 
malicious  or  charitable.  Will  there  be  good 
will  enough  in  Japan  to  make  such  rear- 
rangements of  her  claims  in  China  that 
Chinese  bitterness  and  suspicion  will  be 
removed?  Will  there  be  enough  good  will 
in  China  to  cooperate  when  these  rear- 
rangements are  made?  Will  there  be 
enough  in  the  United  States  to  accept  the 
pledges  of  mutual  support  which  must  be 
made  if  the  nations  concerned  are  to  limit 
their  armaments?  Have  we  enough  faith  in 
men  to  accept  the  only  possible  alternative 
in  the  present  world  to  unlimited  armament, 
and  that  is,  a  union  of  peoples  pledged  to 
face  misunderstandings  at  their  beginning, 
to  separate  them  into  their  elements,  and  to 
bring  all  the  force  of  collective  judgment 
and  intelligence  to  adjustment? 
222 


MEASURE  OF  THE  CONFERENCE 

It  may  be  that  the  United  States  does  not 
yet  sufficiently  understand  that  the  prin- 
ciple of  unionism  which  is  its  strength  is 
a  world  principle,  that  one  primary  cause 
of  wars  in  this  world  is  isolation,  with  its 
necessity  of  being  suspicious,  on  guard, 
ready  to  strike — like  a  rattlesnake.  2Esop 
is  a  guide  here,  with  his  fable  of  the 
bundle  of  sticks — sticks  easy  to  break 
if  separated,  unbreakable  when  bound 
together. 

It  may  be  that  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States  will  refuse  to  back  this  pact  of  good 
will  which  is  just  as  essential  to  carrying 
out  the  program  of  limitation  of  naval  arma- 
ment as  a  guarantee  to  France  against  un- 
provoked aggression  was  two  years  ago  (and 
is  still)  to  European  disarmament.  But, 
refuse  it  or  not,  the  day  will  come — and 
nothing  has  ever  demonstrated  it  more 
clearly  than  the  Washington  Conference, — 
when  we  are  going  to  understand  that  the 
world  can  only  remain  in  peace  through  a 
union  which  is  a  practical  application  of 
223 


PEACEMAKEBS 

the  brotherhood  of  man,  not  a  limited 
brotherhood  of  man,  such  as  Mr.  Wells 
preached  in  his  final  comment  on  the  Arms 
Parley,  but  one  including  all  men. 

Mr.  Wells'  idea  of  a  brotherhood  of  na- 
tions is — or  was! — one  that  includes  not 
every  state  of  the  world  but  "the  peoples 
who  speak  English,  French,  German,  Span- 
ish, Italian  and  Japanese,  with  such  states 
as  Holland  and  Norway  and  Bohemia,  great 
in  quality  if  not  great  in  power — sympa- 
thetic in  training  and  tradition."  He  would 
admit  only  people  of  like  ideals,  exclude 
Kussia,  India,  China.  Could  there  be  a 
surer  way  to  throw  Eussia  and  India  and 
China  into  an  alliance  against  this  so-called 
"Brotherhood  of  Man"?  Is  there  a  surer 
way  to  awaken  an  ambition  for  liberty,  to 
spread  ideals  than  to  share  what  you  have 
with  those  that  seem  to  you — and  yet  never 
in  all  respects  are — backward  nations?  Is 
there  any  brotherhood  of  man  worthy  the 
name  which  does  not  include  all  men? 

224: 


MEASUEE  OF  THE  CONFERENCE 

However  we  may  feel  about  it  as  a  na- 
tion to-day,  though  we  may  ruin  the  present 
program  for  limitation  of  armament  by  re- 
jection of  its  underlying  pacts,  the  day  will 
surely  come  when  we  shall  realize  and  ad- 
mit the  fullest  international  association 
and  cooperation.  It  is  the  one  real  asset 
humanity  has  carried  from  this  war — the 
sense  of  the  oneness  of  the  world,  the  im- 
possibility of  order  and  progress  and  peace 
except  as  each  is  allowed  to  develop  its  in- 
dividuality, in  a  free  continuing  union  of 
all. 

Eventually  the  Washington  Conference 
for  the  Limitation  of  Armament  will  be 
judged  by  what  it  contributes  to  this  union 
of  nations,  exactly  as  all  its  predecessors 
will  be  judged.  The  Washington  Confer- 
ence is  but  one  in  a  long  chain  of  interna- 
tional undertakings  looking  to  peace.  It 
is  built  on  the  experience  of  many  different 
men,  of  many  different  countries,  running 
back  literally  for  centuries.  Its  immediate 
225 


PEACEMAKERS 

predecessor  was  the  Hague  Conferences 
and  tribunal  and  the  Paris  Conference  with 
its  resultant  League  of  Nations.  So  far  the 
League  of  Nations  is  at  once  the  most  ideal- 
istic and  the  most  practical  scheme  men 
have  yet  framed,  the  broadest  in  its  scope 
and  the  most  democratic  in  its  spirit.  It 
may  prove  that  humanity  is  as  yet  too  back- 
ward to  grasp  and  realize  its  intent  and  its 
possibilities.  It  may  make  too  great  a  de- 
mand on  their  faith,  their  charity,  their 
love ;  but  nothing  can  destroy  the  great  fact 
that  it  has  been  undertaken  by  fifty-one 
nations,  that  it  is  alive  and  at  work.  That 
fact  will  stand  as  a  hope  and  a  guide  to  the 
future. 

The  present  Conference  has  boldly  and 
nobly  attempted  to  do  in  a  limited  field 
something  of  what  the  Paris  Conference  at- 
tempted to  do  for  the  whole  world.  The 
limitation  of  armament  it  proposes  rests, 
like  world  disarmament,  on  unionism, 
standing  together.  Unionism  requires 
226 


MEASURE  OF  THE  CONFERENCE 

faith;  have  we  enough  of  it?  It  requires, 
too,  men  of  good  will.  Have  we  enough  of 
them?  In  the  final  analysis,  it  is  with  them 
that  "peace  on  earth"  rests. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed.  ied  below 

Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


ftVK  iu  01 

*. 

•4 

1 

UOAN  DEPT 

.  ._    „  

MAY  17  1978 

' 

J9«MAY03.990 

, 

LD  21A-60- 
(H241slO)476B 


General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


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